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Abstract 
The publication of David Roberts’ Paternalism in Early Victorian England in 1979 has sparked 
some debate as to the extent in which paternalism existed as a solid, definable concept or 
ideology and the degree to which it influenced Victorian politics, society and culture. This 
thesis has attempted to reopen this debate with a fresh perspective on paternalism, in order 
that its importance, on both aristocratic behaviour and the ‘decline and fall’ of the British 
aristocracy in the late nineteenth century, may be reasserted. The thesis also aims to reassert 
the importance of the agricultural depression in providing an atmosphere that encouraged and 
necessitated great change in rural England during this period. This thesis will rely on evidence 
obtained from the estate records of three aristocratic families and will particularly relate to the 
lives of three aristocratic paternalists - namely Henry Chaplin, the second earl of Leicester of 
Holkham and the seventh duke of Devonshire. The central argument of this thesis is that, 
despite the potential for aristocratic paternalism to be flexible to change, the aristocracy 
largely failed to adapt their traditional understanding of their roles and duties in local and 
national politics and society to the new challenges that were facing them. Great weight is 
added to the importance of the agricultural depression in providing the principal circumstance 
that contributed to their decline, by placing them in a ‘sink or swim’ environment. Largely 
speaking, their responses to the agricultural depression often had negative effects on their 
paternalism. It is hoped that this thesis will encourage others to pursue research into 
aristocratic paternalism in the twentieth century or alternatively, industrial paternalism in the 
late nineteenth century. 
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Introduction 
In his momentous two volume report on the state of English agriculture, entitled Rural England 
and published in 1901-02, H. Rider Haggard concluded that ‘the impression left upon my mind 
by my extensive wanderings is that English agriculture seems to be fighting against the mills of 
God. Many circumstances combine to threaten it with ruin, although as yet it is not actually 
ruined.’1 He went on: 
 
Of the three classes connected with the land – the landowner, the tenant farmer, and the 
labourer – I believe that, taking the country through, the owner has suffered most. In many 
counties... there is often nothing at all left for him after the various expenses have been met, 
whereas, if it is in any way encumbered, landed property is a millstone round his neck. In such 
counties the possession of land is becoming, or has already become, a luxury for rich men, to 
whom it is a costly toy or a means of indulging a taste for sport. Than this no state of affairs can 
be more unwholesome or unnatural; the land should support men, not men the land.
2
 
 
 Haggard’s work, while offering explanations at the time, still poses exciting questions 
to those who are interested in British politics, society and economics in the late nineteenth 
century. His topic remains the vocation of modern historians who are still posing questions 
about the agricultural depression. Was the state of English agriculture as poor as Haggard 
claimed? Was there such a thing as the Great Depression in agriculture during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? If so, what were its causes and consequences? 
What affect did this supposed agricultural depression have on the fabric of rural society? More 
particularly, what affect did the agricultural depression have on the landowning class, 
especially the larger landowners and members of the aristocracy and gentry? What were the 
landed elites’ responses to the agricultural depression on their own estates and in national 
politics? What were the ramifications of landowners’ responses to the agricultural depression 
upon their position within the social hierarchy, both locally and nationally? Did the agricultural 
depression mark the beginning of the so called ‘decline and fall’ of the British aristocracy?3 
 Historians, such as P. J. Perry and Richard Perren, have tended to agree that the 
agricultural distress - beginning in the mid 1870s and continuing beyond the turn of the 
century, with short-lived periods of minor prosperity in between - was predominantly caused 
                                                             
1
  H. Rider Haggard, Rural England, Vol. 2, (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1902), p.536 
2  Haggard, Rural England, Vol. 2, p.543 
3  David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, (Pan Books Ltd, London, 1992) 
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by a decline in cereal prices and adverse weather conditions.4 The reduction in cereal prices 
was largely due to competition from the emerging American and German agricultural sectors, 
which were flooding the British market with enormous quantities of grain and thus, by 
undercutting the price of British produce, they necessitated a fall in prices.5 To some degree 
this was ‘masked by a run of bad seasons and poor harvests from 1875, culminating in one of 
the wettest years on record for 1879’.6 The agricultural depression can therefore be said to 
have largely affected arable farmers, predominantly in the south and east of England, while 
pastoral farmers mostly residing in the north and west of England benefitted to a degree from 
the fall in cereal prices, as it resulted in cheaper feed for their livestock. That said, pastoral 
farmers did suffer from disease brought about by adverse weather.7 As Perren claims, 
‘continued wet weather in 1880 and 1881 brought about sheep rot, causing an estimated loss 
of 6 million animals worth a total of £12 million’.8 
While falling prices and adverse weather account for the most important causes of the 
agricultural depression, Perry has highlighted other secondary causes. While legislative action 
in the form of the successive Agricultural Holdings Acts of 1875 and 1883 did occur, the 
government largely failed to respond to the depression in a way that was acceptable to the 
agricultural community, i.e. by introducing protection or reducing taxes.9 Tenant farmers 
regularly blamed high rents for worsening their problems, although it will be argued here that, 
on the whole, landlords actually reduced rents rather generously.10 Perry also claims that the 
restrictions put on tenants by landlords and ‘old issues’ within landlord-tenant relations 
further exacerbated the effects of the depression, however it will be argued here that the 
gradual deterioration of landlord-tenant relations was more of a consequence of agricultural 
depression than a cause.11 
                                                             
4  Richard Perren, Agriculture in Depression, 1870-1940, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), 
pp.7-16, P. J. Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression, 1870-1914, (David & Charles, Newton 
Abbot, 1974), pp.40-66 
5
  Perren, Agriculture in Depression, 1870-1940, pp.7-16, Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression, 
1870-1914, p.54 
6  Perren, Agriculture in Depression, 1870-1940, p.7, Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression, 
1870-1914, p.54 
7  Perren, Agriculture in Depression, 1870-1940, p.7 
8
  Perren, Agriculture in Depression, 1870-1940, p.7 
9
  Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression, 1870-1914, pp.60-62 
10  Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression, 1870-1914, pp.62-63 
11  Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression, 1870-1914, pp.63-64 
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Despite contemporary views at the time and the popular view within the 
historiography, not all historians have agreed that there was such a thing as an ‘agricultural 
depression’ in this period. The leading dissenters have been Gordon Mingay, David Chambers 
and F. M. L. Thompson, who, in highlighting the regionally diverse experience of agriculture in 
this period, have argued that there was ‘“no general depression in English Farming”’.12 
Thompson has claimed that ‘the misfortunes and disasters of some farmers and farming 
sectors were the opportunities of others, that corn-growers suffered but livestock producers 
prospered’ and that the notion of depression was essentially constructed out of the ‘farmers’ 
self-perception’.13 For the purposes of this thesis, which focuses predominantly on large 
estates and their owners in the arable, corn-growing east of England where the signs of 
economic distress were most evident, the depression will be treated as such. It is enough that 
the characters in the narrative here presented believed themselves to be suffering at the 
hands of a depression in agriculture and it is important that it is treated as such because their 
actions in this period were so often influenced by this belief.  
Much comment has already been made upon the consequences of the agricultural 
depression for the landlord, tenant-farmer and labouring classes and upon rural society as a 
whole; therefore only a summary here will be necessary. The agricultural depression put great 
strain on the relationships between tenants and their landlords. As the depression attacked 
their prosperity, tenant class consciousness was increasingly aroused in the late nineteenth 
century and tenant-farmers pushed for greater tenant rights, greater autonomy in decision 
making on their farms and the reduction of rents. Furthermore, as the agricultural depression 
gradually became the established economic environment and many tenants who were unable 
to cope were forced to quit, tenant farming became a less desirable vocation and to a degree 
landlords had to appease their tenants in order to keep their farms occupied. In an article 
concerning Farmers’ organisations in Lancashire in the 1890s, including the Lancashire Tenant 
Farmers Association, Alistair Mutch argues that such organisations were on one level a direct 
response to immediate economic circumstances, since their main demands were rent 
reductions.14 This ‘necessitated the building of organisations independent of landowner 
leadership’.15 Yet on another level ‘the associations were an organisational crystallization of 
                                                             
12  F. M. L. Thompson, ‘An Anatomy of English Agriculture, 1870-1914,’ in Holderness, B. A., and Turner, 
M., (eds.), Land, Labour, and Agriculture, 1700-1920: essays for Gordon Mingay, (Hambledon Press, 
London, 1991), p.211 
13
  F. M. L. Thompson, ‘An Anatomy of English Agriculture, 1870-1914,’ pp.221, 240 
14
  Alistair Mutch, ‘Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Depression in Lancashire, 1890-1900,’ 
Agricultural Historical Review, 31 (1983), p.33 
15  Mutch, ‘Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Depression in Lancashire, 1890-1900,’ p.33 
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farmers’ desire to share in the leadership of rural society, the culmination of deeper shifts in 
that society’.16  
The effect of the depression on the agricultural labouring class was varied. In one 
sense their real wages increased as the price of bread dropped and therefore they afforded for 
themselves more meat and milk in their diet, which further benefitted pastoral farmers. Yet 
many labourers also lost their jobs as their employers attempted to cut costs by using new 
technologies, converting to pastoral farming and leaving fields out of cultivation in line with 
grain prices. Nigel Scotland has demonstrated how significant rural outmigration was at this 
time, with as many as 100,000 leaving rural Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk in this period.17 
The apparent fragmentation of rural society, suggested by Mutch, was perhaps further 
exacerbated by the emergence of the National Agricultural Labourers Union and other 
agricultural trade unions in the 1870s. Pamela Horn argues that landlord and tenant responses 
to trade unionism were varied. While some raised wages and improved conditions, others 
responded by sacking their workforce.18 
What then of the effect of the depression upon the landowner class? David Cannadine 
and F. M. L. Thompson have attributed the agricultural depression as a primary cause of the so 
called ‘decline and fall’ of the British aristocracy and the landed elites.19 As Cannadine claims, 
the ‘collapse in agricultural prices meant that estate rentals fell dramatically, and that land 
values plummeted correspondingly. As a result, the whole territorial basis of patrician 
existence was undermined...[and]... land was no longer the safest or securest form in which to 
hold wealth’.20 However the effects of the depression were worsened when taken alongside 
the many other changes occurring in British politics and society during the late nineteenth 
century. The gradual strengthening of the industrial powerbase at the hands of the weakening 
power of the landed elites had been occurring throughout the century. Political and social 
agitation, which had also been developing throughout the century, was heightened during the 
depression and most obviously demonstrated itself in the widespread demands for extensions 
to the voting franchise. The landed elites were forced to heed such demands and the resultant 
democratization of British politics, particularly the Third Reform Act in 1884-85, signified that 
                                                             
16  Mutch, ‘Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Depression in Lancashire, 1890-1900,’pp.32-33 
17  Nigel Scotland, ‘Methodism and the “Revolt of the Field” in East Anglia, 1872-96,’ Proceedings of the 
Wesley Historical Society, 41.1 (1977),  p.42 
18  Pamela Horn, ‘Landowners and the Agricultural Trade Union Movement of the 1870s,’ Sources for 
Agricultural History,  
19
  Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, p.26, F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed 
Society in the Nineteenth Century, (Routledge, London, 1980), pp.293-326 
20  Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, p.27 
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‘the age of the masses had superseded the age of the classes’.21 Furthermore, ‘in the counties, 
the reform of local government meant that the “rural houses of lords” were swept away. And 
at the centre, the end of laissez-faire, and the rapid growth of government, portended the 
eclipse of patrician-dominated administration.’22 
A fair critique of this argument, particularly with regard to David Cannadine’s work, is 
that it focuses too much upon the upper echelons of the landed elites - those very wealthy and 
landed aristocrats whose experience during this period was not necessarily relevant to all 
members of the landed elites; chiefly those small landowners and members of the gentry 
whose existence was much more common than their grandee counterparts. To a degree, this 
thesis is open to the same criticism, in that it also focuses on large landowners and very 
prominent members of the aristocracy and gentry. However, this is a study of aristocratic 
paternalism and as will hereon be argued, it was in the larger estates that such a traditionalist 
mentality had best been protected until the late nineteenth century. Among smaller 
landowners, who held less power and influence in their localities, it had already begun to 
deteriorate in the years before the 1870s. 
Historians E. H. Hunt and S. J. Pam have turned the question of the agricultural 
depression’s effect on the landowning class almost on its head by asking how the aristocracy 
responded to the depression. They dispute claims by others, such as Avner Offer, that farmers 
and landlords failed to adapt under the depression and made their own situation worse.23 
According to Hunt and Pam, tenant farmers’ cropping was responsive to the fluctuating price 
of cereals and some switched to pastoral farming when the resources were available to 
them.24 They categorise landlords’ responses into ‘managerial’ responses, i.e reducing rents, 
granting rent abatements, maintaining estate investment levels and giving tenants greater 
freedom over cropping by removing obstructive lease requirements; and ‘entrepreneurial’ 
responses, i.e. promoting local economic growth, finding new markets for their tenants’ 
produce, encouraging cooperation, improving estate infrastructure, etc.25 On the whole, Hunt 
and Pam argue that landlords’ managerial responses were impressive. As a result of these 
measures, they agree that landlords shouldered most of the cost of the depression.26 However, 
they criticise landlords for their apparent lack of leadership and entrepreneurship, and for 
                                                             
21  Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, p.26 
22  Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, p.28 
23  E. H. Hunt and S. J. Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression, 1873-96: managerial success, 
entrepreneurial failure?’, Agricultural Historical Review, 50:2 (2002), p.226 
24
  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ pp.226-38 
25  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ pp.238-52 
26  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ pp.238-42 
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failing to recognise that the depression required innovative solutions.27 Landlords, they claim, 
failed to encourage their farmers to meet the increasing demand for fruit, vegetables, eggs, 
poultry, butter, cheese and bacon because of ‘institutional and cultural constraints’.28 
Sue Farrant provides an example of successful landlord entrepreneurship in the lower 
Ouse valley in Sussex. She claims that the Brand family, who at the centre of their Glynde 
estate built a dairy next to the railway station to open up new markets for their tenants’ milk, 
successfully managed to offset the worst effects of the depression in their locality.29 But in 
support of Hunt and Pam’s argument, Farrant claims that such an experience was rare during 
the depression.  
Mark Rothery asserts that those members of the gentry who best survived the 
depression were those who diversified away from land and into investments of a safer non-
agricultural character.30 These were mainly fluid investments, usually in stocks and shares in 
colonial railway, banking and mining companies.31 This had important ramifications both on 
the depression and the role of the landowner in agriculture. As will later be discussed, there 
was some irony in the aristocracy’s investment in foreign infrastructures, as it served to 
heighten the competition British grain growers were facing by enabling the easier 
transportation of foreign grain and hence a reduction in its price. By increasingly relying on 
non-agricultural ventures to supplement their income, the aristocracy and gentry were also 
beginning to lose their zeal for agriculture and became increasingly inattentive to the needs of 
their estates. The traditional ties that had bound them to their land over the many centuries 
were slowly being severed. As will be seen, this had an important effect on paternalism. 
Yet aristocratic responses to the depression were not only economic. At risk was not 
only their wealth, but also their power, status and influence and their position at the top of 
Britain’s social hierarchy. It was in the localities that the aristocracy had first established their 
ascendancy and it was in the localities during the late nineteenth century that it was most 
importantly, but also most subtly, being tested. Paternalism, or the aristocrat’s inherent, 
benevolent sense of duty, had hitherto secured and bolstered his local ascendancy and yet the 
challenges that were brought about by the depression were having a profound effect on 
paternalism’s ability to facilitate the aristocracy’s aims. The traditional paternal mentality 
                                                             
27  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ pp.244-50 
28  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ p.244 
29  Sue Farrant, ‘The Management of Four Estates in the Lower Ouse Valley (Sussex) and Agricultural 
Change, 1840-1920,’ Southern History, 1 (1979), pp.165-70 
30
  Mark Rothery, ‘The wealth of the English landed gentry, 1870-1935,’ Agricultural Historical Review, 55 
(2007), pp.251-53 
31  Rothery, ‘The wealth of the English landed gentry, 1870-1935,’ pp.251-53 
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required some adaptation in order for the aristocracy to successfully cope with effects of the 
depression in their locality and hence maintain their ascendancy. 
The publication of David Roberts’ Paternalism in Early Victorian England in 1979 has 
sparked some debate as to the extent in which paternalism existed as a solid, definable 
concept or ideology and the degree to which it influenced Victorian politics, society and 
culture. Roberts defines a Victorian paternalist as believing that society should be 
‘authoritarian, hierarchic, organic and pluralistic’.32 A paternalist should also be notable, 
according to Roberts, for accepting that ‘property has its duties as well as its rights’,33 and that 
the principal duties were ‘ruling, guiding and helping’.34 Roberts accepts that paternalism in 
this period is a broad and amorphous concept and incorporated ‘varying attitudes and 
beliefs’.35 Dividing the main body of his book into three parts, Roberts discusses the 
intellectual and literary revival of the concept, the theory in action at a grassroots level and its 
manifestation within Parliament. He argues that paternalism was revived among the governing 
classes in the early 1800s from the latitudinarianism and indifference of the eighteenth-
century, only to peak in the 1840s and decline thereafter.36 This is a view which is largely 
supported by Kim Lawes’ Paternalism and Politics: The Revival of Paternalism in Early 
Nineteenth-Century Britain.37 Mark Girouard has also contributed to Roberts’ argument by 
highlighting the influence of traditional, chivalric notions of duty upon the Victorian 
aristocracy.38 
Reactions from Roberts’ reviewers were mostly positive, noting his contribution to a 
topic that had been largely under-researched. Gertrude Himmelfarb claimed that Roberts had 
preserved the concept’s amorphousness, whilst ‘giving it some historical concreteness’, and 
that ‘the very difficulty of definition testifies to the importance of the concept’.39 Dianne 
Sadoff was praising of the use of the family to serve as a metaphor for the study of culture and 
                                                             
32  David Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, (Croon Helm, London, 1979) p.4 
33  Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, pp.4-5 
34
  Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, pp.4-5 
35  Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, p.1 
36  Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, pp.19-22 
37  Kim Lawes, Paternalism and Politics: The Revival of Paternalism in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain, 
(Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000) 
38
  Mark Girouard, Return to Camelot Chivalry and the English Gentleman, (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1981) 
39  Gertrude Himmelfarb, ‘Review: Paternalism in Early Victorian England by David Roberts,’ Journal of 
Modern History, 52:3 (1980), pp.513-14 
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history.40 Initially, Roberts’ main critics were Boyd Hilton, Paul Littlewood and Norman Gash 
who seemed to agree that Roberts’ understanding of paternalism was too amorphous, and 
that whilst complaining ‘that previous historians have defined the term paternalism too 
narrowly...he seems to have spread its net too widely to be useful’.41 Conservative historian 
Norman Gash seems to go even further in arguing that paternalism was the ‘traditional social 
attitude’ that provided the ‘common, pervasive background of thought and action’, and that 
Roberts invites confusion by describing the rule as though it were the exception.42 Following 
this line of argument, Gash seems to contest whether there was a ‘revival’ of paternalism in 
the early 1800s and the extent to which there may have been a decline after the 1840s. 
More recently Boyd Hilton appears to have altered his position on paternalism and is 
now more in line with David Roberts. In his recently published Oxford History of the early 
Victorian era, Hilton supports Roberts’ idea of a revival of paternalism, claiming that the 
‘longings for a chivalric “olden time” were reactive rather than consensual... but they were 
undoubtedly revivalist – not survivalist – in mode, and would not have emerged but for the 
traumas of the late eighteenth century revolutions’.43 Hilton claims that in the ‘“war of ideas”’ 
that was sparked by these revolutions, one of the most disruptive elements politically was a 
‘socio-economic version [of Liberalism] based on market values’, which ‘provoked a backlash in 
the form of a revived paternalism’.44 Hilton also appears to agree with Roberts that 
paternalism declined during the mid nineteenth century, claiming that ‘a degree of consensus’ 
was established again in the 1850s, ‘when another profound shift in sensibility occurred’.45  
This thesis will, to a degree, support Norman Gash’s critique of Roberts’ conception of 
paternalism. It proposes that Roberts’ notion of paternalism is too broad and multifaceted to 
be workable. In order to address the amorphousness of Roberts’ interpretation, it is argued 
here that one broad notion of paternalism will not suffice in explaining the many facets of the 
concept. Instead this thesis proposes that in order to fully understand paternalism’s effect on 
                                                             
40  Dianne Sadoff, ‘Review: Paternalism in Early Victorian England by David Roberts,’ The Antioch Review, 
38:4 (1980), p.525 
41
  Boyd Hilton, ‘Review: Paternalism in Early Victorian England by David Roberts,’ The Historical Journal, 
24:3 (1981) p.772, see also Norman Gash ‘Review: Paternalism in Early Victorian England by David 
Roberts,’ The English Historical Review, 96:378 (1981), p.168 & Paul Littlewood, ‘Review: Paternalism in 
Early Victorian England by David Roberts,’ The British Journal of Sociology, 32:2 (1981), p.301 
42  Gash ‘Review...,’ p.168 
43
  Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England 1873-1846, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006), 
p.26 
44  Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England 1873-1846, p.30 
45  Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England 1873-1846, p.30 
13 
 
British politics, culture and society in the nineteenth century, many smaller, more distinctive 
studies investigating the different types of paternalism in their different spheres of influence 
are required. This thesis will specifically investigate aristocratic paternalism and its influence 
upon the landed estate and within the localities of England. 
Aristocratic paternalism, as expressed in the localities, was intrinsic and inherent, 
stemming from a set of virtues passed down dynastically through the generations of the 
family. At its core was not the theoretical, literary tradition that Roberts over emphasises. 
Although it had political ramifications, it was not the same as the political paternalism with 
manifestations across the Parliamentary parties that both Roberts and Hilton have discussed. 
In its simplest form, aristocratic paternalism was an inherited, benevolent sense of duty to the 
inhabitants of one’s estates. It was so well established within the array of aristocratic 
behaviour that it was almost instinctive. In essence it was a social norm that influenced the 
aristocracy at large and although not every patrician adhered to it, for most, it provided the 
‘common, pervasive background of thought and action’.46 
Dominant ideologies are difficult to define and can present historians with manifold 
problems. However, without adding unwanted perplexity, paternalism could be viewed as a 
dominant ideology among the aristocracy, made up of the dual strands of traditionalism and 
localism. It was conservative and somewhat reactionary in that it harked back nostalgically to a 
rural, feudal, ‘golden age’ where chivalry and honour had dictated behaviour and all classes 
were thought to be happier. Paternalism was also a championing of localism, in that a smaller 
and less intrusive central government would enable and necessitate a powerful and influential 
aristocracy in local governance and society. It is here where Roberts and Hilton’s notion of a 
political paternalism in Parliament and national government, when pitted against aristocratic 
paternalism in the locality, contributes to the confusion in defining the term. Roberts 
particularly has focused on the successive early Victorian Tory governments’ failure to enact 
paternal legislation, apart from the occasional piece championed by the backbencher Lord 
Ashley, because of the general support for laissez faire in Parliament and government. Here he 
has added confusion and not clarity to the concept, because he has failed to understand that 
localised paternalism and centralised laissez faire were not competing but cooperating 
philosophies among the landed elites that promoted greater individual power and influence in 
the localities.  
Paternalism also encouraged the rural classes within the individual aristocrat’s estate 
or locality to subscribe to deference as a dominant ideology. As Hilton claims, nineteenth 
century society may be viewed in terms of ‘a comfortable reciprocity between deference and 
                                                             
46  Gash ‘Review...,’ p.168 
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paternalism’ and ‘a massive consensus, based upon the widespread acceptance of aristocratic 
values and aristocratic leadership’, by the tenants, estate workers, shopkeepers, innkeepers, 
country attorneys, and others who made up the populations of the provincial villages and 
small towns. The aristocracy created local communities around their country houses, ‘in which 
all had their place and attendant rights and duties’.47 These local communities were ‘bound 
together by charity, which emphasized both the benevolence of the giver and the dependence 
of the recipient’.48 
Matthew Cragoe has emphasized the importance of families on landed estates holding 
tenancies dynastically, in much the same way that estates themselves were owned by dynastic 
families.49 As this thesis will show, it was not only landownership and tenancies that were 
dynastic; positions of responsibility, such as that of the land agent, could also be held by 
successive generations of the same family. The dynasticity of the many families on the estate 
facilitated paternalism and the acceptance of one’s place within the estate’s social hierarchy. 
Landowners could emphasize the shared traditions and ancestries on the estate and therefore 
ensure the inhabitants would construct their identities based on a sense of belonging to the 
estate community. 
This localised aristocratic paternalism, individual of Roberts’ attempts at a 
comprehensive definition of paternalism, did not decline in the mid-nineteenth century as he 
has indicated. True though it may be that the theoretical, literary and Parliamentary 
manifestations of paternalism may have begun their decline after their peak in the 1840s; the 
intrinsic paternalism of the aristocracy in the localities and at the grassroots level, in being 
more subtle, was better established and hence lasted decades longer. It was not until the mid-
1870s that this manifestation of paternalism was profoundly tested. As the title of this work 
suggests, the agricultural depression, combined with the many other political and social 
changes of the late nineteenth century, put aristocratic paternalism into a period of crisis. 
Although, as will be suggested later, aspects of it survived into the twentieth century. 
What then were the ramifications upon paternalism of the many challenges facing the 
aristocracy in this period? The agricultural depression had the potential to negatively affect 
paternalism in three distinct ways. Firstly, in carrying out their duties to their tenants, 
landlords attempted to relieve the burden on them by reducing their rents. They also largely 
attempted to maintain the pre-depression levels of estate expenditure, at least until the 
                                                             
47
  Mutch, ‘Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Depression in Lancashire, 1890-1900,’ p.33 
48
  Mutch, ‘Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Depression in Lancashire, 1890-1900,’ p.33 
49  Matthew Cragoe, An Anglican aristocracy : the moral economy of the landed estate in 
Carmarthenshire, 1832-1895, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), pp.33-34 
15 
 
1880s. This meant that the financial burden of the depression predominantly fell on the 
landowning class. In reducing their wealth, as it did for so many, it had the potential to reduce 
their ability to fulfil the benevolent duties entailed by their paternalism, such as in patronising 
charities and community organisations or building schools, churches or chapels. If such 
benevolent activity declined, the aristocrat risked losing their local status and the deference of 
their dependents. Secondly, landowners, in being aware of their declining rental income, 
attempted to adapt to the depression by looking for other non-agricultural sources of income, 
which mostly resulted in their passive investment into stocks and shares of a variety of 
companies. The potential danger here was that in relying less on land for their wealth and 
more on investments, traditional ties to the land would gradually break down, along with the 
sense of duty to the estate inhabitants. Finally, the depression had a profound effect on the 
disposition of the other rural classes. Both the tenant-farmers and the agricultural labourers 
began to develop a strong sense of class consciousness, which occasionally broke out into class 
agitation, for example with the National Agricultural Labourers Union strikes or the National 
Federation of Tenant Farmers’ Clubs’ demands for greater tenant rights. As Alistair Mutch 
highlights, such movements unified farmers or farm labourers ‘across estate boundaries and so 
threatened to break down that local authority which landlords fostered’.50 Farmers’ 
organisations more particularly ‘threatened to replace the vertical links between landlord and 
farmer with horizontal links between farmers’.51 This meant that even on estates where 
distress and agitation was extremely rare, paternal landowners were still facing an underlying 
and gradual shift towards the fragmentation of rural society and the disintegration of its social 
hierarchy. 
Aside from the problems entailed by the agricultural depression, aristocrats were also 
facing political changes that directly affected their ability to display their paternalism on their 
estates. Throughout the century, central government had gradually been extending its 
influence and encroaching on the power of the aristocrat in the locality. Central government 
was increasingly taking on roles for itself in the localities that were hitherto the privilege of the 
large landowner or aristocrat, such as the provision of education. The culmination of the 
growth of the jurisdiction of central government at the hands of local aristocrats resulted in 
the local government reforms of 1888-99, which created and empowered county councils and 
made these and parish councils directly elected.52 As a result local governance became more 
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codified and increasingly the reserve of career politicians rather than local lords.53 The 
electoral reforms that had occurred intermittently throughout the century were also gradually 
eroding the local political power of the aristocracy. These reforms, particularly the Secret 
Ballot Act of 1872, had also reduced the aristocrat’s ability to ensure the deference of his 
tenants.54 In extending the voting franchise to the labouring class, the reforms also furthered 
their politicisation. Yet it is perhaps testament to the permanence of paternalism and 
deference on the estates of England that even after political coercion had been so hindered, 
estates still tended to vote at large for the political party of the landlord. 
This thesis aims to reassert the importance of paternalism in enabling greater 
understanding of the mid- and late-nineteenth-century aristocracy. It is hoped that it will 
therefore revive the debate on the influence of paternalism upon the Victorian aristocracy, 
which has been largely cast aside since the publication of Roberts’ seminal work in 1979. It is 
also hoped that this work will contribute to the wider debate surrounding the British 
aristocracy’s ‘decline and fall’ and provide greater understanding of the importance of the 
agricultural depression in initiating and catalysing the deterioration of their power, status and 
ascendancy.  
The central argument of this thesis is that, despite the potential for aristocratic 
paternalism to be flexible to change, the aristocracy largely failed to adapt their traditional 
understanding of their roles and duties in local and national politics and society to the new 
challenges that were facing them. However, the aristocracy were not lame ducks and this 
thesis will describe a variety of their responses to the problems facing them and their attempts 
to adapt their roles and paternalism into the new age. Both individual circumstances and the 
more general political, social and economic problems conspired against them and made 
adaptation, with their paternalism still intact, almost unattainable. This adds even greater 
weight to the importance of the agricultural depression in providing the principal circumstance 
that contributed to their decline, by placing them in a ‘sink or swim’ environment. Since 
paternalism was in essence an intrinsic sense of duty, it had clear potential to be flexible to the 
interests and characters of the aristocrats in question, in that they may have differed in their 
understanding of their specific duties. It also had the potential to be flexible to the new 
demands put upon it by the economic and political challenges to the aristocracy’s local 
hegemony. As will be shown, for many, who were so used to agricultural prosperity, the 
depression caught them off guard. They hadn’t the foresight to know how long it would last or 
what its long term political and social implications were. Paternalism and the desire to 
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maintain good relations with their tenants inspired them at large to reduce rents and to 
maintain expenditure. Yet, in hoping that the adverse seasons and falling prices were a short 
term trouble that would soon ‘blow over’, many failed to make provisions for the long term 
security of their wealth and power. Those who did often did so to the detriment of their 
paternalism. As a result the existing political and social pressures on their dwindling power and 
influence were further exacerbated, as they could no longer generate deference among their 
dependents to the degree required. 
In order to investigate paternalism in the late nineteenth century and the responses of 
aristocrats to the agricultural depression, this thesis will be divided into three chapters, each 
focusing on a different landowner in a different area of the country. The case studies will be 
Henry Chaplin MP, later first viscount Chaplin; Thomas William Coke, second earl of Leicester 
of Holkham; and William Cavendish, seventh duke of Devonshire. Each chapter will investigate 
their differing approaches to estate management and their different responses to the 
agricultural depression and the many other challenges that faced them. Their estate records 
will make up the bulk of the primary source material for this thesis. Chaplin’s estate records 
are contained in the Lincolnshire Archives, while Leicester’s and Devonshire’s are stored in 
their respective country houses – Holkham Hall and Chatsworth House – and have been 
accessed with the permission of the families. The thesis will predominantly focus on the period 
between 1870 and 1900. However, where necessary, information may be brought to the 
readers’ attention from outside this period. 
Chapters one and two will concern Henry Chaplin MP and the second earl of Leicester 
of Holkham, whose estates were located in the east of England in the very rural and 
predominantly arable counties of Lincolnshire and Norfolk respectively. In 1866, Lincolnshire 
grew 294,014 acres of wheat, outgrowing even Yorkshire (at 290,793 acres).55 In 1871 Norfolk 
grew 207,452 acres of wheat, out of a total of 457,069 acres ‘under corn crop’.56 These 
counties extreme reliance on arable agriculture as their main industry, meant that they were 
hit particularly hard by the agricultural depression. This, with their relatively sparse population, 
perhaps make them untypical of most English counties, but in such places paternalism was 
most likely to thrive. Having been particularly affected by the depression and being in isolation 
from ‘the major metropolitan and provincial centres of English political life’, their communities 
undoubtedly depended on the leadership and patronage of their upper class families.57 
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Chapter three will concern the seventh duke of Devonshire, whose colossal estates spanned 14 
counties in Great Britain and Ireland.58 Yet his estate management will only be discussed 
briefly and the chapter will predominantly be concerned with his involvement in industry in 
the Furness area of Lancashire. 
There are various similarities and differences between the three case studies. While it 
is true that Chaplin was only a ‘squire’, or a member of the gentry, until his ennoblement in 
1916, his 23,000 acres, when compared to the average acreages in Bateman’s Great 
Landowners of Great Britain, puts him into the upper echelons of the landed classes.59 In 1883, 
Leicester owned a massive 44,090 acres, while Devonshire owned a colossal 198,572 acres.60 In 
this sense, despite large variations in their landownership, they were all firmly established 
within the aristocratic patrician class, while Devonshire also qualifies to be part of the minority 
of super-wealthy and anciently established aristocrats.  
They also had different circumstances which make their narratives unique. For 
example they were not all as wealthy as they seemed. Chaplin was already mortgaged to the 
hilt before the depression had even begun and upon inheriting the dukedom in 1858, 
Devonshire found himself to be deeply encumbered by the debts left by his extravagant 
predecessor. These personal circumstances complicate the narrative in interesting ways and 
present the characters in this thesis with additional dilemmas to respond to. Equally the 
differing personalities and interests of the aristocrats adds greater curiosity to the story and 
explaining their different characters may serve to enable a better understanding of their 
different responses to the problems they faced. Chaplin, for example, was rather different 
from Leicester and Devonshire, in that he was a popular socialite and a charismatic, ambitions 
politician, with a keen interest in sports, hunting and gambling. Leicester and Devonshire, on 
the other hand, were rather similar in that they lived rather reclusive lives in their country 
houses, they were indifferent to politics and they both held more middle class tastes and 
virtues. The result was that Chaplin’s many leisure interests prevented him from being a fully 
attentive and resident landlord, while Leicester and Devonshire were diligent men who were 
heavily involved in their estates’ management and other concerns. As will be seen, the many 
similarities and differences of the three case studies had wide-ranging effects on their 
paternalism. 
 
 
                                                             
58
  John Bateman, Great Landowners of Great Britain , 4
th
 Edition, (Harrison, London, 1883), p.130 
59  Bateman, Great Landowners of Great Britain, p.84 
60  Bateman, Great Landowners of Great Britain, pp.130, 263 
19 
 
Chapter 1 – The Paternalism of ‘the Squire’: Henry Chaplin MP 
Esq. (later the first viscount Chaplin) and his Lincolnshire 
estates 
In 1926, the Marchioness of Londonderry published a memoir concerning the life of her late 
father, Henry Chaplin, the first viscount Chaplin (1840-1923).61 Full of flattery and adulation 
towards its protagonist, the memoir reads as one would expect having been written by a 
dutiful daughter of means wishing to preserve the legacy of her not too distantly departed 
father. Yet Londonderry was seemingly conscious of its wider ramifications, particularly to 
historians concerned with social and political change in late nineteenth-century England. In the 
book she writes that upon her father’s death on 29 May 1923, ‘it was universally felt that the 
world had lost more than an outstanding figure on the turf and in the hunting field – more 
than a great authority on agriculture – more than a singularly picturesque and lovable 
personality. The “Squire”, as he was affectionately called by his friends [and tenantry], was all 
these things.’62 She goes on: 
   
But he was something else. In spite of his vigorous individuality, he was a representative – 
almost the last representative – of that type of landed gentry whose political and social 
influence had meant so much to Victorian England. He belonged essentially to that old school of 
country gentlemen to whom a long line of squires had bequeathed a tradition of responsibility 
to their country no less than to their acres.
63 
 
Indeed R. J. Olney’s Oxford Dictionary of National Biography article on Chaplin concurs 
with Londonderry’s assessment of her father, by concluding that he was ‘one of the last of the 
country gentlemen party.’64 Londonderry goes on further to say that since the time of her 
father’s prominence, things had changed. Heavy taxation and periods of agrarian depression 
had diminished the possibility of squires being able to play prominent roles in politics or 
maintaining their lavish lifestyles of leisure and sport. Moreover, the great country houses and 
estates of the Victorian landed elites had passed into the hands of ‘strangers who belong to a 
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different world and have inherited no traditions with the acres they have purchased’.65 She 
concludes, quite rightly, that the memoir has ‘the interest of a completed chapter to which 
there can be no sequel. It tells of men and women and modes of life that will not come 
again.’66 
Chaplin was born into an ancestry of squires that predated him by 200 years. It was by 
default that the Blankney and Tathwell estates, each originally owned by separate wings of the 
Chaplin family, were brought together under the ownership of Thomas Chaplin in 1730. It was 
these two estates in Lincolnshire which made up the vast majority of the 23,000 acres that 
Henry Chaplin inherited as a minor in 1856.67 Ancestry and tradition were important status 
conferrers in the hierarchical, late-Victorian society and, as will later be seen, emphasis on 
such things could be used by paternalists as a key rhetorical device when communicating with 
their subordinates. 
In Chaplin’s more immediate ancestry and in the relationships that were formative in 
his upbringing, his paternal influences are most evident. His father, the Rev. Henry Chaplin, 
who died when the young Henry was only 8 years old, was ‘a country gentlemen of the old 
type as well as a clergyman’.68 The young Henry then spent the greater part of his childhood 
living with his uncle Charles, the old ‘Squire’ of Blankney. Londonderry writes that ‘Charles 
Chaplin was a survivor of a most ancient order of squires... a complete autocrat on his own 
land’, and yet one who was ‘regarded with universal respect and a good deal of awe’, since his 
was a ‘benevolent despotism’.69 Charles was childless and Henry was brought up as his uncle’s 
heir, spending the larger part of his childhood on the estate, where he undoubtedly learned 
that ‘property has its duties as well as its rights’.70  
Chaplin was a lifelong Conservative and an important figure in both local and national 
politics. Upon entering parliament in 1868 as MP for Mid Lincolnshire, he almost immediately 
gained the favourable attention of Disraeli. Due to his solid understanding of the questions 
relating to land and agriculture, he was appointed a member of the Royal Commission on the 
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agricultural depression (1879-1881). He later served in a number of cabinet positions in 
Conservative governments, including Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1886), with special 
responsibility for agriculture and President of the Board of Agriculture (1889-1892), as the first 
with a seat in cabinet. Henry Blyth remarks that ‘from his father he inherited the Christian 
outlook, but from his uncle he inherited the religion of Toryism’.71 From his friend and mentor 
Lord George Bentinck, Chaplin inherited the ardent support for protectionism that was at the 
centre of his political creed. As his daughter claims, ‘to the end he remained convinced that 
Tariff Reform was the only measure which could restore a satisfactory means of livelihood to 
the English farmer’.72 From a political career marked by his understanding of agriculture and 
his advocacy of protection, he attained, in the later stages of his life, the unofficial position of 
leader of the agricultural interest in parliament.  
Bentinck also mentored his younger friend on the delights of a busy sporting life. 
Throughout his life Chaplin was a keen sportsman and gambler and as with his political 
ambitions, these interests also made claims on his time and to an extent removed him from 
the routine management of his estates. Throughout his adulthood, Chaplin spent huge sums 
gambling on horse racing, amongst other sports and buying racehorses. Chaplin was equally 
obsessed by shooting, deerstalking and hunting, serving as a member and master of two hunts 
in Lincolnshire. Londonderry remarks that when resident on his estate, he was hunting up to 
five or six days per week. David Cannadine adds that Chaplin ‘virtually bankrupted himself with 
the Blankney [Hunt], was forced to sell his hounds in 1883’.73 
Alongside his active political and sporting commitments, Chaplin juggled a social life 
that was equally lively. He was a popular character within London society and had a passion for 
lavishly entertaining his friends and acquaintances. While a student at Oxford, Chaplin 
befriended HRH the Prince of Wales and there developed a lasting ‘taste for high society and 
extravagant living’.74  
Not only did his busy sporting and social lives have a detrimental effect on his ability to 
keep a watchful eye on the management of his estates but they also had an equally negative 
effect on his wealth. ‘Within five years of inheriting his uncle’s estates and their rent roll of 
over £30,000 a year, Henry Chaplin had mortgaged much of his land to secure loans of 
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£95,000.’75 Despite his excessive borrowings he continued to spend on racing, hunting, 
shooting and entertaining and disregarded the ‘endless warnings from his stewards’.76 If 
agriculture had remained prosperous over the course of the nineteenth century, then perhaps 
Chaplin’s rental income could have justified the interest on his debts enough so that despite 
being heavily mortgaged he could have at least retained his estates. But agriculture crashed 
into a prolonged slump, Chaplin continued his excessive personal expenditure and had to hand 
over his Blankney estate to his chief mortgagee, Lord Londesborough, in 1897 and sell off his 
Tathwell estate just three years later. 
Chaplin’s story is a significant one with important ramifications to a study of 
paternalism in the late nineteenth century. As the title of this thesis suggests, the period was a 
critical one in which paternalism as a traditional social outlook and as a model for the structure 
of rural society needed to be updated if it was to remain intact at the dawn of a new century. 
Chaplin’s narrative is one of a landlord largely unfazed by the political, social and economic 
adjustments going on around him and unwilling to adapt his outdated ideas of what the roles 
and duties of a landowner entailed.  
His story poses important questions. As politics, sport and society made increasing 
claims on his time and made him ‘an inattentive and only partially resident landlord’,77 how 
much of the routine estate management was left to his agents? What of Chaplin and his 
agents’ responses to the agricultural depression? Did he relieve his tenants of the economic 
burden of depression by taking it on himself? Did he initiate any endeavours to promote 
economic growth on his estates with new ideas and entrepreneurialism? What of his 
benevolence during a period when rural communities on his estate were being impoverished 
by agrarian depression? Did Chaplin provide the leadership one would expect from a 
paternalist to his dependents? How did he view his political roles and duties? Were these 
influenced by his paternalism? 
This chapter will attempt to provide answers to above questions. It will be the 
contention of this case study that while Chaplin carried out many of the established roles and 
duties that were the mainstay of the traditional paternalism of the landed elites, his 
paternalism ultimately failed to adapt to the new challenges that were posed by the 
agricultural depression and the other changes in late Victorian politics and society. Chaplin’s 
failure to adapt had catastrophic results both personally, as he lost his estates, and to the 
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aristocracy at large, as his was an example of a potentially prevalent experience awaiting all 
those who would also failed to adapt. In this sense, to Londonderry’s claim that her father was 
the ‘last representative’ of the landed gentry, can be added an additional layer of meaning. 
The chapter will be divided into four ensuing sections. The first will investigate the 
nature of estate management under Chaplin and the role of his agents. It will then discuss the 
characteristics of the relationships between landlord, agent and tenant on the estate. The 
second section will detail Chaplin and his agents’ responses to the agricultural depression and 
the successes and failures contained therein. It will be argued that while they followed 
national trends in reducing rents and maintaining expenditure, they failed in what E. H. Hunt 
and S. J. Pam have called their ‘entrepreneurial’ role in promoting local agricultural economic 
growth as a route for the entire estate to climb out of the grips of depression.78 The third 
section will discuss Chaplin’s benevolence and patronage of local charities, societies and 
institutions like churches and schools. Finally, the fourth section will discuss Chaplin’s political 
career in greater detail and draw conclusions based on the ramifications of the narrative here 
presented. 
 
I 
In 1879 British agriculture had suffered a series of bad harvests, the prolonged effects 
of which, when coupled with the lowering of grain prices due to foreign competition, meant 
that contemporary farmers were beginning to feel the harsh effects of a depression which 
showed no immediate possible signs of recovery. That same year Chaplin wrote to his wife, 
claiming that he must go to see tenants ‘“who are on the verge of giving up, before October, 
which is the time they give me notice to quit... it is a matter on which I must decide things for 
myself and on which Burton [the agent] can hardly act for me. Besides which I could keep 
them and he couldn’t.”’79 Chaplin’s comment is revealing, not only of how a landlord could 
sympathise with his struggling tenants, but also of how he perceived his own role and decision-
making power in relation to that of his agent. His comment suggests that while the agent was 
left to handle the majority of day-to-day management decisions, the very important decisions 
had to be made by, or at least in consultation with, the landlord. More significant is the 
comment “I could keep them and he couldn’t”, which suggests that while the agent had to 
make decisions from a more mercilessly economic stance, the landlord was able to be more 
moral and paternal as it was his own wealth that was at stake. 
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The chief agent on Chaplin’s Lincolnshire estates was John Francis Burton, of the 
Lincoln-based law firm Burton and Scorer and Co. His primary vocation was as an attorney and 
he eventually went on to become clerk of the peace for Lindsey (a large district covering north 
Lincolnshire), ‘the pinnacle of the legal profession of the county’.80 As Olney remarks ‘it was 
not uncommon for attorneys to act as agents to one or more landowners, supervising the 
financial as well as the more purely legal side of estate management’.81 Burton’s appointment 
as agent to Chaplin’s estates marks the increasing use of upper middle class professionals, as 
opposed to men from farming backgrounds, to fill the position of agent on nineteenth-century 
estates. Yet Burton’s appointment also highlights the successes of his father, who, as another 
beneficiary of the Chaplins’ patronage, was appointed Conservative agent for the North 
Lincolnshire elections of 1835 and 1841.82 Landlord’s clearly liked to occupy their land and the 
positions for the provision of the duties it entailed with men they knew.  
The vast majority of the documents within Chaplin’s estate records are written in 
Burton’s handwriting and generally signed by him also. Indeed, Chaplin’s handwriting and 
signature appears quite rarely in the general records, materializing more frequently in the 
estate letters and correspondence than elsewhere. Furthermore, the only remaining evidence 
of the management of Chaplin’s estates exists amongst other legal papers in estate records 
deposited with the Lincolnshire Archives by the law firm Burton and Scorer and Co. Neither 
Chaplin nor any of his descendents ever deposited estate records with any archives. This 
evidence supports the claim that the administration and management of Chaplin’s estates was 
predominantly left to the agent, although Chaplin may have made the very important 
decisions by himself. Unfortunately it is impossible to assess the level of communication, 
discussion and consultation between the agent and the landlord, as a large proportion of this 
work would have been done verbally, leaving no evidence for the historian.  
‘A really large estate might employ as head agent a man of legal training, with local 
agents to provide knowledge of agriculture and to exercise day-to-day supervision.’83 This was 
certainly the case on Chaplin’s estates. A name which appears regularly in the estate records is 
that of William Bartholomew, who was a mature and well experienced tenant on the Chaplin 
estates when Henry Chaplin came to inherit them. Alongside being a successful tenant farmer, 
Bartholomew appears to have been employed by Chaplin and perhaps also by his uncle, as a 
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sort of agent and advisor.84 As an inhabitant of the estate, with a wealth of local farming 
knowledge, Bartholomew would have been invaluable to an only partially resident landlord 
like Chaplin. As testament to the landlord’s preference for the dynastic succession of the 
families on their estates, Bartholomew’s son, Bart Bartholomew, was also one of Chaplin’s 
tenants.85 
Another duty of the land agent was to provide financial advice to their employer. Land 
agents were more limited in their ability to be paternal or be sympathetic to suffering tenants 
because of their awareness of the importance of estate finances; after all it was not their 
money to spend but it was their job to lose. Chaplin, who was largely inattentive to his own 
financial position, had far greater potential to spend money on patronage and benevolence 
than his agents. Since it was the agent’s job to attempt to keep the landlord’s expenditure at a 
reasonable level, a general point can be made that unlike the landlord, the agent could express 
only limited paternalism. It must be noted, that Chaplin’s agents largely failed to get him to 
curtail his excessive expenditure, despite their ‘endless warnings’.86 They also failed to advise 
him to invest his money in non-agricultural passive ventures, e.g. stocks and shares in colonial 
companies, at a time when so many other members of the aristocracy and gentry were doing 
so to supplement their fallen income during the agricultural depression.87 
Two undated newspaper clippings retained in Chaplin’s estate records, both letters to 
the editor concerning a dispute over tenancy agreements within the Nottinghamshire 
Chamber of Agriculture, reveal to an extent the nature of landlord-tenant relations and the 
rise in class agitation between the two groups in this crucial period. The dispute appears to 
have been over one of the Agricultural Holdings Acts which would have interfered with the 
freedom of contract between landlord and tenant and given tenants the right to appeal to the 
Inclosure Commissioners in issues arising from their contracts. It resulted in the resignation of 
the chairman of the chamber, John Chaworth Musters, a landowner in the county. The 
language within the articles suggests that there existed ‘a position of political hostility between 
landlord and tenant’, with those few apparently ‘intelligent’ and ‘first-class tenants entirely 
agree[ing] with their landlords’.88 Musters, upon resigning, wrote that he felt  ‘that the 
chamber is becoming more and more a political and agitating body, than an association to 
forward the true interests of all connected with agriculture – the landlord, tenant farmers, the 
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labourers and the public generally’.89 Since the clippings were retained within the estate 
records it is likely that Chaplin, as an agriculturalist and a landowner in a neighbouring county, 
as well as his agents, watched this story unfold very closely. 
This rise in tenant class consciousness may be explained in both economic and political 
terms. The agricultural depression strained the relationship between the landlord and tenant 
classes and provided an atmosphere in which tenant class identity was developed. The 
shrunken agricultural economy pitted the tenant class against the landowners in a struggle to 
regain wealth lost during the depression. Yet the political preoccupation with the Irish 
Question in Westminster had ramifications for all British tenant farmers. The rallying of the 
Irish on mass against their ‘absentee aristocracy’ in support of the 3Fs cause (fixity of tenure, 
free sale and fair rent), forced the government to act. The resulting Agricultural Holdings Acts 
of 1875 and 1883 went some way to improving and increasing tenants’ rights across the whole 
of Great Britain. The actions of Irish farmers also provided inspiration to English tenant 
farmers.  
Alistair Mutch, in his study of farmer’s organisations in Lancashire 1890-1900, has 
argued that farmers’ believing that their ‘industry was in the grip of depression’ formed 
organisations which sought to achieve reductions in rent and greater tenant rights.90 This 
‘automatically brought them into conflict with the traditional leadership of the landed gentry’ 
and further necessitated tenants’ organisation.91 Yet he also argues that the rise of these 
organisations was not a mere reflex to economic factors but a culmination of a development of 
tenant-class identity. He concludes that the farmers’ assertion of their interests as a class 
against those of their landlords, led to a fragmentation of rural society and ultimately 
contributed to the declining influence of the landed aristocracy in local and national 
government.92 The argument presented in this thesis will largely concur with Mutch’s 
conclusions, though it will be stressed that the apparent fragmentation of rural society 
occurred more gradually than Mutch seems to imply. Although the development of tenant-
class identity was not a mere reflex to economic factors and had deeper roots, the sustained 
period of agricultural depression did provide the single most important reason for the eventual 
breakdown of the paternalistic society on large estates. Yet as testament to the strength of the 
paternal-deferential bonds between landlords and tenants, the full effects of the agricultural 
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depression on the harmony within rural society were not fully realised until well after the turn 
of the new century.  
In Lincolnshire, Chaplin and his agents were able to prevent agitation over tenant 
rights on the Blankney and Tathwell estates and Chaplin’s tenants remained, on the whole, 
rather docile. Chaplin achieved this by largely ignoring the governments’ attempts to legally 
codify tenant rights (under the Agricultural Holdings acts) and by persuading his tenants to 
ignore their legal rights in preference for customary rights.  
Customary tenant rights in Lincolnshire, where they were first developed in the 1740s, 
were already quite generous and wide-ranging.93 Outgoing tenants could expect to be paid for 
virtually all work done, including the labour and seed costs, for the incoming tenant. They 
could also expect to be paid for improvements they made to the land, such as underdraining, 
or the buildings, provided they had the permission of the landlord.94 J. V. Beckett notes that 
customary tenant rights offered for the tenant ‘security for his investment, and for the 
landlord it saved him the need to prosecute a tenant who defaulted on his rent and left early. 
He could deduct some or all of the arrears from the sum to be paid by the new occupier to the 
outgoing tenant, and thereby recover the arrears without resorting to unpopular and harsh 
measure which might end with a tenant being imprisoned.’95 
The governments successive Agricultural Holdings Acts were essentially an attempt to 
legally entrench abovementioned customary rights. As J. V. Beckett claims, customary tenant 
right ‘became the basis of the Agricultural Holdings Acts of 1875 and 1883. The Agricultural 
Holdings Acts therefore gave tenants greater power and greater means for ensuring that their 
landlords did not attempt to evade paying their claims.96 Resources such as the law courts and 
the Inclosure Commission were now made more available to tenants for helping them to 
resolve disputes with their landlords arising from tenancy agreements or the lack there of. This 
empowerment of tenants was at the expense of the power and authority of the landlord and 
their supposed rights to freedom of contract.  
Like John Chaworth Musters, Chaplin viewed the Agricultural Holdings Acts with 
distrust and he deliberated over how he could evade the authority of the Acts.97 He was 
advised that Clause 37 of the 1875 Act ‘effectually preserves freedom of contract, but it 
appears by Clause 38, that a Landlord must give notice of rejecting the Act, which assuming 
the Act to be just and reasonable, is an invidious thing for a Landlord to do, especially for such 
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a prominent supporter of the government as Mr Henry Chaplin’.98 When the 1883 Act took a 
step further in legally codifying tenant rights, Chaplin was no longer bound by his support of 
the government. He opted to ignore the Act by asking his tenants to sign new printed 
agreements, in which they had to forgo the rights granted to them by the act in substitution 
for a continuation of the customary tenant rights that they were used to and to accept these 
as ‘fair and reasonable’.99  
Why then did landowners like Chaplin and Musters prefer, and latterly champion, 
customary tenant rights over legally based rights? Their reasoning was both superficial and 
ideological. The Agricultural Holdings Acts essentially made landlords more legally accountable 
and potentially culpable for expensive legal proceedings and fines and in this sense their 
hostility to the Acts is quite natural and somewhat expected. In affecting the balance of power 
between landlord and tenant, the Acts also had a negative effect on the landlord’s ability to 
express paternalism on the estate by making its inhabitants more independent. Paternalism 
could only thrive in the traditional functions of the aristocracy, where the government, local or 
national, and the law had yet to encroach. Without outside interference, tenants would have 
to rely on their paternal landlord who, in the ideal, knew well his responsibility to fairly 
compensate his tenants based on the customs and traditions of his predecessors. In the legal 
codification of tenant right, paternal landlords saw the erosion of the importance of the 
paternal-deferential relationships that were at the core of estate life. 
This highlights regional contrasts in the development of tenant-class identity. In 
Lincolnshire where customary tenant rights were first developed in the mid eighteenth 
century, they had become so well established by the late nineteenth century that tenants 
largely accepted their continuance without agitation, even when this meant forgoing greater 
security under the legally codified rights. In Nottinghamshire, Lancashire and other parts of the 
country, where customary tenant rights were more recently established, perhaps not as 
generous and probably more constrictive than in Lincolnshire, tenants were more steadfast in 
promoting their rights and as a result agitation between the classes was more common.100 
It is testament to the strength and endurance of paternalism on Chaplin’s estate that 
there is no evidence that he faced any opposition from his tenants when evading the 
implications of the 1883 Act. On the whole, as will be shown throughout this chapter, landlord-
tenant relations on Chaplin’s estates were very good. One particular example of this was when 
Chaplin’s friend and fellow MP for Mid Lincolnshire, Weston Cacroft Amcotts, wrote to him 
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complaining that a new railway line had taken land the Louth Corps of Volunteers used for a 
shooting range and asked if he would allow a new range on some of his land. Chaplin replied ‘I 
have no objection if it is agreeable to my tenant, but it must depend upon what he thinks 
about it’.101 Luckily for Amcotts and his Corps, Chaplin’s tenant, George Oliver, reciprocated 
with characteristic deference to his landlord’s paternalism, and replied ‘I have no objection to 
them having the new range on my farm, if the Squire [does] not object’.102  
 
II 
 Upon returning from one of the initial Royal Commission meetings on the agricultural 
depression in 1879, Chaplin took a four day tour of all of the farms on his estates. He wrote to 
his wife claiming that he had done so in order to see for himself the hardship ‘“on those who, 
in spite of bad times, and all their previous hopes, have been doing their very best all the 
same.”’103 He wrote of terrible rains that, if persistent, ‘“will mean almost ruin for them all”’.104 
Some farmers he claimed were even on the verge of giving up. The disconsolate tone of his 
writing is given greater poignancy when contrasted to the earlier hope he expressed that the 
Royal Commission ‘“must do good, and cannot fail to do so”’.105 Londonderry gives the 
impression that his dismal tone stems not only from sympathy for his tenants’ but also from a 
share in their distress.106 Chaplin was beginning to realise that as landlord it fell to him to take 
effective measures in response to the agricultural depression and to attempt to relieve the 
burden on his tenants. By doing so, Chaplin would have to accept significant cuts to his rental 
income, alongside the expectation of his tenants to maintain estate expenditure at a time 
when he was already severely in debt.  
 Traditional assessments have claimed that landlords largely failed to respond to the 
depression, which caused its effects on both tenant farmers and landowners to be prolonged. 
Hunt & Pam state that ‘some have claimed that landlords innovated too little. Others have 
drawn attention to the supposedly restrictive effects of traditional leases.’107 Some historians, 
such as Avner Offer, have vehemently maintained ‘that failure occurred because agriculture 
was handicapped by incompetent, risk adverse, and rapacious landlords, and by the pernicious 
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effects of the English estate system’.108 Hunt & Pam, along with Cormac O’Grada and F. M. L. 
Thompson, have doubted the veracity of this damning portrait of landlord responses to 
agricultural depression and also the idea that tenant farmers and landlords ‘failed’.109 In their 
article, Hunt and Pam have created a criteria for assessing Essex landlords’ competence in 
responding to the depression, grouping their actions into either managerial or entrepreneurial 
responses and measuring the levels of success and failure in each. Hunt and Pam argue that in 
their managerial responses, landlords were ‘competent and socially responsible’, in that they, 
generally-speaking, reduced rents to ease the burden on their tenants, removed obstructive 
clauses in their leases to allow tenants greater freedom to grow different crops and 
maintained the levels of estate investment that tenants had grown used to during the so-
called ‘Golden Age’ of British farming.110 However, in terms of landowners’ entrepreneurial 
responses, Hunt & Pam are rather more critical. They claim that ‘the depression had brought 
new challenges requiring more than merely managerial responses’ and that ‘in their more-
demanding entrepreneurial role, landlords, unquestionably, were less successful’.111 Hunt & 
Pam describe this entrepreneurial role as providing leadership on their estates, improving 
infrastructure and transport links, encouraging co-operation among their deferential tenants 
and neighbours, promoting smallholding, encouraging tenant farmers to diversify, investing in 
new ventures and opening up new markets that helped to collectively sell their tenants’ 
produce.112 
 This section will attempt to apply Hunt & Pam’s criteria for managerial and 
entrepreneurial successes and failures to the case of Henry Chaplin and his Lincolnshire 
estates. It will argue that as was the case among Essex landlords, Chaplin’s managerial 
response was at least competent, while his entrepreneurial response was rather non-existent. 
However, considering Chaplin’s already rather disastrous financial situation at the beginning of 
the depression, his level of self sacrifice in ensuring that his tenants were freed up from the 
financial burden of depression requires some explanation. It is doubtful that any landowner 
enjoyed having to reduce his own rental income whilst attempting to keep estate expenditure 
up, but the contrast lies in the fact that most of Chaplin’s contemporaries could at least afford 
it: Chaplin could not. Was Chaplin just desperately holding out for the return of agricultural 
prosperity? Or did he accept sacrifices to his own wealth to help his tenants because of an 
underlying sense of duty towards them? At first, like many of his contemporaries, Chaplin 
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probably viewed the depression as a short term slump and was willing to take on some of its 
burden with a view to recouping losses when things picked up. Yet as the depression drew out 
and began to establish itself as the dominant economic environment, the continuation of 
assistance Chaplin offered his tenants carries more significance. It will be further argued here 
that paternalism as a mentality and an inherent sense of duty is an important contributing 
factor when explaining Chaplin’s responses to the agricultural depression on his Lincolnshire 
estates. 
  In 1879 Chaplin wrote of his friend, a tenant on his estate and a ‘first-rate’ farmer, 
‘“poor Howard... is quite broken-hearted. However, I consoled him by promising some relief 
from his payments at rent day.”’113 It appears that both Mr Howard and his son, another 
tenant on the estate, were struggling to pay their rents due in part to the series of bad 
harvests that had begun in the mid 1870s.114 Yet they were far from the only tenants receiving 
some form of rent relief from Chaplin. A list of tenants claiming rent reductions contains no 
fewer than 11 names renting over 7000acres in both the Blankney and Tathwell estates, with 
two more pencilled in presumably later.115 The rent paid by the tenants (which is presumably 
at the reduced rate where only one figure is given) varies greatly, and is likely dependent on 
the quality of land, buildings, etc, with some paying more than 28s/acre and others as little as 
18s/acre.116 Calculations on the document suggest some were claiming even further rent 
reductions, such as Abraham Knott whose rent on his 220 acre farm was reduced 24s.11d/acre 
to 18s.1d/acre, which alone gave Chaplin a £70 reduction in his annual rental income.117 The 
list also contains the names of two Howards (R. G. & F. R.) claiming rent reductions on 
separate farms on the estate. This suggests that even the competent farmers like Mr Howard 
(senior) whose heath farm, Chaplin had claimed was ‘“an example to the whole country,”’ 
were suffering at the hands of bad harvests and foreign competition.118 Frustratingly, the list, 
which is practically the only piece of evidence detailing the extent of reductions within the 
records, is undated. Due to the scale of the agricultural depression it is likely that the list was 
an early one and that rent reductions and arrears continued to grow in size and had to be 
granted to many more tenants as the depression wore on. Documents within the estate 
records are generally fragmentary and often undated. It is certainly conceivable that 
documents detailing further and wider rent relief have merely been lost. 
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 Hunt an Pam argue against the traditional view that during the depression landlords 
made retrenchment the ‘order of the day’ and that estate improvements were ‘stopped at 
once’.119 They instead claim that the provision of long-term capital was considered, like rent 
adjustment, as a traditional responsibility of landlords, even in difficult economic conditions 
and that investment levels were retained and in some cases increased, until after the mid 
1880s where the overall picture suggests more restrained expenditure.120 A review of Chaplin’s 
expenditure on improvements to his estates concurs entirely with Hunt and Pam’s argument. 
Chaplin’s ‘Building Fund’ reveals that between January 1878 and February 1880, he spent over 
£6900.00 on the erection of new buildings and improvements to old ones.121 These include 
new labourers’ cottages at Tathwell, a new foreman’s house on Fowler Cartwright’s farm, a 
new farmstead at Scopwick and alterations and additions to Mr Knott’s house at Blankney 
Barff.122 Estate accounts within the estate records are very fragmentary and actually non-
existent for most years. However, as an indication, the 1880 (and only) accounts, in which the 
estimated total gross income for the Blankney and Tathwell estates ‘from every source’ was 
£28,226, suggest that approximately 12% of the annual gross income of the estates was 
invested back into improving and erecting buildings.123  
 Due to the fragmentary nature of the building accounts in the estate records it would 
be ill-advised to suggest a total expenditure on buildings for the 1870s and early 1880s. Yet it 
can be safely suggested that the abovementioned £6900 spent during 1878 and 1879 makes 
up the bulk of the expenditure on agricultural buildings on the estate during the 1870-85 
period. Only some extensive alterations work done at the Temple Grange Farm in 1872 and 
five pairs of cottages erected at Tathwell, Hallington and Hangham in 1873 are excluded from 
the above figure, and total in themselves a further £2900.124 Other than these figures there is 
no other evidence of any further building work carried out on the estate. As with rent 
reductions, it may be argued that Chaplin did continue to improvement the estate with 
building work but is misrepresented by his incomplete estate records from which many 
documents could have been lost. The halting of investment in the early 1880s was most likely 
due to his finances becoming ‘severely embarrassed’.125 Chaplin should not be judged too 
harshly for this. His curtailing estate investment in the mid 1880s was in line with English 
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landowners at large, whose estate investment was more ‘restrained’ after the 1880s, but 
never amounted to an ‘investment moratorium’.126 
 Improvements on Chaplin’s estates were extensive. They reveal an estate office that 
paid attention to detail and accommodated tenants to a high standard. For example in the 
account of the works done to the Temple Grange Farm in 1872, under the ‘Hall Passage’ 
section there is a list including an ‘elliptical arch’, ‘cloth on swing door’, ‘beaded bell board’ 
and ‘1 dozen black cloak hooks’, to name but very few of the costs.127 These efforts to make 
tenants’ houses elaborate persisted well into the early 1880s, when the depression was well 
established. With vacant farms becoming more plentiful across the country during the 
depression, it was clearly important for landlords to make a good impression in order to retain 
existing tenants or secure new ones. 
 Yet Chaplin’s improvements to the buildings on the estate were not solely aimed for 
the benefit of his tenants. A large proportion of the building work carried out in this period 
was on new pairs of cottages for labourers. As previously mentioned five new pairs of cottages 
were built on the Tathwell estate in 1872, at a cost of over £1300 and a further five double 
cottages on the Tathwell estate and one double and one single on the Blankney estate, during 
1877-78 at a cost of over £1950.128 These too were elaborate buildings that were carefully 
designed and built to ensure comfortable living for farm labourers on the estate. H. Rider 
Haggard, during his famous tour of rural England, wrote that ‘at Blankney... are some of the 
best cottages I have seen, built of stone and very picturesque. Indeed, this may be called a 
model village.’129 He even included a picture of the Blankney cottages when his report, Rural 
England, was published in 1901-02.130 It increasingly became a landlord’s responsibility to 
attract a decent workforce to the area for the use of his tenants, particularly as the depression 
caused high levels of rural outmigration. The location of labourers’ cottages was of huge 
importance in their working life. An article in the Times in 1847 suggests that labourers in 
Lincolnshire could have to walk more than five miles to work in a morning and the same 
distance back home at night, if their cottage was not situated on or near to the farm where 
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they worked.131 In attempting to address such a grievance and providing decent cottages for 
labourers, Chaplin demonstrated that his paternal duties extended to all classes on the estate. 
 In order to pay for these improvements to estate buildings, Chaplin, following trends 
among the wider aristocracy, relied on government loans from the Land Improvements 
Company (hereon refered to as the L.I.C.). Loans were subject to strict specifications and plans 
and required the approval of an appointed surveyor and the final sanction of the Inclosure 
Commissioners before work could begin.132 The expenses and interest on the loans were 
particularly low which made them very popular in this period.133 Though the evidence again is 
fragmentary in the records, it suggests that Chaplin had no fewer than four contracts with the 
L.I.C., in which were included most of the abovementioned works, such as the Tathwell 
cottages and the works at Temple Grange Farm (Contracts: 1730 & 2306).134 However, the 
loans often did not cover the entirety of the costs for the buildings, for example contract 1730 
for the 5 pairs of cottages at Tathwell dated August 1871 totals £1175, whereas from the 
building accounts we can see that they actually cost £1301.135 Chaplin would have had to pay 
the excess as loans could not be extended. Hunt and Pam emphasize that nationwide 
government loans for this purpose were ‘considerably higher in 1875-99 than between 1850 
and 1874,’136 which is understandable in the context of depression and falling rental incomes. 
But what is important to note is that struggling landlords, like Chaplin, took out such loans to 
maintain levels of estate investment before considering reducing expenditure or embarking on 
a policy of strict retrenchment. So incisive was the paternal sense of duty towards their 
estates’ inhabitants that they continued to spend even after they could no longer afford to do 
so.  
 The agricultural depression brought with it great changes which threatened the 
traditional social order and the bonds which had previously united the rural classes. Whilst 
rural outmigration drained estates of the talent and energy associated with youth, class 
relationships were strained under the burden of depression. Farmers’ organisations and 
labourers’ trade unions were on the rise, gradually causing rural society to fragment. Good and 
fair estate management was no longer the primary duty of a paternal landlord. They had to 
take on what Hunt and Pam refer to as the ‘entrepreneurial’ role.137 Paternalism, as the 
                                                             
131  The Times, 08 September 1847 
132  L.A.O., BS/13/1/5, Land Improvements Company 
133  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ pp.238-40 
134
  L.A.O., BS/13/1/5, Land Improvements Company 
135
  L.A.O., BS/13/1/3, Detailed accounts of work done, L.A.O., BS/13/1/5, Land Improvements Company 
136  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ p.238 
137  Hunt and Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression,’ p.243 
35 
 
dominant, traditional mentality subscribed to by the aristocracy, had to rise to the challenges 
that faced it if it was to survive and if the aristocracy were to remain as Britain’s social and 
political elite. In essence, landowners had to adapt their traditional, paternal mentalities and 
find a way to enable their estates to climb out of the depths of depression. In 1878, 
Chaplin began talks and agreements with the Great Northern Railway Company (hereon 
referred to as the G.N.R.), regarding a proposed line between Spalding and Lincoln.138 In return 
for his support in Parliament for their new line, he was able to obtain from them promises that 
the line would run through three miles of the Blankney estate, with stations at Metheringham 
and Scopwick (to adjoin a public road). He also gained their agreement to build a piece of 
agricultural siding which would hold 15 trucks for the use of the brickyard at Blankney and 
their promises to provide all maintenance to the track, bridges, fences, hedges and gates 
(including hunting gates) at his and his tenants’ convenience.139 Yet whilst these talks were 
occurring, a large number of his tenants and some labourers on the estate had signed a 
petition from the competing Great Eastern Railway Company (hereon referred to as the G.E.R.) 
in support their proposed line between Sleaford and Lincoln.140 The petition claims that the 
line would place the area ‘upon a main track line with direct and uninterrupted 
communication between London and the agricultural district of the east of England on the one 
hand and the manufacturing and coal producing district of Yorkshire and the North on the 
other and each district... will have a better and more direct access to the markets for its 
produce than now exists’.141 By agreement with the G.N.R., Chaplin was obliged to support 
them and ensure through the control of his tenants that they did not create any 
obstructions.142 As a result, Chaplin coerced his tenants into dropping their support for the 
G.E.R., in favour of the G.N.R. A copy of the G.E.R. petition is littered with pencilled-in lists of 
tenants’ names, with ticks and crosses next to them.143 A letter mentions six tenants who 
signed in favour of the G.E.R. who ‘would not have done so had they known Mr Chaplin was in 
favour of the Gt Northern, they have promised to sign in favour of the Gt Northern’.144 
Deference was clearly still the prevailing attitude among Chaplin’s tenants. Another letter from 
                                                             
138
  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/4, Subject Items: Agreement with Great Northern Railway 
139  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/4, Subject Items: Agreement with Great Northern Railway 
140  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/5, Subject Items: Petition by farmers for support of Great Eastern Railway 
northern extension 
141  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/5, Subject Items: Petition by farmers for support of Great Eastern Railway 
northern extension 
142
  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/4, Subject Items: Agreement with Great Northern Railway 
143  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/5, Subject Items: Petition by farmers for support of G.E.R. northern extension 
144  L.A.O., BS/13/1/4/5, Subject Items: Petition by farmers for support of G.E.R. northern extension 
36 
 
the G.N.R. congratulates Chaplin’s agent: ‘we are glad to hear that the tenants are 
withdrawing their support from the Great Eastern scheme’.145 
 As it happened, the two companies merged in 1879 to form the Great Northern and 
Great Eastern Joint Lines (hereon referred to as the G.N.&G.E.R.), making such tenant coercion 
rather unnecessary.146 However the route from this point to eventually opening the line in 
1882 was still far from straightforward.147 There ensued disagreements between Chaplin and 
the engineers of the G.N.&G.E.R. over the situation of one station (Kirkby Green) and the 
necessity of siding at Blankney brickyard. Chaplin’s agents persisted and eventually the 
engineers yield over both issues ‘in deference to Mr Chaplin’s wishes’.148 While it is unclear 
why the situation of Kirkby Green station was so important, the siding at Blankney brickyard 
was of ‘great importance’ to Chaplin as it would have opened up wider markets for selling his 
bricks and their transportation to other areas of the estate for improvement works more 
easy.149  
 On 11 March 1881, after gaining all the assurances he needed from the company, 
Chaplin sold the 30 acres required for the track across the estate to the G.N.&G.E.R. for 
£5276.150 The sale came with an agreement that the company would construct for the use of 
his tenants level crossings, gates, drains etc where required.151 Chaplin also managed to secure 
from them their agreement to build the stations on the line through the estate at 2 miles 
apart, when ‘the usual distance is about 4 miles’.152 The opening of the new line in 1882 should 
be seen as an important success for Chaplin; one that is surprisingly omitted by his daughter 
from his memoirs. He competently executed the role of leader and representative of the 
community and by using his status and the appeal of his vote in parliament he guaranteed 
what he and his tenants wanted and needed from the railway. The line itself provided great 
potential for the future economy of the estate by opening up new markets for the farmers’ 
produce. And although the railway line itself was not an innovation, it provided a base and 
infrastructure from upon which new ideas and companies could be launched. In return for his 
involvement and association with the creation of new railway line, Chaplin was provided with 
greater status both locally and nationally. After all, it was likely the fact that railway provision 
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could confer greater status which caused so many aristocrats to become so heavily involved in 
the railway boom. 
 The problem was that Chaplin’s entrepreneurialism and his efforts at promoting local 
economic growth to lead the estate out of the depression largely ended with the opening of 
the line. If we compare Henry Chaplin to Henry Brand, later first viscount Hampden, who 
owned the Glynde estate in the lower Ouse valley between 1853 and 1892, we find Chaplin’s 
leadership somewhat wanting.153 Brand like Chaplin had embarked on a costly programme of 
investment and had granted rent abatements when necessary. Yet Brand also suggested that 
his tenants ‘should take more advantage of their railway links to widen their range of 
products’.154 He had already seen the benefits of railway links in his development of three 
cement works on the estate which relied on them.155 Brand’s very successful solution to the 
depression on his estate was to build a dairy in Glynde, about half a mile from the station, 
which was centrally located to ‘ensure a regular supply of milk... from the farms around it,’ and 
sought markets in London and the other towns nearby.156 The dairy, which in 1890 was turned 
into a company enlarged rapidly, for the benefit of many farmers in the locality. As Sue Farrant 
states, the Brands had ‘made a positive contribution towards change of land use and 
consequently retained their estate.’157  On the other hand, Chaplin had made little such 
contribution and ultimately lost his estate. 
 While there is no evidence to suggest that Chaplin obstructed agricultural adjustment, 
equally there is no evidence to suggest he promoted it either. When cereal prices remained so 
low for so long, farmers needed to diversify in order to protect themselves from the worst 
effects of the depression. This could mean changing the crops in their rotations, for example to 
market garden produce or even to switching to pastoral farming. The landlord could provide 
assistance and guidance to his tenants, which is probably what was expected of Chaplin, the 
self proclaimed agriculturalist. Although it he did make efforts to relieve the economic burden 
of depression on his tenants and should be noted for his altruism in doing so, he failed to 
provide them with the leadership and innovation required for the whole estate to prosper and 
the local economy to grow. Paternalism as a traditional, established set of duties to provide 
good and fair estate management, was adhered to by Chaplin, but he failed to recognise the 
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necessity for taking on new responsibilities when new challenges emerged. To some degree 
paternalism failed Chaplin; but equally Chaplin failed paternalism.  
 
III 
 David Roberts argues that ‘benevolence was not really the core [of paternalism], it was 
rather only a part of a wider set of duties’.158 This thesis will attempt to reset the importance 
of benevolence within aristocratic paternalism, by providing examples of its importance in 
each case study. Just as landlords had maintained investment on the estate during the 
depression, it was equally important to maintain their benevolent activities or else they risked 
undermining the traditional paternal social bonds between the rural classes, which were 
already under attack from increased class agitation. Those charitable endeavours which 
promoted a sense of community could be a powerful tool in a paternalist’s repertoire for 
counteracting the gradual fragmentation of rural society. 
 While Chaplin’s primary concern was clearly the welfare of his tenants and the 
relationships he had with his tenancy, his paternalism also contained a duty to improve life on 
the estate for all its inhabitants, particularly as the depression would have seen some 
members of the rural population becoming increasingly poor while the rural economy was in 
decline. Like many of his fellow paternalists, Chaplin saw the fulfilment of this duty in his 
leadership of the benevolent institutions of the estate which attempted to elevate its moral 
economy, such as schools and churches, and in his wider benevolence, as subscriber and 
patron to a number of charities, societies and organisations which promoted a sense of 
community.  
 In 1872, Chaplin spent just over £315 on the erection of a new School House in 
Tathwell.159 This is the only evidence of Chaplin’s school building activity which exists in the 
estate records. When compared to the second earl of Yarborough, who on his north 
Lincolnshire estate built no fewer than nine schools between 1847 and 1858, Chaplin’s school 
building record appears quite meagre.160 However, Chaplin cannot be judged too harshly for 
this disparity, as it is largely due to the epoch in which he lived. Whilst Yarborough was a 
landlord during the mid-nineteenth century when the aristocracy’s involvement in School 
building was at its height, by the late nineteenth century, School building had slowed, as most 
villages with a sufficient demand for a School would have already been provided for. Yet 
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Chaplin’s account books still display an on-going support for education through school 
subscriptions. Chaplin was a subscriber to both the Kirkby Green and Scopwick School Funds 
paying each £15 annually and an extra £1 paid in June to the ‘School Feast Fund’.161 He also 
subscribed £5.5s annually to Legbourne School on the Tathwell estate.162 
 Anne Hattersley claims that the paternalist’s sense of duty was not fulfilled by mere 
‘voluntary contributions’ to village schools but also by ‘interaction’ with them.163 She defines 
such ‘gentry interaction’, as members of the gentry serving as ‘school managers’, with 
responsibility for monitoring teaching during regular visits, ensuring the good maintenance of 
the buildings and serving as ‘benefactors’ who could encourage children to work hard by 
providing rewards such as school feasts and visits to their mansion houses.164 Hattersley 
suggests that interaction with Schools was usually a role for the women of gentry families, 
particularly wives and daughters and evidence suggests this was the case in the Chaplin family. 
In an 1879 letter to his wife regarding a conversation with Rev. Stephens, the rector at 
Blankney, Chaplin writes: ‘“The schools, etc., will wait until he can see you about them in the 
autumn”’.165 
Another of Chaplin’s letters, dated 5 April 1876, concerns an interesting saga surrounding 
Metheringham School, in which Chaplin as leader of the community was forced to become 
involved. Chaplin originally made over the school ‘to the parish or the Clergyman for the 
purposes of education’, but after the vicar in the parish went abroad and the Schoolmaster left 
soon after, ‘the school, without any hearing to the parish, was shut up’.166 The parishioners 
then gathered the necessary funds to hire a school master and reopened and conducted the 
school capably. Chaplin helped them by getting back the conveyance of the School house ‘to 
hand over to a Committee’ and found a suitable cottage for the new Schoolmaster.167 When 
the vicar later returned from abroad, he immediately sacked the new schoolmaster, dismissed 
the scholars and locked up the building.168 Chaplin then sought legal advice on behalf of the 
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parishioners, writing to his legal advisors and asking ‘how are the parishioners able to obtain 
legal possession of it again for School purposes?’169  
The whole saga is strange and without any further information, it may be presumed 
that the difficulties arose from an altercation between the vicar and the parishioners. The issue 
appears to have been resolved for the time being, as in August 1878 Chaplin paid a 
subscription of £32 to the school to meet further ‘difficulties in which the Trustees had 
become involved’.170 Very little further evidence of the Chaplins’ interaction with schools on 
the estates can be found in the estate records. Again this may be due to the deficient nature of 
evidence within the estate records, perhaps because of a failure on the part of the estate 
administrators to preserve documents. However it is not surprising that interaction with 
schools, in being largely the role of aristocratic and gentry’ women rather than men, did not 
leave a paper trail in the estate records. Despite the school building activity declining, 
involvement with education on the estate was clearly still an important duty among the 
paternal aristocracy and gentry, even for landlords like Chaplin whose time was already well 
occupied with a burgeoning political career and an active social and sporting life. By 
implementing paternalism and enforcing deference in schools the landed elites hoped to 
‘strengthen a social order that was characterised by interdependence’.171 And yet the scope for 
paternal landowners to be involved in education was gradually being eroded at a proportional 
degree to the rise in State intervention.172 Here again we see paternalism in crisis, as the 
traditional roles set out for the landed elites were being commandeered by the state. 
 Chaplin was, surprisingly for the son of a vicar, not particularly devoted in his religion. 
He regularly made allusions to finding attendance of church services somewhat of a chore in 
private letters to his wife.173 And yet as a paternalist and a Conservative, he no doubt valued 
the institution of the Church very highly. Vicars and Lords of the Manor, as fellow paternalists, 
could work together to improve the moral economy of the estate and this seemed to happen 
at Blankney. In 1879, under the new Rector Revd J. O. Stephens, a project to enlarge and 
restore both Blankney Church and the rectory was commenced. The ‘Squire’ and his wife ‘took 
a very active interest’ and contributed a good proportion of the costs.174  
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 When Revd Stephens later declared his concern for the young boys attached to 
Blankney stables and the stud farm, Chaplin offered to ‘“give them an address by way of trying 
to get them all to attend church better than [had] hitherto been the case”’.175 Only days after 
Chaplin appealed to his young employees, Stephens found four stable boys coming along the 
road ‘roaring drunk and kicking up a row’.176 Chaplin responded ‘“by hook or by crook, I will 
find out who they were and make an example”’.177 As a man who himself enjoyed excess and 
frequently partook in vices like gambling, it was perhaps the lack of discreteness among the 
boys rather than the actual consumption of alcohol that so angered Chaplin. However, in line 
with the good morals and virtues that were expected of all classes within Victorian society, 
Chaplin had a duty to discipline the boys. Yet this was not merely an attempt to keep up 
appearances. It was in the interests of a paternalist to maintain order and deference on the 
estate and this occasionally required firm action and discipline. While Victorian society 
understood itself to have a civilising mission abroad, the aristocracy were also assigned the 
role of improving the moral economy at home and in the localities, despite how they may have 
behaved in their own private lives. Encouraging their dependents to be a virtuous people could 
in essence be a positive reflection of the virtues of the aristocrat and increase his status in 
politics and society. 
 Evidence of Chaplin’s charitable activities, in the form of lists of his subscriptions, only 
exist for the years 1881 and 1882. This means it is difficult to assess whether his charitable 
spending was increased, decreased or maintained over any period of time. His subscriptions 
were quite wide ranging but tended only to include clubs based on the estates and those 
which he had a specific interest in. In 1881 we find subscriptions to Tathwell Pig and Clothing 
Club for £7 and Raithby and Maltby Clothing Club for £5.178 Whilst for the first half of 1882 
(where the records end), there are subscriptions to Lincolnshire Licensed Victuallers 
Association for £1.1s, Scopwick and Kirkby Green Clothing & Coal Club for £10 and Tathwell Pig 
and Clothing Club again for £7.179 Chaplin also paid substantial poor rates of over £185 for 
Metheringham and Blankney during this year and a half between January 1881 and June 
1882.180 His charity seems to have been predominantly aimed at relieving the inhabitants of his 
estate from the worst effects of rural poverty, a particularly important cause in a time when 
the agrarian economy was so depressed. 
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IV 
 Chaplin’s friend and contemporary, Lord Willoughby de Broke, once famously said of 
him: ‘“When our Harry is broke, which is only a matter of time, all the crowned heads of 
Europe ought to give him a hundred thousand a year in order that he may show them how to 
spend their money.”’181 Despite its frivolous tone, Willoughby de Broke’s prediction of 
Chaplin’s financial doom was ultimately vindicated. Indeed Londonderry claims that by 1892 
her father’s finances were ‘severely embarrased’ and that it was evident that the Blankney 
estate, ‘by now heavily mortgaged, must soon pass into other hands’.182 In 1897 Chaplin was 
required to handover the Blankney estate to his chief mortgagee, Lord Londesborough.183 And 
by 1900 he was forced to sell the Tathwell estate in order to pay off his other debts.184 Yet 
Chaplin’s financial difficulties, and the details of his losing the estates, are surprisingly almost 
undocumented in the estate records. Only one undated paper reveals that Chaplin had over 
17,000 acres mortgaged across both the Blankney and Tathwell estate.185 
 The precise details of Chaplin’s decline into the realms of financial nadir are perhaps 
less important to this study than an explanation of its causation. Chaplin’s culture of excessive 
expenditure, which he developed as a young man and never managed to curtail, must be seen 
as a primary reason.186 As this chapter has already shown, Chaplin was significantly in debt 
before agricultural prosperity began to wane and his refusal to reduce his personal 
expenditure when coupled with his fallen rental income ultimately proved disastrous. The 
agricultural depression therefore must be considered a secondary cause. If agricultural 
prosperity had continued and Chaplin’s rental income remained high, then perhaps he could 
have at least afforded the interest on his excessive encumbrances. Finally Chaplin was ‘an 
inattentive and only partially resident landlord’, whose political, sporting and social lives 
increasingly distracted him from the management of his estate, not to mention being costly 
activities in themselves.187 As an only partially resident landlord, Chaplin’s response to the 
agricultural depression can at best be seen as ‘managerial’. Had he been more attentive to the 
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needs of his estates and their inhabitants and brought entrepreneurship, innovation and 
greater leadership to his management of them, then perhaps he may have saved himself the 
embarrassment of near bankruptcy. Yet it is difficult to see how else than miraculously he 
could have taken on the ‘entrepreneurial’ role as described by Hunt and Pam. If he had any 
entrepreneurial attributes then surely he would not have allowed his expenditure to have 
gotten so out of hand in the first place. 
 This chapter has attempted to explain some of the challenges facing the landed elites 
in the late nineteenth century and the necessity for them to find new solutions to their 
problems in order to survive as the dominant group in British politics and society. Chaplin 
largely failed to adapt his traditional understanding of the duties and responsibilities expected 
of him in the locality to the new challenges that were facing him. He endeavoured to maintain 
and strengthen the relationships he had with his tenancy and the wider estate community, by 
providing the leadership, order, discipline and benevolence that had been the mainstay of 
landlord activity prior to the depression. Yet economic insecurity required heightened 
leadership with innovative and entrepreneurial action in order to overcome it and in this 
Chaplin and his traditional paternalism failed. Aside from the obvious economic consequences, 
the agricultural depression also provided an atmosphere in which hidden tensions between 
the rural classes were beginning to become aggravated and exposed in a way they never had 
been previously. While these tensions were probably more gradually developed, particularly in 
Lincolnshire, than other historians have perhaps claimed, by retaining the estate and adapting 
his paternalism to the new era, it is plausible that Chaplin could have offset their effects and 
the resultant breakdown of the rural social hierarchy.  
 It was Chaplin’s political ambitions that were chief among his distractions from estate 
management. Henry Blyth remarks ‘from his father he inherited the Christian outlook, but 
from his uncle he inherited the religion of Toryism’.188 He remained to the end a zealous 
Conservative, both locally and nationally. In Lincolnshire he was a tireless campaigner. When in 
1881, James Lowther stood as Conservative candidate for North Lincolnshire in a by-election, 
Chaplin spent three weeks campaigning across the region on Lowther’s behalf. He regularly 
spoke at five different places in a day, sometimes to radical audiences and never finished until 
very late in the evening.189 As a result of his efforts in the locality, ‘he soon became a figure of 
note in the front rank of Conservative politics’.190 
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 Although Chaplin was a loyal party member, his politics are best seen in light of his 
protectionism and representation of agricultural interests. His daughter claims that he was 
‘born a Protectionist, and to the end he remained convinced that Tariff Reform was the only 
measure which could restore a satisfactory means of livelihood to the English farmer’.191 G. R. 
Searle states that protectionism had been strong in Lincolnshire for a long time, but it was 
Chaplin who ‘provided [it with] vigorous leadership’,192 and as a result he later earned himself 
the unofficial title of ‘Veteran Protectionist’.193 Londonderry writes of Chaplin in late 1870s, as 
‘the champion, as he already felt himself to be, of the agricultural interests of England, his 
hands were full in urging in parliament the claims of English land upon a pre-occupied 
government’.194 He represented agricultural interests when he served as a member of the 
Royal Commission to investigate the depression and this was a prelude to his representation of 
agriculture in government and on the front benches.195 In 1886 he was offered the position of 
President of the Board of Agriculture but refused it because it did not carry a seat in cabinet.196 
Here he fought to ensure that the problems facing agriculture would be given a fair hearing by 
ministers and he did not succumb to the vainglory of an offer of high office. He was ultimately 
successful, as when he was offered the position again in 1889, it did come with an offer of a 
seat in cabinet. In 1903, when leading members of the government, such as Joseph 
Chamberlain, stated their support for Tariff Reform, Chaplin must have felt truly vindicated in 
his lifelong devotion to the cause.197 He was an obvious choice for an appointment to the Tariff 
Reform Commission as a representative of agriculture.198 
 It is plausible therefore that Chaplin chose to negate efforts to improve his local status 
in preference for striving to achieve greater national status and prestige. While Chaplin did 
display paternalism in the locality when in residence and through his agents, perhaps he 
viewed the representation and leadership of national agricultural interests in parliament as a 
higher calling and a greater fulfilment of his paternal duties and responsibilities. Could 
Chaplin’s paternalism have transcended the needs of individual farmers, or of farmers in 
certain localities, for the needs of all those involved in agriculture? In this sense, the apparent 
neglect of his estates, which ultimately lead his losing them, was not a failure of paternalism, 
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but rather the consequence of an elevation of his sense of paternal duty and a resultant 
change in the roles he perceived for himself. No doubt Chaplin enjoyed hearing the idea, from 
his former Sleaford constituents, that his legacy was one of contribution ‘“towards the 
advancement of agriculture, the beneficial results of which are recognized throughout the 
whole of the United Kindgdom”’.199 It is hardly surprising then that upon losing his Sleaford 
seat in 1906, he fought and won the Wimbledon by-election the following year on a platform 
of representing ‘the agricultural interests of the country’.200 
 Yet Chaplin’s ardent championing of national agricultural interests poses significant 
questions about the wider aristocracy and gentry’s failure to do so. After all Chaplin was one of 
only a handful in parliament who were fighting on behalf of the interests of British agriculture 
and yet the majority of members, both backbenchers and those in government, were 
themselves owners of landed estates and were equally in danger of having their wealth 
permanently diminished. Indeed Chaplin’s appointment as the first President of the Board of 
Agriculture with a seat in cabinet in 1889 was in itself an acknowledgement by the landed 
elites that agriculture was severely in distress and needed representation in government in a 
way it never had previously. Successive governments and parliaments had hitherto always 
been made up of landowners. To some degree it was an acknowledgement by the British 
aristocracy and gentry of their own decline as the political and social elite and certainly an 
acknowledgement of the decline of land as a status conferrer. And yet Chaplin’s appointment 
to government was an attempt to appease him and the handful of other agriculturalists in 
parliament. The government almost entirely failed to act to improve the agriculture economy 
in Britain and the majority of Chaplin’s recommendations were ignored. What were the wider 
landed elites doing that Chaplin wasn’t? What caused their sense of urgency to protect 
agriculture to lessen? We know from the well documented effects of the agricultural 
depression that the landlord entrepreneurship mentioned by Hunt and Pam was not the 
common experience on British estates in this period. So what enabled the British aristocracy to 
adapt to the economic challenges that faced them? How did this affect paternalism and its 
legacy? 
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Chapter 2 – ‘All that is most desirable in a landed gentleman’: 
Thomas William Coke, second earl of Leicester and the 
Holkham estate 
On 29 November 1892, Thomas William Coke, the second earl of Leicester of Holkham (1822-
1909), wrote to his acquaintance Henry Chaplin.201 Chaplin, in his role as a member of the 
Royal Commission on Agriculture, had previously asked Leicester to provide evidence to be 
used in the Commission’s report. Leicester replied: 
 
My dear Chaplin, 
I enclose you a general Statement of the Annual rents on this estate when I came into 
possession in 1842, in 1878 when they were at their highest and in 1891 when the last payment 
was made. Since then a further great depression in Agricultural produce has taken place and 
rents will again be considerably reduced. 
I have now two farms representing 729 acres let to a tenant free of all rent except the amount 
due for tithes, and 6d per acre for the right of Sporting. This arrangement will have to be carried 
out on other farms unless Agricultural produce increases in value. 
...I think you will admit (if this is not an exceptional case) that Landlords will not bear much 
more squeezing.
202
 
 
 The tone of the letter, as one may easily infer, is quite dismal and given Chaplin’s 
disastrous financial position, the irony in Leicester’s writing ‘I think you will admit that 
Landlords will not bear much more squeezing’, is quite remarkable. As Leicester, who was 
widely considered a ‘model’ landlord, writes of farms having to be let rent free on the world 
renowned Holkham estate, the full extent of the effects of the agricultural depression become 
clearer.203 While the data he enclosed within the letter displays what proportion of its burden 
rested on the landlords. 
In 1842 the annual rents of the Holkham estate were £40,419.1.5¼, while the 
expenditure was £7,608.4.5½, leaving Leicester’s income at £32,810.16.11¾.204 In 1878 annual 
rents reached their peak for the century at £60,218.1.6½, with expenditure also increasing to 
£20,653.10.3, leaving an income of £39,564.9.3½.205 Yet by 1891 annual rents had dropped 
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back down to £43,790.15.7¾, while expenditure remained high at £20,323.2.11½, leaving a 
much reduced income of £23,467.12.8¼.206  
Leicester also included within his letter the staggering totals for expenditure on the 
estate under both his father and himself. His father, the agriculturalist Thomas William Coke, 
first earl of Leicester of Holkham, best known as ‘Coke of Norfolk’, spent £536,992 on buildings 
and repairs between 1776 and 1841.207 The second earl himself had spent £558,156 on 
buildings and repairs and the purchases of land between 1841 and 1891, revealing that 
between 1776 and 1891 the Leicesters had spent over £1million between them on improving 
the Holkham estate.208 
The above figures became available to the public via popular newspapers at the time 
and were printed again in Leicester’s obituary in the Eastern Daily Press in 1909.209 They pose 
significant questions to a study of landlord paternalism during the late nineteenth century. If 
annual rents were cut so significantly, while expenditure was maintained during the 
depression, how did landed aristocrats like Lord Leicester survive with their estates and wealth 
largely intact at the turn of the century and beyond? More plainly, if the aristocracy’s 
agricultural income was falling, what did they supplement it with in order to maintain their 
economic position? And how did this affect their social and political status, both locally and 
nationally? With land becoming less important to the aristocracy as a form of income, what 
happened to landlord paternalism and their sense of duty? 
This chapter will reveal that the method via which Leicester survived the depression 
was by investing outside of agriculture, in a variety of different companies, within different 
industries, based locally, nationally and internationally. It is necessary here to introduce what 
P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins have termed ‘gentlemanly capitalism’.210 In their two volume work 
on British Imperialism from 1688 to the present, they have attempted to reassert the 
importance of the metropolis within their topic.211 They argue that British imperialism owes 
much more to the growth of the financial and service sector in the City of London, than to 
British industry or bourgeois manufacturing.212 In terms of social and political status too, they 
argue that ‘City’ men were more wealthy and in a more respectable line of work in the eyes of 
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the upper classes.213 This enabled them to form a sort of loose alliance with the landed and 
political elites; one that the industrialists could have only hoped for.214 As a result those elites 
dedicated to public service ensured foreign and economic policy was always in favour of the 
‘City’, even when it wasn’t in favour of industry.215 
They argue that this loose alliance was based on what they call ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’, which was a fusion of elements of tradition and modernity. Gentlemanly capitalists 
were a mix of aristocrats and ‘City’ men, i.e. bankers, financiers, etc.216 In return for their 
acceptance into this loose alliance, ‘City’ men would help their aristocratic counterparts to 
invest their money wisely. Particularly during the agricultural depression aristocrats were 
advised to invest outside of agriculture, often into colonial railway, mineral and banking 
companies.217 Invisible income was becoming increasingly socially acceptable.218 Among 
gentlemanly capitalists the principles of free trade and sound money almost became virtues of 
morality and their colonial investments harmonized completely with their notions of Britain in 
her civilising mission abroad.219 According to Cain and Hopkins, the gentlemanly capitalists’ 
loose alliance was never a conspiracy but an openly accepted and acknowledged norm.220 For 
the period following 1850 they also argue that the power base within the alliance gradually 
shifted, as the influence of finance grew whilst that of the landed interest declined.221 
Cain and Hopkins’ argument has significant ramifications to a study of paternalism in 
the late nineteenth century. If, as they claim, the British aristocracy followed the advice of 
their ‘City’ friends and invested their wealth outside of agriculture, then land would gradually 
lose its prominence as a source of income, power and status. It would gradually become less 
important to the aristocracy and as a result they would slowly shed the sense of obligation to 
their estates’ inhabitants. The traditional paternal-deferential relationships within the estate 
hierarchy would slowly cease to be the norm and the hierarchy itself would fragment. It 
remains to be seen whether Leicester’s non-agricultural investments were passive or whether 
they enabled him to become involved in the companies’ administration and therefore provide 
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him with an opportunity to practice paternalism. Alternatively, did Leicester’s non-agricultural 
income enable fresh investment in his estates or additional patronage expenditure within the 
locality?   
Leicester remains somewhat absent from any of the recent historiography on late 
nineteenth century aristocracy or even rural history during the agricultural depression. Even in 
the literature that exists on the history of the family and the estate, the life and times of 
Leicester have been largely brushed over. Considering the great changes that befell Victorian 
politics, society, economics and culture during his long life, this is somewhat surprising. It is 
even more surprising particularly of the second half of the nineteenth century, when Leicester, 
as owner of the Holkham estate, witnessed agriculture move so quickly from its golden years 
to its darkest.  
Susanna Wade Martins’ PhD thesis, later published by Cambridge University Press, 
entitled A Great Estate at Work: The Holkham estate and its inhabitants in the nineteenth 
century, does deal in part with Leicester’s ownership of the estate.222 Yet, again, in Wade 
Martins’ book only a small proportion of pages are concerned with Leicester whilst the rest of 
the work concerns his father ‘Coke of Norfolk’ or the estate itself. Leicester’s father was ‘Coke 
of Norfolk’, a politician known as the ‘father of the commons’ who served as an MP for over 50 
years, but is perhaps best known as a famous agriculturalist of the British agrarian 
revolution.223 He was a proponent of enclosures, selective breeding in sheep and the four 
course crop rotation. His agricultural reputation meant that his sheep shearing events were 
internationally attended.224  
When researching and writing her thesis in the early 1970s, Wade Martins had to work 
through mountains of unsorted documents at Holkham Hall, which later made up the bulk of 
her primary source material. Due to the jumbled nature of the sources Wade Martins was 
dealing with, it is likely she was not able to see all of the relevant material in order to 
sufficiently recreate nineteenth-century Holkham. Since then archivist Christine Hiskey has 
been employed by the Coke family, who still reside at Holkham, to sort through their 
documents and catalogue everything that still survives. In some cases, old records have been 
newly found that had been hidden away in obscure places.  
Leicester, born at Holkham Hall in 1822 and mostly educated through home schooling, 
was brought up to love the ‘wholesome rural life’ and was a man of very simple tastes - 
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contented eating a meal of just bread and cheese with the poorest labourer on his estate.225 
Unlike his father, he never played a prominent part in politics and was largely not interested in 
the London season or high society.226 However, he did follow in his father’s footsteps in his 
devotion to agriculture. A member of the Royal Agricultural Society of England, much of his 
time and effort was spent on the improvement of his estates. Until old age and infirmity 
slowed him, Leicester was quite hands on with agricultural work. He met his bailiff daily, 
regularly watched his men in the fields, personally picked trees to be felled and even joined 
the working gangs in times of emergencies.227 
Like Henry Chaplin, Leicester was a close personal friend of the Prince of Wales and 
even made a member of his council in 1866.228 In his early days he had made Holkham a social 
centre and hosted regular shooting parties, at which the Prince was a regular guest.229 Yet 
unlike Chaplin or the Prince, Leicester was by no means a socialite. In his reserved nature and 
almost middle class values he held much more in common with the seventh duke of 
Devonshire, the subject of the next chapter, than with Henry Chaplin.230 Indeed, on one of his 
stays at Holkham, the Prince, perhaps bored of the diet of bread, cheese and beer, had asked 
his host for a brandy, Leicester had replied: ‘“Your Majesty is welcome to anything in my house 
except brandy at nine o’clock in the morning”’.231 
Where then does Lord Leicester and his family compare to their fellow aristocrats in 
terms of wealth and land? According to Bateman, in 1883, Leicester owned 44,090 acres all at 
Holkham in Norfolk.232 Yet by the time of his death, this amount stood nearer to 50,000 acres, 
as Leicester had added to the estate by the steady but continual purchasing of land and the 
reclamation of land between Wells and Holkham.233 The Holkham estate was world renowned 
for its innovative farming techniques and was often labelled a ‘model’ estate.234 Therefore 
Holkham is, to a degree, unrepresentative of most British agricultural estates in this period 
because it is not a standard estate but a superlative one. Yet for the same reason 
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understanding Holkham is incredibly valuable to the historian of this subject; Holkham 
provided for other estates the ideal to which they could strive to be. Cain and Hopkins also 
inform us that Leicester was in the top 50 income earners in Britain in the late nineteenth 
century; however it is not certain whether this was due to agricultural income alone or from 
his investments as well.235 
This chapter will be divided into four further sections. The first will deal predominantly 
with agriculture on the estate itself. It will discuss the nature of the estate’s management and 
explain the roles of the agents in relation to those of the landlord. It will also discuss 
Leicester’s responses to the agricultural depression and argue that, like Chaplin, Leicester’s 
was largely a managerial response.  The second section will detail the nature of Leicester’s 
investments outside of agriculture, as part of a wider trend among the aristocracy and explain 
the effect this had on paternalism. The third section will discuss Leicester’s benevolence, 
particularly his charitable contributions to his favourite cause: public health. The final section 
will conclude the chapter and argue that while Leicester competently carried out the 
traditional roles associated with a paternal landlord, like Chaplin he largely failed to adapt his 
understanding of his duties to the estate during the challenging period of agricultural 
depression. Instead of providing the innovation and leadership to enable the whole estate to 
prosper, he invested his excess wealth into non-agricultural passive ventures and prospered 
alone. However he did spend some of this extra wealth on benevolence and put weighty 
support behind improving public health in the locality amongst other things. 
 
I 
Upon returning to Holkham from a vacation in Norway in August 1865, Leicester found 
his tenants distressed and disillusioned.236 It was revealed to Leicester that his agent, Samuel 
Shellabear, had sent a circular to every tenant on the estate which had attempted to ‘coerce... 
[them] in their political action’, presumably urging them to vote Liberal in accordance with 
Leicester’s wishes.237 His tenants were ‘as a body... strongly and avowedly with the Liberal 
cause’, yet he was quick to write another circular in which he claimed such coercion was ‘in a 
manner utterly at variance with the principles and practice of myself and my house’.238 
Leicester’s circular was earnestly apologetic. He claimed to have read firsthand the ‘indignant 
expressions’ of his tenants and to need no extra information to acquaint himself ‘with the 
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feelings of surprise and pain which it must naturally have excited in my tenantry’.239 The 
original circular, he claimed, was accidently sent because of miscommunication in the estate 
office, whereby he had urged on Shellabear the ‘necessity of prompt and vigorous [political] 
action from Holkham’, which Shellabear interpreted as an instruction to urge Holkham tenants 
to vote Liberal.240 
Leicester was careful not brush over the incident as a plain misunderstanding, writing: 
‘the necessity of an explanation to you directly is apparent; the circular was addressed to you, 
was issued with apparent authority, and called forth feelings of sorrow and mortification which 
I both respect and justify’. ‘At the same time gentlemen,’ he bargains, ‘I would have you think 
considerately of Mr Shellabear’, who had displayed a little too much ‘zeal in carrying out 
instructions’ and had been stirred by ‘the heat and fervour generated in an election’.241  
Leicester concluded the circular by appealing to the sentimentality of his tenancy and 
by reminding them of their shared past, traditions and values:  
 
coercion of the political views of the tenantry has never existed on the Holkham estate. My 
father gathered round him a body of tenantry who were attached to him by a community of 
sentiments; he and his tenantry were devoted to the Liberal cause... An honoured remnant of 
that family still exists on this estate: sons and grandsons occupy the places of their fathers and 
grandfathers who are gone. Like myself they have inherited the same great political principles: 
and I have a proud consciousness that no estate in England has a tenantry with more united 
sentiments, even in politics – that with us Liberal principles are an heirloom and a tradition, and 
that coercion, always a crime, would be to you an unparalleled blunder and folly.
242
 
 
 The circular is saturated in the type of rhetoric one would expect from a paternal 
landlord. The persistent allusion to shared experiences, traditions and values, including 
Liberalism, allowed Leicester to create a ‘community of sentiments’ (if it didn’t already exist) in 
support of his position at the top of the estate hierarchy. After all, paternalism was, in a sense, 
the glorification of tradition. Membership of the estate community had always been 
conditional upon an understanding and acceptance of the divinely ordained hierarchy within 
the estate and the obligations of one class towards another. An espousal of shared tradition 
was merely a confirmation that this was still the case and each party still accepted it. 
Leicester’s father, by gathering around him Liberal tenants (if we are to believe that coercion 
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was never used on the estate), was simply enabling this acceptance to be more favourable to 
all parties involved. 
 By reminding his tenants that many of them occupy the places their parents and 
grandparents once occupied, he hoped they would remember that they too owe their position 
within the estate, as he did, to dynastic succession. The dynastic establishment of the tenant 
and labouring families on the estate enabled even greater acceptance of one’s place within its 
hierarchy and one’s duties to the community as a whole, because it anchored one’s identity to 
the estate itself and gave him a greater sense of belonging. These families were tied into an 
understanding of the estate hierarchy as a natural order and therefore subscribed to the 
estate’s dominant ideology: paternalism. 
Like his father, Leicester was renowned for being an ‘improving landlord’, while the 
Holkham estate itself had attained a position of eminence among all those involved in British 
agriculture.243 The extensive list of applicants for Holkham farms in 1906 reveals that although 
many were local men, residing in nearby villages like Wells and Mileham, others had applied 
from places as far away as Sunderland, Huddersfield and London.244 What was it about 
Holkham that attracted this nationwide renown and made it so desirable to farmers far and 
wide seeking new tenancies? Was Holkham’s desirability maintained during the depression?  
Wade Martins has already noted in some detail the roles of the Holkham agent and 
the backgrounds and personalities of those men who occupied the position throughout the 
nineteenth century.245 The agent was at the ‘centre of a complex and often diverse business’ 
and they diverged in how they viewed their roles and duties, which largely became dependent 
on their own interests.246 The first and most famous Holkham agent, Francis Blaikie, appointed 
by ‘Coke of Norfolk’ in 1816, had a personal influence on the farming of the estate and took 
great interest in the characters of the tenants and particularly their sons.247 He also had a 
personal influence on his employer’s paternalism. Believing that Coke’s estate expenditure had 
been too extravagant Blaikie intervened to ensure expenses were cut.248 In this sense agents 
were capable of restraining and curbing a landowner’s sense of duty. Here we see an agent 
championing good fiscal policy against over-enthusiastic paternal notions of duty. Blaikie was 
not sentimentalist or paternalist but a practical man. This casts some doubt on the idea that 
paternalism could become codified into the functions of the agent. 
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While Blaikie may have restrained paternalism, later Holkham agents were clearly 
influenced by the paternalism of their employer. Samuel Shellabear, appointed in 1863, was 
heavily involved in setting up board schools in the villages of the estate and conducting much 
of their administration.249 He also served as chairman of the Wells school board.250 There is, 
therefore, no certainty of paternalism’s penetration into the role of the agent. Throughout the 
century the position of agent was filled by diverse men of differing characters. There was some 
scope for an individual agent to decide what his job responsibilities were and in turn agents 
had some autonomy in deciding the extent to which paternalism would influence their office. 
Initially at least, the agent’s background was often in farming. Many, like Blaikie, were 
the sons of farmers or yeoman and ‘had practical skills rather than formal education’.251 Agents 
could train their clerks in the estate office to succeed them. Blaikie was succeeded by his clerk, 
Mr Baker, upon retiring in 1832.252 Also William Keary’s replacement, Shellabear, had worked 
his way up through the estate office, without any other farming background and was more of 
‘an administrator than a practical farmer’.253 Wade Martins claims that before the 1860s, 
Holkham agents had greater influence on farming on the estate – because they regularly 
travelled the area speaking to the tenants and because of their farming backgrounds, they 
were in the best position to offer advice based on their comparisons of techniques and 
knowledge of the land.254 Yet with their increasingly administrative backgrounds after William 
Keary, ‘it is probable that their influence over farming matters declined’.255 
Plotting precisely the nature of estate management at Holkham and the ratio of power 
and influence over estate matters held by the landlord and the agent is a formidable task. 
Wade Martins states that some of the most important work of the agent was done verbally 
and so is lost to the historian or researcher.256 Yet much the same can clearly be said of the 
landlord. Despite not having sufficient evidence to precisely identify Leicester’s role against 
that of his agent, if indeed there was such a strict distinction between them, we may easily 
infer that Leicester was much more involved in his estate than the almost absentee landlord 
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Henry Chaplin. As his obituary remarked, Leicester was a ‘man of practical workaday affairs,’ 
who ‘kept a hand on all the strings’.257 
In an undated letter to his daughter probably written during the harvest of 1864, 
Leicester expressed a wish that he could be ‘in two places at once’: 
 
I cannot yet leave home. I have so many people to look after, and in many things there is no 
head for the work. I have saved some hundreds by being here during harvest. We have had very 
uncertain weather and had to get our corn when we could, the other week I had 103 men, 
women and boys cutting barley... which would not have been done if I had not been here... 
[and] saved a whole field that would have been much spoiled by heavy rain which came in the 
night. We have just had 40 hours of rain. If today is very gloomy and nothing can be done, it is 
beginning to look very serious for us farmers. But I am in a better position than my neighbours...
 
258
 
 
 While it is not clear which farms Leicester is referring to, it is likely the subject is the 
Home Farm, which was farmed ‘in-hand’ by the Coke family.259 The sentiments within the 
letter reveal how Leicester viewed his role and the obligations entailed therein. His tone 
certainly suggests that he was motivated by a firm sense of duty to his own farm and its 
employees. Yet in being present during the busy harvest period he was able to share in the 
experience and plight of all tenant-farmers on the estate. He even identified himself alongside 
his tenants as a ‘farmer’. This was not a typical paternal action, as paternalists 
characteristically always endeavoured to uphold the social hierarchy and their place at its 
apex. Yet by working and identifying himself alongside his tenants, Leicester was able to gain a 
greater appreciation of their existence and in doing so, he enabled healthier landlord-tenant 
relations at Holkham. 
 True to his rather middle class values and simple tastes, Leicester also attempted to 
gain greater insight into the plight of labourers on his estate and improve their conditions. 
Throughout his ownership of the Holkham estate, Leicester showed a great interest in cottage 
improvement.260 Indeed he aimed to house all labour locally and estimated that one cottage 
per 50 acres was required.261 However, the average workforce on the estate actually required 
one cottage per 30 acres and given the importance of female and child labour up until the 
1870s, it is little wonder that overcrowding was rife on the estate at the beginning of 
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Leicester’s tenure as landlord.262 William Keary’s 1851 report on the estate included a section 
on cottages let directly by Leicester – which at the time amounted to 128 of a total of 
approximately 300 cottages.263 He noted the poor condition of many of the cottages, 
particularly the ‘wretched thatched’ cottages.264 Many were without decent sanitary facilities 
and some without a privy at all. Poor sanitation and overcrowding no doubt contributed to the 
cholera epidemic in Tittleshall, which was caused by a ‘defective state of the drainage of the 
village’.265 Keary optimistically wrote ‘there can be little doubt that the causes which 
occasioned the late dreadful mortality will be removed’ and his prediction was largely 
vindicated by Leicester’s enduring commitment to cottage improvement.266 
 The initial period following 1851 was largely spent attempting to remedy the ills Keary 
brought to attention in his report. Yet in the longer term, greater attention was taken to the 
state of the cottages on the estate. An 1885 notebook in the records entitled ‘Complaints of 
Cottagers’ contains a list of labourers living in estate cottages alongside their various requests 
for repairs. Phrases like ‘pump out of order’, ‘water bad’, ‘windows very bad’, ‘stairs want 
attending to’ and ‘wet comes in at roof’, appear regularly.267 Some cottagers, such as the 
widow Mrs Butters, would ask for extra space or new amenities, like store rooms, new ovens, 
garden gates and washhouses.268 Although these items were often ‘not promised’, the 
situation was regularly reviewed.269 Evidence of the letting of land at Holkham suggests that as 
early as 1860 (and perhaps earlier) allotments of roughly two acres were being given to 
labourers like Edward Arnold of Wells.270 It is evident that the primary task of Leicester’s 
cottage improvement campaign was to improve existing cottage accommodation and to 
provide better facilities for labourers’ houses and gardens. While not all cottagers’ complaints 
were addressed, the estate office did at least become better at recording them for future 
reassessment. 
 Yet Leicester’s concern for the welfare of labourers was not only confined to improving 
existing cottage accommodation; a significant piece of his legacy rested on his extensive and 
prolonged building campaign for the provision of new cottages. Between 1850 and 1880, there 
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was a steady rise in expenditure on new cottages and it is estimated that 100 new cottages 
were built in this time.271 And yet it appears that this rise in expenditure was further increased 
so that by 1895, there were 730 cottages on the estate.272 In order to reach his target of having 
one cottage per 50 acres on the estate Leicester would need 100 more; yet taking account of 
the level of rural out-migration, which had risen particularly during the agricultural depression, 
the estate probably had sufficient cottages to prevent overcrowding by the turn of the 
century.  
 Wade Martins argues that Leicester’s interest cottage building and the resultant 
increase in expenditure for such activity was due to the repeal of the Settlement Laws in 1865, 
which ‘removed the incentive to keep down the number of labourers resident in an estate 
parish’.273 She reminds her readers that the proportion of total estate expenditure spent on 
cottages was always low and that Leicester’s approach to cottages building was one of 
economy.274 Yet Wade Martins seems to underplay the level of paternal concern Leicester 
displayed towards the labouring classes. Firstly, the repeal of the Settlement Laws does not 
account for the interest in cottage improvement before 1865, when it was first cultivated. If 
Leicester was not interested in improving cottage provision on the estate before 1865, then 
why was Keary instructed to carry out such an extensive report in 1851? And why did Leicester 
then act on its findings and embark on a lasting cottage improvement program? Despite Wade 
Martins’ claims, Leicester’s interest in cottage provision was in actuality more influenced by 
paternalism than by economic expediency. 
 His paternal influences were certainly evident in a speech he made to the Norfolk 
Agricultural Association in 1866, in which he claimed to own 521 cottages supplying about 450 
able-bodied labourers.275 He calculated that 950 labourers were required to cultivate the 
entire estate. The ‘home supply’ of labourers (those 450 living in estate cottages), he claimed, 
earned 10-12s per week and paid rents of £2.17.4 per year.276 ‘The other 500 who are needed 
for proper cultivation,’ he went on to say, ‘may be living in cottages put up by speculative 
builders and paying rents of between £4 and £5 per year. These houses are usually poor and 
hardly ever have a garden. The labourers have to walk three or four miles to work... The time is 
not far distant when the first requirements of a farm will not be ample farmsteads, but 
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sufficient cottages.’277 Although the practical need to provide his tenants with a reliable 
workforce was clearly important to Leicester, one cannot disassociate this from a genuine 
concern that labourers should not suffer excessive rents, poor accommodation or having to 
walk such long distances to their workplaces. Leicester also resisted unrestrained capitalist 
thought when he prevented his cottagers from allowing lodgers and required their married 
children to find their own homes in an attempt to resolve overcrowding issues on the estate.278 
 Although cottage provision tended to be better on larger estates, the high standard 
achieved at Holkham by the turn of the century was ‘certainly not achieved elsewhere’ and as 
a result Leicester was praised by various Royal Commissions for his efforts.279 The worst 
cottages tended to be on smaller estates, where there was less capital and less potential to 
build efficiently. Joseph Arch wrote that the ‘worst sinners’ were the small proprietors whose 
cottages were ‘a disgrace to civilisation’.280 Leicester’s concern for the welfare of farm 
labourers, particularly their housing is accountable, at least in part, for why he was never 
singled out as a target for abuse on the labourers’ union platforms.281 Another reason may lie 
in his extensive and generous patronage of local charities and hospitals which will be dealt 
with in greater detail in a later section. 
So far this chapter has attempted to promote the idea that Leicester held a close 
affinity to his tenants and their labourers which was the result of his paternalism. But how did 
Leicester react to the agricultural depression? Was his reaction merely managerial or 
entrepreneurial? And to what extent did his paternalism remain intact when the estate’s 
rental income declined so drastically? It will here be argued that Leicester’s was a managerial 
response to the depression, whereby he reduced rents and maintained expenditure but fell 
short in his creative solutions to the problems. 
 Rents on the Holkham estate were systematically reduced to relieve the tenants of 
most of the financial burden of depression. A document that compares the rents of just under 
70 tenants between the years of 1878 and 1893 displays the impressive scale of reductions.282 
The lowest level of rent reduction for any tenant was 14.6 per cent, while the highest was 100 
per cent.283 In Leicester’s 1892 letter to Chaplin, he had claimed that two farms amounting to 
                                                             
277  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.241 
278  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.241 
279  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.242 
280  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.243 
281
  Clarke and Wade Martins, ‘Coke, Thomas William, second earl of Leicester of Holkham (1822–1909), 
agriculturist and landowner,’ 
282  Holkham MSS., F/2E/17, Rent Reductions 1873-93 
283  Holkham MSS., F/2E/17, Rent Reductions 1873-93 
59 
 
729 acres were being let rent free and remarked that this arrangement would likely have to be 
carried out on other farms.284 Indeed a year later it was three farms amounting to 1298 acres 
being let rent free.285 However, such examples were still infrequent. The average rent 
reduction between these years was 43.1 per cent.286 Even by discounting those anomalous 
three farms at 100 per cent reduction when calculating the average it still stood at an 
impressive 40.44 per cent.287 
 The level of estate expenditure in 1878 was only slightly above that of 1891, with both 
figures residing above £20,000.288 In the estate accounts for the years in between, expenditure 
was always around £20,000.289 In 1881 it actually increased to £23,592 and further still in 1885 
when it was £24,815; while in 1889 it was £19,028.290 The more staggering figure in Leicester’s 
letter to Chaplin was his total expenditure on the estate between 1841 and 1891, which 
amounted to £367,981 and with the purchase of estates (£190,175) amounted to £558,156.291 
The net gain in the acreage of the estate in these years totalled 2511 acres (1936 acres 
purchased and 575 acres gained through enclosure and reclamation).292 Not only did Leicester 
maintain his spending on improving the estate up to 1892, but he also continued to purchase 
land to enlarge the estate. This was not a common action for landowners during the 
depression. Smaller landowners would rarely be in so good a position as to be able to purchase 
more land, if indeed they wanted to. One wonders with a fall in the profitability of arable 
farming, what enabled and inclined Leicester to enlarge the estate further, even if land prices 
had fallen.  
 After 1891, estate expenditure began to decline. In 1896 it was a mere £12,505.293 It 
1901 it increased a little to £13,488, but still fell short of its level in the 1880s.294 There is no 
specific evidence within the records which explains this significant decline, however it is 
plausible that Leicester took heed of his own advice that landlords would ‘not bear much more 
squeezing’ and finally relented to a more frugal approach to expenditure. In doing so he was 
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part of a trend among landowners to reduce expenditure as described by Hunt & Pam.295 
However, Leicester’s expenditure was maintained for longer than most landlords, who tended 
to reduce their expenditure, like Chaplin, in the mid 1880s. After such an extensive period of 
expenditure on his estates, which totalled £367,981 by 1891, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the estate no longer required annual expenditure at such a high level.296 This was certainly the 
case for Leicester’s cottage building program, which had largely been successful in achieving its 
goal by the turn of the century. While expenditure dropped after 1891, it never dropped as 
low as it was in 1841, when Leicester inherited the estate and it was a mere £7608.297 
 According to Hunt & Pam’s criteria Leicester’s was a ‘managerial’ response to the 
depression. He reduced rents and maintained estate expenditure and investment until the 
1890s. This gave his tenant the confidence to carry on farming when the general mood in 
British agriculture was one of defeatism and fatalism. Was there any entrepreneurial response 
to the depression at Holkham? Apart from Leicester’s usual estate expenditure on 
improvements like repairs, roads, drainage and new buildings, in what ways did he invest to 
could promote local agrarian economic growth?  
 As Chaplin’s example has shown, a managerial response devoid of any 
entrepreneurship could lead to financial ruin for a landowner. What level of income was 
required for Leicester to be safe from similar financial ruin and for him to continue to reside at 
Holkham? How did he not only survive the agricultural depression but maintain his elite 
position among the wealthiest men in the country? The next section will argue that Leicester’s 
‘entrepreneurial’ response was, as with Chaplin, limited to the improvement of railway 
networks in the locality. It will propose that he maintained his enormous wealth largely by 
investing outside of agriculture, into various railway, mineral and banking companies and by 
drawing an additional income from the dividends on these investments. Unlike his estate 
management, his investments outside of agriculture were passive and this had important 
ramifications to the future of paternalism. These investments were only part of a general trend 
amongst the aristocracy and as a result they came to rely less and less on agriculture to supply 
them with wealth. Land had already been losing its status and importance in national politics 
and society and because of the depression it was failing to provide the aristocracy with wealth 
and status. Although they may have maintained the appearance of still being rural people, it 
was mostly a facade that concealed the fact that they were gradually losing interest in 
                                                             
295
  E. H. Hunt and S. J. Pam, ‘Responding to Agricultural Depression, 1873-96: managerial success, 
entrepreneurial failure?’, Agricultural Historical Review, 50:2 (2002), p.240 
296  Holkham MSS., F/2E/13, Letter to Henry Chaplin MP 
297  Holkham MSS., F/2E/13, Letter to Henry Chaplin MP 
61 
 
agriculture and their association with land was disintegrating. This gradually removed the 
sense of duty and obligation the aristocracy felt to the inhabitants of their estates. The 
agricultural depression therefore provided the pretext for the gradual demise of paternalism.  
 
II 
 The agricultural depression had a profound effect on Leicester’s disposition. 
Disheartened by the prolonged financial ‘squeezing’ he had been suffering, Leicester wrote to 
his agent, Shellabear, in 1884.298 He requested Shellabear’s opinion on the future financial 
prospects for his son, Viscount Coke, were he, Leicester, to die in the near future.299 The tone 
of the letter is of trepidation, gloom and despondency. Leicester even justified his sombre 
tone, writing ‘bear in mind that it is much wiser in a case of this kind to take a gloomy view, 
and in all matters of money to take care and be on the safe side’.300  
 Shellabear had already suggested to Leicester that the net income of the estate was 
unlikely to fall below £30,000 per annum in the future.301 Yet Leicester still sought assurance 
from Shellabear that he earnestly believed this and that he could give good reasons why.302 
Leicester strongly believed that if the net income fell below this amount, his son would not be 
able to justify living at Holkham Hall and possibly face even worse financial difficulties as the 
estate itself depreciated in value.303 This suggests that £30,000 was the annual income 
required to for an Earl of Leicester’s living expenses and to keep Holkham Hall itself up and 
running.304 One wonders, with the net profit of estate at only £28,316 in 1885, how was 
Leicester able to avoid such difficulties himself? 
‘My future is of little importance, not so that of Lord Coke,’ he writes, ‘and what that 
will be will depend much upon the manner in which I may apply the surplus that may be 
available during my life.’305 Yet he goes on to say ‘it was never my intention that Lord Coke 
should derive any advantage from any investments I might make, beyond giving him entire 
freedom from any charges on the Estate that might occur from my second marriage’.306 It is 
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not clear from the letter with whom or where Leicester had decided to dispose his surplus 
wealth, though the next section will make some suggestions. 
Leicester wanted to ensure that although his son would be supported by an estate that 
was still sustainable, he would be free to achieve his own successes and not be reliant upon his 
father’s surplus wealth. In the subtext of the letter is an insinuation of shame at having been 
successful in generating wealth outside of agriculture. Perhaps Leicester’s middle class values 
are partly the cause of this discomfiture, yet it is likely that it existed among the aristocracy 
more generally. Despite the unity and affiliation between the aristocracy and the ‘City men’ 
that Cain and Hopkins allude to, the Victorian aristocracy were still extremely hierarchical in 
nature and obsessed by social status. Land for so many hundreds of years had been the basis 
of their power and influence and was vital to plotting one’s place within the social hierarchy. 
As the depression wore on and land began to lose its status, it is little wonder the landed elites 
were somewhat embarrassed of their passive investments in non-agricultural enterprises. To 
the other classes, their investments must have been seen as a means of survival and by 
admitting as much, the aristocracy were essentially acknowledging their own ‘decline and fall’. 
  The landed elites were predominantly paternalists, who were aware that 
landownership enabled them to hold high levels of local power and influence, which mere 
investment in other sectors could not. There was also a certain degree of emotional 
connection between the elites and their land. Often it had been bought by their distant 
ancestors and stayed within the family for many generations. An aristocrat’s land was imbued 
with a great sense of tradition and would have been vital in constructing their identity. If 
agriculture did not recover then the economic, social and political value of land to them would 
diminish. And to rely on the wealth accumulated by other ventures was to betray the very 
foundation of their paternalism, power, influence and identity. However, without such careful 
diversification and adaptation of the source of their wealth, the aristocracy’s ‘decline and fall’ 
would undoubtedly have begun much sooner and been much more severe. 
 According to Wade Martins, aristocrats had two distinct options when it came to 
spending their disposable income. ‘They could either use it for very lavish living,’ she writes, ‘or 
they could invest it in concerns outside their estates’.307 While the first option would support 
the local economy to an extent, by employing local labour, it would have very little effect on 
the local or national life.308 The second option however, as well as generating wealth for the 
aristocrat in spite of the agricultural depression, ‘could be of great benefit to economic growth 
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and thus landed wealth could be providing capital for others’.309 ‘If the earl chose to invest his 
wealth rather than simply to spend it on conspicuous consumption,’ she writes ‘then his 
influence on the economy could extend well beyond the boundaries of his estates’.310 
What Wade Martins overlooks is that by extending their influence beyond the estate 
in such a way, the aristocracy were also gradually reducing their influence within the estate. As 
they came to rely less on their estate’s rental income and more on alternative means for 
providing them with wealth, land became less important to the aristocrat and so too did the 
obligations it entailed. Paternalism slowly became uprooted and was almost discarded as a 
social norm from the array of aristocratic behaviour. It is possible that this trend could have 
been slowed or even reversed, if wealth generated by non-agricultural concerns was used to 
reinvest back into the estate. This action could itself be motivated by paternalism and in turn 
secure a future for paternalism on English estates. The landowner could even use such wealth 
to invest in entrepreneurial schemes that could enable all the estate’s inhabitants to prosper 
and thus further the cause of paternalism on his estate, by achieving greater local status. 
Yet this did not commonly happen on the estates of England and certainly not at 
Holkham. For Leicester, his non-agricultural concerns were used to support his declining rental 
income but not used to significantly extend his landed influence. Although it is true that 
Leicester bought land and extended his estates during his lifetime, this never amounted to 
much more than a 5% increase.311 The depression significantly reduced the demand for land as 
it was no longer seen as an economically profitable asset. Furthermore, Wade Martins claims 
that Leicester’s rapidly increasing investment in stocks and shares in the 1870s and 1880s 
accompanied a decline in investment in estate improvement from about 20% to 10%.312 She 
also asserts that even as late as 1890, agricultural income was still more important to 
Leicester, yet this will be contested hereon.313 
Leicester’s investments can easily be divided into two categories: they were either 
localised or international. His localised investments, often influenced by his own interests, 
were into local and occasionally national ventures. They were usually of an agrarian nature and 
often indirectly improved his estate and its infrastructure. The inhabitants of his estate could 
often enjoy the non-monetary benefits these investments produced and they were in this 
sense an expression of paternalism. Leicester’s international, or colonial, investments were 
quite different. They were largely passive investments in colonial and foreign companies. Due 
                                                             
309  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.61 
310
  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.61 
311
  Holkham MSS., F/2E/15-16, Purchases and Sales 1841-91 
312  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.64 
313  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.64 
64 
 
to their passive nature, they cannot be seen as an expression of paternalism, although colonial 
investment could be seen as a kind of imperial duty for the aristocracy. They were generally 
much more profitable than his localised investments. 
Throughout his long life ‘Coke of Norfolk’ invested in only two organisations – the Lynn 
Theatre and the Reform Club – and both of these were local. Both investments likely had the 
sole aim of consolidating his local social and political influence and were an ordinary 
expression of aristocratic benevolence.314 ‘Coke of Norfolk’, a man who reproved of gambling 
as a vice, never wholeheartedly invested outside of agriculture because he distrusted such 
activity and feared losing money.315 His great uncle (or Leicester’s great great uncle) Thomas 
Coke, 1st Earl of Leicester of Holkham, of the earlier creation, had lost a significant amount of 
money through the ‘South Sea Bubble’.316 Coke had originally laid out £58,300 in 1720 on 
South Sea stock, but only actually ever made payment on £48,900 of this amount. When the 
bubble burst, his total loses reached a staggering £37,928.317 R. A. C. Parker remarks ‘the 
events of 1720 help to explain why the Cokes never plunged again into the stock market’, until 
three generations of the family and 120 years had passed.318 Perhaps the moral of this family 
fable escaped Leicester, because upon attaining his inheritance he quickly began to invest his 
surplus wealth in a variety of ways and continued to do so until he died.319 
Leicester’s early investments were also localised and reflected his interests. His first 
investment was in 1846 for £150 worth of stock in the Royal Agricultural College at 
Cirencester.320 As a keen agriculturalist and member of the Royal Agricultural Society of 
England (R.A.S.E.), it is rather expected of Leicester, but it may have been made with his 
tenants in mind. The college promoted the scientific and innovative approach to farming for 
which R.A.S.E. and its supporters had become famous.321 By investing in greater learning in 
farming, his tenants and British agriculture more generally could potentially benefit in the long 
term. His next investments were also in the agricultural vein. In 1853 he invested £100 into the 
Corn Exchange at Fakenham and again in 1857 he invested £24 into  East Dereham Corn 
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Exchange.322 Corn exchanges would help to open up new markets for farmers’ produce and 
could enable opportunities for greater prosperity during the later depression. These were 
clearly investments and not donations but it is not clear how good the return on them was. 
Leicester’s investment in local railways followed a general trend among the British 
aristocracy at the time.323 It was clearly not blind investment as he knew he would both 
directly and indirectly benefit from it. Not only would he see a return of capital but his tenants 
and other estate inhabitants would benefit from the improved communication and 
infrastructure on the estate, which in turn could make his property more valuable. In 1855 
Leicester owned £11,640 worth of Wells and Fakenham Railway shares, but his involvement 
with the railway was nothing short of vital.324 It was Leicester who had formed the Wells and 
Fakenham Company, alongside other smaller landowners and some directors of the Norfolk 
Railway Company in 1853. It was incorporated in 1854 with a capital of £70,000. The line was 
opened in 1857 and in 1862 it was vested in the Great Eastern Railway, of which Leicester was 
also an investor.325 Indeed from his initial investment in the Wells and Fakenham company and 
the West Norfolk Junction railway (£2628), he began to invest in larger railway companies 
servicing wider areas around Norfolk. These included varied investments in the Great Eastern, 
the North Eastern, the Great Western and the London & North Western, which collectively 
totalled £49,763 in the 1870s.326 A further £64,430 worth of British railway stock was 
purchased in the early 1880s.327 
After 1870, Leicester’s investments became much wider in their scope and the ensuing 
investments tended to be dominated by colonial railway, mineral and banking companies. Yet 
there were still a handful of local companies which received Leicester’s backing. £1000 worth 
of shares in the Norfolk County School at North Elmham were purchased in 1874.328 £5 was 
spent in backing the Walsingham Coffee House Company in 1880.329 Rather expectedly, he 
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invested £500 in the Norfolk and Norwich Agricultural Hall Company in 1881, £20 in the 
Farmer’s Foundry Company in 1885 and £1000 in Lawes Manure Company in 1888.330 From the 
1880s he was investing in breweries, which were favoured by other aristocrats such as the 
Duke of Portland.331 By investing in local businesses, Leicester was enacting a positive response 
to the agricultural depression, in that he was encouraging local economic growth, which 
generated greater demand for local produce and helped to create jobs for those who had been 
made redundant by farmers’ cutbacks. 
Leicester’s colonial and foreign investments, which again followed the wider trends 
among the aristocratic export of capital, began in 1870 with the purchase of £10,891 of stock 
in the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company.332 Initially at least, aristocratic investment 
favoured the railways of the Empire and India was the most favoured recipient. The peak year 
for investment from Britain into Indian Railways was 1866 in which £7.7million of capital was 
provided.333 In missing the peak years Leicester was clearly following the trend rather than 
setting it, but he soon caught up spending £51,533 on Indian railway stock between 1870 and 
1878.334 Alongside the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company there were three other 
recipients of Leicester’s investment: the Madras Railway Company (£17,411), the South Indian 
Railway Company (£11,552) and the Scinde Delhi and Punjaub Railway Company (£11,679).335 
This investment in Indian railways occurred during the final ‘golden years’ of British 
agriculture, when Leicester’s estate was still highly profitable. In order to understand the scale 
of Leicester’s investments we must set them in context. The £51,533 he invested into Indian 
railways over a period of eight years was only £5000-£10,000 above the standard net profit of 
the estate for one year in the 1870s.336 Indeed the grand total of Leicester’s investments in the 
1870s of £88,842 is still small in comparison to the total estate income for that decade of 
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£749,924.337 Leicester’s investments in the 1870s were still rather cautious and there was none 
of the sense of necessity or urgency to invest that there was in the following decade. While 
agriculture was still thriving his investments seem to have provided him with less important 
supplementary income. 
As the depression was becoming prolonged, Leicester’s investments increased in scale 
and he came to rely much more on their returns to supplement his falling rental income. After 
spending £64,340 on British railway stock in the early 1880s, in 1886 the focus fell again on 
colonial and foreign interests. However these were expanded out from India to Australia, 
Canada, South Africa, and South America. In the four years between 1886 and 1890, £55,090 
was invested in these four areas. Again this mainly began with railway companies like the 
Quebec & Ontario and the Buenos Aires & Pacific, but soon after expanded to mineral 
companies, banks and government stock.338 Companies as diverse as the Transvaal Gold 
Mining Estates and the Manitoba Mortgage & Invesment Company received Leicester’s 
backing.339  The aristocracy’s investment in banking companies supports Cain and Hopkins’ 
notion of unity among aristocrats and bankers based on their gentlemanly capitalism.340 During 
the 1880s, when total estate income was £441,521, Leicester’s non-estate investments 
totalled £233,400.341 This marks an increase of investments equalling 12% of total estate 
income in the 1870s to 53% in the 1880s. Clearly as agricultural depression became an 
established normality, Leicester and his fellow aristocrats felt a greater sense of urgency to 
invest their way out of financial insecurity.  
 Through a lack of evidence available to her at the time of her research Wade Martins 
was forced to speculate about Leicester’s investments after 1891. Wade Martins suggested 
that the ensuing investments were of character similar to those of the 1880s except that more 
bank shares were purchased. Since then a more comprehensive document listing all of 
Leicester’s investments throughout his life has been discovered and it largely vindicates her 
                                                             
337  Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.64 
338
  Holkham MSS., F/2E/5, Earl of Leicester’s Investments 1843-1911 
339  Holkham MSS., F/2E/5, Earl of Leicester’s Investments 1843-1911 
340  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism Vol. 1, p.185, P. J. Cain, and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 
Vol. 2: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, (Longman, London, 1993), p.305 
341 This investments total for the 1880s was calculated using ‘Holkham MSS., F/2E/5: Earl of Leicester’s 
Investments 1843-1911’. Wade Martins alternatively claims the 1880s investments total was £190,384 
and hence 43% of total estate income in this period. The disparity has likely occurred because Wade 
Martins did not have access to the more comprehensive list of investments mentioned above. See the 
abovementioned document and Wade Martins, A Great Estate at Work, p.64 
68 
 
prediction.342 The total expenditure on non-estate investments upon Leicester’s death stood at 
a colossal £553,157.343 This suggests that while his investments following 1890 were in a 
similar vein to those before, the 1880s remains by far the most productive decade for 
investment activity.  
It is unclear from any document with the records what the exact returns on Leicester’s 
investments were, although 5% is a figure that appears regularly alongside descriptions of 
stock in the registers. If we were to take this 5% as only a suggestive average for returns, then 
we could say that upon his death in 1911, Leicester’s annual dividend income may have stood 
at over £27,000. Wade Martins claims that ‘even as late as 1890 agricultural income was more 
important than that from investments’.344 However it is likely that returns on investments 
overtook agricultural income at some point in the 1890s, as the suggested figure for Leicester’s 
dividend income in 1901 (5% of £512,180) is £25,609, whilst the net profit of the estate was a 
mere £18,218.345 
There is scope for arguing that by investing in the colonies, the aristocracy were 
fulfilling a duty, albeit a duty with wider national and international ramifications than those 
ordinarily local paternal duties. The British aristocracy, through their export of capital, were 
indeed extending their influence abroad, possibly as a reaction to their declining influence at 
home. However, there was a degree of irony in their investments in American railways. 
Leicester, following the wider trends among the aristocracy, purchased shares in a number of 
railway companies in the U.S.A., including the Chicago, Milwaukie & St Paul and the Illinois 
Central.346 By doing so the aristocracy were contributing further to the problems causing the 
agricultural depression in Britain, as they were providing capital for the improvement of 
American transport links, which in turn meant that America was able to provide British food 
producers with even greater competition in prices. Furthermore, British industry, also suffering 
from the effects of a depression, was under-capitalised and in need of investment.347 It is 
therefore difficult to view the aristocracy’s colonial investments in terms of paternalism, even 
if they did justify them to themselves as part of a wider imperial duty.  
Whilst the agricultural depression was significantly reducing Leicester’s estate income, 
his investments outside of the estate were increasingly being used to enable him not only to 
survive the agricultural depression, but to remain among the top 50 wealthiest people in the 
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country.348 However, crucially the capital returns from his investments were not being 
reinvested back into the estate. As Wade Martins asserts the increasing proportion of total 
estate income spent on investments during the years of the depression was accompanied by a 
decline in investment in estate improvement.349 As with his patronage which will be dealt with 
in the coming section, the companies and ventures Leicester tended to invest in often 
reflected his own interests. He tended to follow wider trends and therefore his investments 
can be seen as representative of the aristocratic export of capital in this period.350 Railway 
companies were the most popular beneficiaries of aristocratic investment. As the example of 
Henry Chaplin has shown, involvement in local railway ventures enabled the landowner to 
display their paternalist mentality and gain themselves greater local status and influence, 
which perhaps explains why railways initially provided such a popular outlet for investment. 
Involvement in railways local, national and international could confer greater status upon a 
Victorian landowner in the same way land had hitherto. As will be seen later philanthropy also 
had this ability. Local railway investment was also a positive response to the agricultural 
depression as it improved the infrastructure of an estate and the locality and had the potential 
to open up new markets for farmers’ produce. Corn exchanges too had much the same effect 
of opening up markets for local farmers’ produce, whilst Leicester’s investment in the Royal 
Agricultural College was a means of promoting greater innovation in farming in response to 
the problems entailed by depression. Other local investments were also positive in that they 
could promote local economic growth and offset the worst effects of the depression. 
Colonial investments may be seen as pertaining to a sense of duty that was part of the 
wider Imperial mission that had existed among the ruling patrician class since the formative 
days of the British Empire. However, in attempting to extend their influence in the wider 
world, possibly as a reaction to their acknowledged declining national influence, the 
aristocracy in actuality contributed further to the decline of their local influence. As land 
became less profitable, their estates could rely less and less upon their wealth, resources and 
time, especially since foreign investments were profitable and effortless. Land became less 
important to the aristocrat and as a result the aristocrat’s sense of obligation to the estate 
declined, which can be seen in the decrease in estate expenditure at Holkham. Thus 
paternalism, as the dominant ideology which both enabled and enforced the social hierarchy 
in rural England, began to expire. Furthermore not only were struggling British industries in 
need of capital, but aristocratic foreign investment also indirectly pitted British agriculture 
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against greater competition from abroad, which further exacerbated the symptoms of 
depression. 
Wade Martins claims that since Leicester’s influence on non-agricultural economic 
affairs was slight, he must be classed ‘primarily as an agriculturalist’, even if he was relieved to 
be drawing income from other sources during the depression.351 It is difficult to see how else 
Leicester would have viewed himself, given his family’s established fame in agriculture and his 
implied disapproval of non-agricultural forms of income in the letter at the beginning of this 
section. Yet it is easy to view Leicester as the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ that Cain and Hopkins 
have identified. Although evidence in the estate records has not been forthcoming, it is worth 
raising the question of who exactly was advising Leicester on his investments. Was it his agents 
or ‘City’ friends? Despite initially resolving not to allow his son Lord Coke to derive any benefits 
of his investments, in later documents we find Lord Coke’s name appearing as an investor in 
his own right.352 Towards the end of Leicester’s life he also bequeathed large proportions of his 
stocks and shares to members of his family.353 And yet what of the surplus wealth that 
Leicester’s investments generated? We know that it was not used for re-investment in the 
Holkham estate, but was it used on philanthropic measures to bolster Leicester’s status in the 
locality and to maintain the appearance of a healthy paternalism on the estate? 
 
III 
On the 23 January 1897 a meeting was convened the Mayor of Norwich and Lord 
Leicester to decide how the county should commemorate Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee.354 
Leicester, as chair of the meeting, stood up to speak. Already ‘partially blind and wholly deaf’, 
he reminded his audience of his old age by reminiscing that he had been at Queen Victoria’s 
coronation as a page to the Duke of Sussex.355 He rightly predicted that, due to his old age and 
infirmities, it would be his last ever public speech.356 He went on: 
 
I have been her Majesty’s Lieutenant for this county and for the city for more than half a 
century, and I thought this might be a fitting opportunity for me to make my final appeal to the 
County of Norfolk and the City of Norwich... The Mayor of Norwich agrees with me that it would 
be better now, as on many former occasions, that the county and the city should combine to 
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express their gratitude to her Majesty for the control that she has exercised, for the example 
that she has set, by which England is more prosperous, more happy, more contented, and, I 
believe, more moral than it was when she commenced her reign. It is for you to determine in 
what form you will commemorate this eventful year.
357
 
 
 After some applause, he went on to provide examples of national schemes begun in 
other parts of the country. In one such scheme, set up by the Duke of Westminster, to which 
Leicester had already contributed, funds were being raised for the Institution of Nurses for the 
Poor.358 Although Leicester doubted that Norfolk inhabitants would be content without a 
memorial that would ‘mark for future generations the great loyalty and respect... held for her 
Majesty in the year 1897’, he also remarked ‘I believe her Majesty would be best pleased if all 
contributions tended in some measure to the relief of the sick and suffering of her poorer 
subjects’.359 It was decided that a new hospital for children would be established separately 
from the adult Norfolk and Norwich Hospital, of which Leicester was already a major 
benefactor.360 The new hospital was to be called the Jenny Lind Hospital for Children and 
Leicester agreed to head the fund with a £3000 donation.361 
This episode is revealing of the role of the aristocrat in both the provincial and civic life 
of the country at the turn of the century.  As late as 1897 and in the grips of old age and 
infirmity, Leicester clearly still felt the weight of public expectation upon him and that his 
community was reliant on him to carry out duties for the public good. While he called on those 
in attendance and the wider community to contribute towards the hospital, he lead by 
example and was the first to endow the fund with a large donation. 
The episode is also revealing of the aristocracy’s communicative role between the 
sovereign and her subjects. Leicester expressed his admiration for Queen Victoria’s ability to 
make England happier, more content and most importantly more moral than it had been 
before. The subtext of these words was likely intended to remind his audience of the 
aristocracy’s role in being the agents of these positive changes. While it may have been Queen 
Victoria who had lead the campaign to improve the moral character of the nation, it was her 
nobility who were intended to provide moral leadership in the localities. Indeed paternalism 
enabled and encouraged them to promote the moral economy of their estates. By being 
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publicly charitable an aristocrat could simultaneously promote charitable attitudes among the 
general populous towards one another and deepen the deference of the lower classes.  
The organisations that received the patronage of an aristocrat tended to be linked to 
his individual interests. As Wade Martins remarks Leicester supported ‘generously anything in 
which he was really interested’.362 It is therefore unsurprising that in his old age infirmity, 
Leicester was a proponent of improving public health. Leicester’s obituary in the Eastern Daily 
Press lists his substantial endowments to public health schemes, as the accumulated totals of 
large grants he had given over a long period of his life.363 In addition to the £3000 he gave to 
the children’s hospital, Leicester gave £15,000 to the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital 
Endowment, £20,000 to the Fletcher Home endowment (a convalescent home associated with 
the hospital), £20,000 to the Nurses Home.364 Over the course of his life Leicester gave more 
than £58,000 or the equivalent of one and a half year’s rental income during the prosperous 
1870s, solely to improve the public health of his county.365 Yet the largest proportion of this 
£58,000 was not given during the prosperity of the 1870s but later, during the agricultural 
depression. While it is true that £13,000 was given towards the hospital in 1876, a further 
£2000 was given in 1881, the £20,000 towards the Fletcher Home in 1890 and the £20,000 
towards the Nurses’ Home in 1899.366  
Yet his support for public health did not end with these large grants. They were 
supplemented with annual subscriptions, including £120 per annum to the Hospital.367 He was 
for many years an annual subscriber to the Norwich Institution for the Indigent Blind and in 
1893 was made a life governor. He gave £200 towards the rebuilding of the institution in 1889 
and also £500 to the Eye Infirmary of which he was president.368 He gave £2100 over a course 
of years to the Kelling Sanatorium. He contributed to further convalescent homes in 
Hunstanton, Lowestoft and Cromer, a blind school and the West Norfolk and Lynn Hospital.369 
Clearly the authors of Leicester’s obituary were vindicated in claiming that he, ‘through the 
whole of his long life kept the relief of the sick and suffering steadily before him’.370  
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Leicester’s involvement with these medical institutions was not limited to the 
provision of funds. In 1846 he was made president of the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital and 
‘took a lead in promoting new building’.371 When it was decided in 1876 that the ‘resources of 
the Hospital were inadequate to meet the annual expenditure’, a meeting was held at which 
Leicester ensured that his friend the Prince of Wales was in attendance and able to provide 
good coverage and weighty support to its resolutions.372 The large quantity of correspondence 
concerning the Hospital within the estate records are also evidence of the time and effort 
Leicester confided in the cause.373 As a result of both Leicester’s funds and labours, the Eastern 
Daily Press implied that his legacy would be anchored in his advocacy of public health: ‘[his] 
name will be associated with the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital as long as that great pile 
stands’.374 
Wade Martins claims that Leicester’s charitable activities ‘suggest that the earl was a 
man who did not get involved in too many schemes, but who remained wealthy enough 
throughout the period to support generously anything in which he was really interested’.375 
However, contrary to Wade Martins’ claim, closer inspection of Leicester’s donations reveal 
that he was interested in and supported a variety of distinct organisations, both locally and 
nationally.  
In a list of donations given ‘in lieu of annual subscriptions’ we find Leicester regularly 
patronising churches and their restoration, for example in 1862 he gave £100 toward the 
restoration of Gt Massingham Church and in 1864 he gave £20 for the restoration of Bintry 
Church.376 (He was also a patron of the residences of clergymen in the county, for example 
Billingford Rectory at a value of £300 per annum and Holkham Vicarage at a value of £330 per 
annum.)377 He gave sums to general charities such as the London Society for the Relief of 
Distress, which he gave £25 over three years and £25 to the Agricultural Benevolent Society in 
1864.378 He supported schools such as Billingford School (£30 in 1843) and Bawdeswell & 
Foxley School (£20 in 1852), as well as organisations that promoted greater learning, as varied 
as the Royal College of Chemistry, the Archaeological Institute, the Ipswich Museum, the 
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Horticultural Society, the Zoological Society and Fakenham District Library.379 While the above 
donations all occurred before the agricultural depression, they continued at a similar rate and 
frequency until at least 1898 where the records end. 
The register of Leicester’s annual subscriptions includes 11 schools, 29 charities and 25 
miscellaneous subscriptions, all of which were in a similar vein to those recipients mentioned 
above and include many community-fostering societies such as cricket clubs.380 These annual 
subscriptions were in addition to the already noted subscriptions to the two Norfolk based 
hospitals, and to which should be added the London Hospital, Charing Cross Hospital and Saint 
George’s Hospital.381 While Wade Martin’s is wrong to claim that Leicester’s charity was not 
wide-ranging, she may be vindicated in arguing that public health schemes received the lion’s 
share of it. 
Was the scale of Leicester’s charity maintained, increased or decreased throughout 
the agricultural depression and beyond? By consulting the estate accounts it would be 
exceedingly difficult to answer this question as the disbursement figures for donations and 
subscriptions were only included in the accounts until the mid-1880s, when the estate office 
changed from a ‘ledger’ to an ‘estate accounts’ record book. In the years that we are able to 
ascertain figures for, the scale of charity is largely inconsistent. For example in 1871, £1589 
was spent on donations and subscriptions; for 1876 this figure went down to £997; for 1881 it 
was £2250 and in 1885 it was £953.382 Given the continually frequent appearance of individual 
donations in other records up to 1898, it is likely that the scale of Leicester’s donations and 
subscriptions was at least maintained. This, when taken with the large grants he gave to public 
health schemes (which in not being mentioned in the estate records, presumably came from 
Leicester’s private wealth), suggests that in actuality his charity was increased during the 
period of agricultural depression. It is highly likely that the success of Leicester’s investments 
placed him in a financial position where he was able to make such generous charitable 
donations. 
Aristocratic patronage was largely directed by the interests of the individual aristocrat. 
Since Leicester was particularly interested in public health, hospitals and health institutions 
received the larger part of his benefaction. Their patronage was normally localised, with the 
recipient organisations usually being based on or near the estate where they could service its 
inhabitants. Otherwise they were based in the locality or within the county and only 
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occasionally were they on a national scale. As Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk, Leicester was aware 
of his obligations to the county as well as to his estate. Even by the early twentieth century, 
when the gradual political developments of the previous century had expanded role of the 
state in the public life and made politics more centralised and more democratic, the 
aristocracy’s traditional, paternal, charitable roles had still not dissolved. In an age before the 
beginning of the welfare state, their patronage of local and national organisations, institutions 
and charities was vital to the wellbeing of the nation. 
We must also note the aristocracy’s leadership of their locality. At the time of the 
Queen’s diamond jubilee, it was they who lead the proceedings to commemorate the event in 
the localities and promoted the idea of charity as a fitting memorial to a famously moral 
Queen. Despite the expansion in the scale of the state during the nineteenth century, the 
consensus on the state’s role had not yet extended to the relief of the poor from extreme 
poverty. The aristocracy were still relied upon to encompass this role in the localities. It was 
the contributions of the aristocracy in the nineteenth century and earlier that provided the 
basis for state concerns such as education and health when the welfare state was initiated, 
even if it was the inadequacy of the aristocracy’s provision of welfare in the localities which 
prompted the state to act. 
The aristocracy were put under intense pressure by the agricultural depression when 
trying to carry out this role in the late nineteenth century. Leicester was shrewd enough to 
invest his way out of the worst effects of the depression and it was his supplementary income 
which enabled him to dispose of large tracts of wealth for the benefit of public health. While 
these large donations most likely came from Leicester’s own personal wealth, he also ensured 
that the estate continued its obligations to charities, societies and organisations through 
donations and subscriptions, even when its rental income had declined so decisively. 
 
IV 
Leicester’s obituary in the Eastern Daily Press is saturated with praising 
acknowledgement of his virtuous character, competent estate management and many good 
works. The deferential tone of the writing alone is cause for a study of Leicester and his 
paternalism. Its authors claim that ‘he held a foremost position among the local nobility by 
reason of his lofty public spirit and his magnificent charities. He was the type of all that is most 
desirable in a landed gentleman.’383 He apparently exercised toward his estate ‘and other 
parishes bordering on the park a sort of patriarchal relationship’, through which ‘he fulfilled all 
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the duties of an English country gentleman of the highest and best class’.384 Ultimately the 
obituary defines him as ‘a man of unpretensions... devoted to public and private duty’.385 
Yet the obituary is also important in that, despite its very flattering portrait of the 
aristocrat, none of the above phrases can be said to be wholly untruthful. In light of his 
unpretentious character, his public spirit and charity, the patriarchal relationships he held with 
his dependents and his sense of duty, it becomes easy to understand how he built himself a 
reputation for being ‘all that is most desirable in a landed gentleman’. It is testament to the 
challenges facing the aristocracy in the late nineteenth century that despite displaying such 
seemingly paternal characteristics and building for himself such a fine reputation, Leicester’s 
attempts to adapt to the new era were damaging to the long term endurance of aristocratic 
paternalism. 
Leicester’s example is representative of a large number of aristocrats who also 
attempted to survive the depression, with their wealth intact, by investing surplus wealth into 
non-agricultural ventures that provided ample dividend returns. For Leicester and many of his 
contemporaries, this was the only way in which they attempted to adapt to the changes 
occurring around them. While such action would enable them to survive and even prosper 
during the agricultural depression, it adversely affected aristocratic paternalism. As part of the 
wider gradual changes occurring throughout the nineteenth century, land was already losing 
its ability to confer status and as it began to lose its ability to confer wealth on the aristocracy, 
they looked elsewhere for these functions. In turn they began to lose interest in land, they felt 
less obliged to improve their estates or concerned about the inhabitants and as a result their 
paternalism deteriorated.  
By looking elsewhere, they found non-agricultural investments to confer them with 
wealth, but nothing that could confer them with sort of status that land had hitherto. 
Furthermore these non-agricultural investments were largely passive, which meant the 
aristocrat could not become involved in the management of ventures. They therefore had no 
new jurisdiction in which to practice their paternalism. Only with regard to the railway 
ventures, were aristocrats able to have some involvement and hence the railway investments 
could confer status. Local railway investment and involvement was also a positive and 
entrepreneurial response to the agricultural depression. 
On the whole, the wealth garnered through non-agricultural investments was not 
reinvested back into the landed estates. There were obvious economic reasons for not 
reinvesting heavily into their estates, principally that rental incomes and land values were 
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falling, which meant that agriculture was no longer a prosperous venture. It seems the largest 
proportions of the wealth generated by Leicester’s non-agricultural ventures were reinvested 
back into more of the same concerns in order to generate even greater wealth. That said some 
of this surplus wealth was clearly spent on benevolent patronage and charitable donations. 
Leicester found public health schemes to be a particularly worthy beneficiary of a sizeable 
proportion of the wealth he had amassed through his shrewd investments. In this sense, while 
paternalism may have been negatively affected by non-agricultural investments and the failure 
of landowners to reinvest this wealth into their estates, Leicester provides an example of an 
aristocrat who used his increasingly bountiful wealth for traditionally paternalist 
preoccupations like philanthropy and benevolence. By continuing to patronise organisations 
and institutions for the benefit of the locality, it is possible that Leicester may have enabled 
paternalism to survive for longer and prolonged its ultimate decline. 
In terms of Hunt and Pam’s criteria, Leicester’s was a ‘managerial’ response to the 
depression. In accord with his sense of duty and desire to maintain his patriarchal relationships 
with his tenants, he reduced rents on the estate and maintained long term estate 
improvement expenditure. Elements of Leicester’s investments, particularly in local railways, 
were ‘entrepreneurial’ in that they improved estate infrastructure and potentially opened new 
markets for his tenants’ produce. However, Leicester’s response to the depression was 
predominantly self-interested, in that he was amassing personal wealth to supplement his 
rental income while his tenants, without innovative leadership, were left to struggle with the 
depression almost alone. 
Leicester was representative of the aristocracy in that he was following wider trends of 
aristocratic investment. Yet was his experience the most common way for an aristocrat to 
adapt to the conditions of agricultural depression? Were passive colonial investments the only 
ones which could give the aristocracy large and secure returns? Or were any other aristocrats 
investing in ventures which enabled them to practice their paternalism? The ensuing chapter 
will attempt to answer these questions. 
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Chapter 3 – ‘One of the finest flowers of the Victorian nobility’: 
William Cavendish, seventh duke of Devonshire and his 
industrial ventures in Furness 
Upon inheriting the dukedom and its estates in 1858, William Cavendish, the seventh 
duke of Devonshire’s total accumulated debts stood at £1million.386 Virtually all of it was 
inherited debt. In 1834, alongside inheriting the Burlington title and estates, he had inherited 
£250,000 worth of debt from his grandfather, the first earl of Burlington, who had made 
extremely ambitious purchases of land throughout his lifetime.387 The rest he inherited in 1858 
from his cousin and predecessor, the sixth duke of Devonshire, who had lived exceptionally 
extravagantly and had ‘epitomized the Regency world of self-indulgence’.388 
 Devonshire, a first Smith’s prizeman in Mathematics at Cambridge, immediately set 
about attempting to reduce his debts by embarking on a policy of strict frugality in the 
management of his estates and by investing surplus wealth into industrial enterprises in 
Barrow-in-Furness.389 At first his strategy was remarkably successful, particularly due to the 
impressive returns from the Barrow industries and he built for himself a reputation of being 
the prime example of an ‘industrious, abstemious, virtuous, public-spirited, mid-Victorian 
aristocrat’.390 Yet after Barrow’s industries suffered a massive crash, he died in 1891 leaving his 
son and successor with accumulated total debts worth £2million. 
 On a superficial level the story displays some of the difficult personal circumstances 
that the aristocracy were forced to respond to, alongside the wider political, social and 
economic challenges facing them. Yet on another level Devonshire’s example highlights the 
risks the aristocracy took in attempting to adapt to the new epoch.  
In Devonshire’s case these personal circumstances were his encumbrances and the 
necessity of reducing them. These circumstances have important ramifications upon a study of 
paternalism during the agricultural depression. What affect did Devonshire’s attempts at 
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greater frugality in the management of his estates have on his ability to display paternalism? 
Was Devonshire really influenced by paternalism or was he just concerned with reducing his 
debts? Why did Devonshire invest in industry in the Furness area rather than following the 
trend among the wider aristocracy in making less risky and more passive investments? Was 
Devonshire actively involved in these industries or merely an aloof investor? Did he display a 
paternal sense of duty in his involvement with Barrow industry? How did he respond when 
Barrow’s industries suffered such a massive crash? 
Like Leicester, and unlike Chaplin, Devonshire had ‘no political talent or ambition’.391 
He was also, like Leicester in his later life, socially reclusive, avoiding ‘the frenetic whirl of high 
society’ and ‘reserving his public life for more serious and uplifting pursuits’.392 John Pearson 
claims that Devonshire was never concerned with birth and tradition or pomp and 
circumstance and that ‘by nature and by habit he was profoundly middle-class’ and in this he 
was again similar to Leicester.393 He was also religiously devoted and in his early adult life he 
was ‘happiest when reading Wesley’s sermons’ with his wife Blanche.394 As a result Devonshire 
was desolated by her death at such a young age in 1840. F. M. L. Thompson claims that 
following Blanche’s death Devonshire ‘threw himself into the serious and useful work of the 
personal management of his estates which was to occupy the rest of his life’.395 
Devonshire particularly concerned himself with his Burlington property in Lancashire, 
to which he had grown up as heir and had owned for 24 years before inheriting the dukedom 
of Devonshire. In 1843, together with the Duke of Buccleuch, he played a leading part in 
launching the Furness railway, which ‘was designed to facilitate the transport of their slate and 
iron ore to the coast at the village of Barrow’.396  
Upon realising the level of debt he had inherited in 1858, Devonshire quickly 
developed a twofold strategy for reducing it. Firstly he attempted to reduce the cost of the 
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running of his estates, by endorsing a policy of strict frugality amongst his various agents. 
However, as will be seen he was largely unsuccessful in this, especially when the agricultural 
depression reduced his rental income and his paternal sense of duty prevented him from 
reducing estate investment levels or patronage expenditure. Secondly he embarked upon a 
long term investment campaign in industry in Furness. Thompson claims that the Furness 
ventures were nothing less than ‘the creation, virtually from scratch, of a whole new industrial 
district, and the duke found himself... drawn into the leadership of this process’.397 His 
investments stretched to nearly all of Barrow’s industries, including the Furness Railway 
Company, the Haematite Steel Company, Barrow Docks, a Shipbuilding Company and a Flax 
and Jute Mill. ‘He never adopted a rentier attitude’ towards these possessions; ‘far from 
simply pocketing his mineral royalties and railway dividends he regarded it as a matter of self-
interest and moral duty to use them to finance the further development of the region’.398 In 
the early 1870s, the peak years of Barrow’s industrial success, Devonshire had attained for 
himself a dividend income that almost matched the income from his colossal estates, as well as 
greater status and a reputation among his contemporaries for being ‘“one of the finest flowers 
of the Victorian nobility”’.399 This was perhaps because those around him believed that he had 
successfully shown a way in which the aristocracy could adapt their roles to the new age.  
Yet Barrow’s prosperity was to be short lived as it was hit particularly hard by a slump 
in the British economy and the ending of the ‘Bessemer boom’ in the steel industry. 
Devonshire did not desert Barrow in her time of need and continued to invest enormous 
amounts of capital into the industries, almost at a total loss, in an effort to buoy up the town 
and prevent the effects of devastating unemployment and economic distress. As a result, ‘the 
great entrepreneurial saviour of the family fortunes had been transformed into the source of 
embarrassments much more severe than those caused by the sixth duke’.400 
David Cannadine has presented Devonshire as a business-minded aristocrat, with a 
profoundly middle class sensibility, who, other than investing capital, tended to remain aloof 
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of the routine concerns of his estate and industrial interests.401 J. D. Marshall has gone one 
step further in arguing that Devonshire did not practice or display paternalism at all.402 This 
chapter will agree that Devonshire was of a different character to most aristocrats in that he 
was reclusive, academic, business-minded and influenced by middle class virtues. Yet it will be 
the aim of this chapter to reassert the importance of paternalism as an influence upon 
Devonshire with regard to both the management of his estates and his industrial concerns in 
Barrow. As will be seen, Devonshire’s paternalism is particularly important when attempting to 
explain why he continued to invest in Barrow industry when he knew it would lead to such 
severe personal financial embarrassment.  
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will be devoted to the 
management of Devonshire’s enormous and widely scattered estates. It will detail the 
management structure and attempt to describe the level of Devonshire’s personal 
involvement. It will argue that, in line with the aristocracy at large, Devonshire’s response to 
the agricultural depression was ‘managerial’, in that he dropped rents and maintained 
expenditure. Devonshire also increased patronage expenditure, which is highly suggestive of 
his paternal influences, especially when viewed alongside his desire for greater economies to 
be made on his estates. The second section will argue that Devonshire’s paternalism was most 
obviously evident in his saving Barrow from economic ruin following its crash in the mid 1870s, 
as well as discuss Devonshire’s level of involvement, besides investment, in his industrial 
ventures. The chapter will conclude that Devonshire’s involvement in Barrow industry is 
evidence of the aristocracy attempting to adapt their roles and paternalism to the challenges 
facing them. By failing and draining the family of such enormous wealth, Devonshire’s Barrow 
experiment was ultimately damaging to paternalism and the status of the family, as his 
successors were forced to sell off land and embark upon much stricter retrenchment policies. 
 
I 
 On 14 November  1885, Mr Hattersley, a Chatsworth tenant, wrote to the Devonshire 
with a list of over 40 tenants’ signatures, who had ‘unanimously agreed... in consequence of 
the very depressed state of agriculture in all its branches and... the very low prices in Stock and 
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Produce’, to ask for a ‘substantial return’ to enable them to meet the next rent audit.403 
Hattersley added that they felt that ‘the ten per cent is not sufficient these hard times’, 
indicating that rents had already been reduced.404 Before replying to Hattersley, Devonshire 
had his agents draw up lists detailing his expenditure on each of the 40 tenants’ farms for 
improvements such as new buildings, repairs to existing buildings and draining, over the seven 
years between 1879 and 1885.405 
 Devonshire then wrote back to Hattersley on 24 November 1885 and was careful to 
send a copy to every tenant who had signed the memorial: 
 
The memorial signed by yourself and forty five other Tenants on my Chatsworth Estate has 
received my earnest consideration. 
The continued agricultural depression I am well aware must be a source of much anxiety to my 
Tenants, and I hope I need not say that they have my sincere sympathy in these trying times. 
I have felt it to be my duty and it has been a pleasure to me to give practical proof of this 
sympathy by the expenditure of large sums on the improvement of their holdings, and I find 
that during the last 7 years I have expended £13,500 or 34 per cent annually of the gross rentals 
of the farms of those who have signed the memorial... I also find that the rents on my 
Chatsworth Estate have not been increased except in a few special cases during the last 27 
years, and I believe the holdings are reasonably rented. 
Under these circumstances I cannot consider myself called upon to alter my decision as to the 
amount of return to be given at the coming rent audit. 
It has always been a satisfaction to me to believe with regard to my Tenants that there was a 
mutual feeling of entire trust between us, and it would be a great grief to me were it otherwise, 
and should these trying times continue, I shall think it my duty again to consider the question of 
giving further assistance.
406
 
 
 Despite not granting the rent reductions his tenants had sought, Devonshire’s 
response is still immersed in paternalist rhetoric. Words and phrases like “duty”, “sympathy” 
and “mutual feeling of entire trust”, display with some clarity the paternal sentiments that 
influenced Devonshire. 
 Previous historians, such as David Cannadine and Lindsay Proudfoot, have tended to 
present the seventh duke of Devonshire as an academic, business-like, ‘prudent, sober, [and] 
moderate man’, who found the ‘responsibilities of his great position burdensome’.407 True 
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though these characteristics perhaps were, they have also underplayed the influence of 
paternalism upon him and presented him as somewhat of a reluctant paternalist. Proudfoot 
highlights a contrast between the seventh duke and his predecessor. She portrays the sixth 
duke as a paternal landlord, who ran his Irish estates ‘in a way designed to ensure harmonious 
landlord-tenant relations rather than to maximise net income’ and wished to ‘“stand well in 
the country as a liberal employer of labour”’.408 Against the sixth duke’s paternalism, she 
presents the seventh duke as ‘an austere man of evangelical persuasion’, with a sombre and 
business-like tone and who couldn’t be persuaded by sentiment.  
The evidence presented here will attempt to reassess the influence of paternalism on 
the seventh duke’s management of his landed estates. It will contend that paternalism was a 
greater influence upon the duke than has been previously been noted and that its influence 
upon the dukedom did not disintegrate upon the death of the sixth duke. While the seventh 
duke was certainly influenced by his academic background and business acumen, this only 
served to make his paternalism more cautious. Like his predecessors, Devonshire was always 
principally influenced by a paternal sense of duty towards the inhabitants of his estates and a 
desire to maintain or increase his social and political status, both nationally and in the 
localities.  
This thesis is somewhat complicated by the circumstances that are individual to 
Devonshire’s narrative. Not only was Devonshire faced with the problems entailed by being a 
landowner during the agricultural depression, namely the difficulties in attempting to alleviate 
the plight of his tenants, but his dukedom was also marred by the difficulties in having to free 
his family from the enormous level of debt left by his predecessor. To some degree he was 
trapped when trying to address both issues, as his resolutions to them were somewhat 
contradictory and competitive. While saving his tenants from the worst effects of depression 
meant maintaining estate expenditure and accepting a reduction in his rental income, 
removing the dukedom of its debts would require strict frugality and retrenchment in estate 
management. 
Upon inheriting the dukedom in 1858, Devonshire was shocked and overwhelmed by 
the burden of having to sort out his predecessor’s financial disorder. He wrote in his diary on 
26 January 1858: 
 
The income is large, but by far the greater part of it is absorbed by the payment of interest, 
annuities, and the expense of Chatsworth, leaving but a comparatively insignificant surplus, and 
much of this will at present be required for legacy and succession duties. This is a worse 
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condition of matters than I had expected, although from knowing the duke's ignorance of 
business, I did not expect to find them very flourishing.
409
 
 
Perhaps evident of how overwhelmed he was by his inherited debts, he initially 
resolved to sell his Irish property (60,000acres), as he was well aware that retrenchment alone 
would not make great inroads to his accumulated encumbrances.410 Devonshire calculated that 
from a gross revenue of £200,000, his disposable income stood at a mere £50,000 
approximately, because of the deductions for estate administration and maintenance, interest 
payments, annuities and other fixed charges. This £50,000 wasn’t sufficient every year because 
of legacy and succession duties and other irregular burdens such as election expenses. He 
concluded that ‘“my impression on the whole... is that my position is at present very 
insecure”’.411 Yet, Devonshire was dissuaded from such drastic measures by the duke of 
Bedford. Bedford advised him that selling his Irish property would firstly diminish the social 
and political standing of the House of Cavendish and secondly he claimed that ‘“a large estate, 
with such a rental as yours is soon brought round to an improved condition, as I have found in 
my own case”’.412 As a result, extensive sales of land were not carried out by the Devonshire 
family until after the seventh duke had died and although the estate fluctuated in size with the 
continual small scale purchases and sales of land, we may maintain that it remained around 
200,000acres until the turn of the century.413  
 Devonshire instead resolved to pursue a policy of strict frugality and retrenchment in 
his estates’ management, writing to Mr Currey, his agent, ‘“great economies are everywhere 
necessary”’.414 However, evidence to be presented here suggests that despite Devonshire’s 
wish for retrenchment, this was never carried out at the expense of paternalism. As will be 
seen, greater frugality in estate management was more of an ambition than a reality under 
Devonshire, because he could never justify drastically cutting estate expenditure. Seeing the 
plight of his tenants during the agricultural depression prevented him from reducing 
expenditure and raising, or even maintaining, rents. One area where realistic and effective cuts 
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could have been made was in benevolent patronage expenditure but because of Devonshire’s 
paternal influences, this was always avoided. His sense of duty and his desire to retain his 
family’s status in the localities in which they owned estates, caused him to largely ignore his 
initial policy of frugality. Essentially he put the plight of his tenants before his own financial 
difficulties and paternalism provides an important part of the explanation for such self-
sacrifice.  
 How then were the enormous Devonshire estates administered? Proudfoot claims the 
estates were managed by a ‘highly stratified functional hierarchy’.415 The senior figure at the 
top of this hierarchy, who was directly answerable to the Duke for the overall running of all the 
British and Irish estates, was the London-based auditor. Immediately responsible to him were 
the resident agents, stationed in the many different estates across Great Britain and Ireland 
and according to Proudfoot, ‘direct communication between the duke and his... [resident 
agents] was relatively infrequent’.416 Resident agents were responsible for routine 
administration, such as collecting rents, valuing property, overseeing improvements and 
enforcing lease covenants,  but were ‘expected to conduct business strictly in accordance with 
the broad principles of management agreed by the duke and his auditor and applied... 
throughout the English and Irish estates’.417 Beneath the resident agent were often sub agents, 
although their number was dependent on the size of the estate in question. 
 Before the early nineteenth century, auditors had been ‘substantial legal figures and 
landowners in their own right’, but in 1827 Benjamin Currey was appointed as the first of three 
generations of his family to hold the post.418 Unlike his predecessors, Currey was ‘a member of 
the upper middle class. His appointment epitomised the new professionalism that was brought 
to the management of the Devonshire’s estates, as ‘the duke... sought to improve managerial 
efficiency’.419 Members of the Currey family also filled the post of Lismore agent (resident 
agent in Ireland), between 1817 and 1885. This is somewhat unsurprising when we consider 
that over the course of the nineteenth century, the Currey family established themselves 
almost as an institution that was as dynastic as their family of employers. One must assume 
that by emphasising their shared history and tradition with the Devonshire and wider 
Cavendish family, they would have achieved greater power and influence than the typical land 
agent of a typical estate. Indeed, Devonshire’s diary entries indicate that the two families were 
closer than a normal professional relationship would allow for. In 1848 Devonshire, then the 
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second earl of Burlington, wrote: ‘greatly grieved by the news of poor [Benjamin] Currey’s 
death... He was a high minded and honourable man and I shall deeply feel his loss. The [sixth] 
Duke will feel it still more severely.’420 
 The institutionalisation of the Currey family into the dukedom’s estate offices 
contributes to the argument presented throughout this thesis, that paternalism was facilitated 
on large estates by the dynasticity of families in all levels of the estate hierarchy. Not only was 
the ownership of an estate passed down through the generations of a family, so too were most 
of the tenancies of farms and the positions of responsibility for the estates’ administration. 
This heightened the sense of shared experience on an estate and enabled a greater general 
acceptance of the hierarchical status quo. In becoming so well established, the Currey family 
will have secured greater influence, more responsibilities and more freedom in carrying out 
their work. They also likely built a firm understanding of the obligations expected of their 
employers by the estates’ inhabitants. It is plausible therefore that the Currey’s inherited some 
of their employers’ sense of duty and that paternalism was to some degree being codified into 
the roles of the agent. As with the professional backgrounds of some of the agents on both 
Chaplin and Leicester’s estates, one wonders whether paternalism was becoming more of a 
middle class preoccupation.  
 J. S. Donelly claims that on Devonshire’s Irish estates, ‘rent increases were infrequent 
and relatively low’.421 Lindsay Proudfoot goes further to claim that the very low levels of 
increase in the rent roll between 1816 and 1891 were even less than Donelly initially proposed 
and that the rent roll ‘displayed remarkable stability’.422 Indeed in the abovementioned 1885 
letter to his Chatsworth tenants, Devonshire was at pains to remind them that rents on the 
estate had ‘not been increased except in a few special cases during the last 27 years’.423  
 It is true that in the letter recorded at the beginning of this section, Devonshire 
refused to grant his struggling tenants further rent reductions. His paternalism was certainly 
cautious. He felt justified in refusing their request because he had already given them a 10% 
reduction and spent 34% of the gross rentals on improvements to their farms. Yet he did 
concede that should conditions worsen, he would view it as his duty to consider again the 
question of ‘giving further assistance’.424 Further evidence suggests rents were reviewed and 
reduced after this episode in 1885. In a letter from Martin to the Duke, dated 17 May 1889, he 
writes ‘it is necessary to know whether your Grace will kindly make the same allowance as the 
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last time viz. 15 P C [per cent] to the larger Tenants – the price of stock is considerably higher 
than last year but I am sorry to say a great number of the Tenants had a very little to sell and I 
doubt whether they ever required relief more than at the present time’.425 This suggests that 
at some point between 1885 and 1888, rent reductions for some Chatsworth tenants were 
raised from 10% to 15%. It is very likely that all corners of the estate received rent reductions 
of some form, because we know that Devonshire’s rental income was significantly reduced. 
 Despite trying to achieve greater frugality in estate management, Devonshire was only 
initially able to make significant cuts to expenditure. This was because the most sizable of the 
initial cuts were made to extraordinary expenditure, predominantly the expensive work at 
Lismore castle begun by his predecessor but abruptly stopped by the incoming seventh duke. 
Because of the irreducible nature of much of the remaining estate expenditure, ‘the duke can 
be said to have been fortunate in having had this opportunity for cost-cutting’.426 By stopping 
all extraordinary expenditure and by cutting the net cost of running the estate farm and 
woodland enterprises by nearly a third, total expenditure in Ireland fell from over £34,000 
(63.3% of income) in 1858 to £19,000 (36.5% of income) in 1859.427 As a result remittances 
grew to around £30,000 in 1861-62, when at over 53% of income they represented the largest 
proportion ever remitted.428 
However, this was all short-lived. The agricultural depression and the progressive 
decline in prices following 1882, meant that rent reductions were much more permanent while 
expenditure remained relatively high.429 The largest and most irreducible component of total 
annual expenditure on the Irish estates was by far the aggregate management cost, which 
under Devonshire averaged £16,115 or 32% of income.430 Perhaps more potentially reducible 
was expenditure on improvements and it may have even seemed justifiable when rents were 
also being reduced. Proudfoot claims that cuts of this sort, as with cuts to patronage 
expenditure, were only theoretically possible and difficult to achieve in practice, because it 
was felt that the 6th Duke’s generosity had ‘gone a long way to ensuring harmonious landlord-
tenant relations, and for this reason alone would have been difficult to shirk’.431 However this 
wrongly implies that Devonshire actually wished to shirk his traditional paternal duty in an 
attempt to achieve greater frugality.  Undoubtedly one might argue that Devonshire 
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maintained improvement expenditure for fearing that any harm to landlord-tenant relations 
would precipitate potentially greater monetary costs. Yet this is unlikely, as it does not account 
for why patronage expenditure was increased under the seventh duke, from that of the ‘lavish’ 
and ‘generous’ sixth duke (which will be dealt with in greater detail shortly). Clearly 
Devonshire was guided by both a paternal sense of responsibility to his tenants and a desire 
that by encouraging harmonious landlord-tenant relations, the social and political status of the 
House of Cavendish, could be maintained and improved. 
Having in his possession such a huge acreage spread across so great an area and a 
‘highly stratified functional hierarchy’ of estate administrators, has caused some historians to 
present Devonshire as aloof and rather uninvolved with his estates’ management. While direct 
communication between him and his Irish estate office may have been scarce, evidence within 
the Chatsworth records indicates that Devonshire maintained a high level of interest in the 
routine administration of his English estates, particularly in Derbyshire and Yorkshire. Agents, 
like Martin, clearly felt obliged to keep Devonshire well informed of the condition of his 
tenants, improvements to be made, duties to be performed and events as they occurred. In a 
letter dated 5 April 1889, Martin writes: ‘My Lord Duke... The high price of stock will help the 
Tenants who are breeders but some of the larger ones are in great fear there will be no profit 
this year as they will have to purchase at such a great price.’432 In another dated 19 January 
1889, Martin advises that the duke should contribute £50 to a footpath at Bolton Abbey (in 
Yorkshire), because it ‘will be a great convenience and comfort to many of Your Grace’s 
Tenants’. 433In March of the same year Martin could not see ‘how we could longer defer 
building a New House for Shaw at Monsal Dale – the old one is completely worn out and 
beyond repair’ and sought Devonshire’s approval to go ahead with the building at a cost of 
£620.434  
Devonshire displayed a similar level of involvement with the dispensation of 
patronage. On 
22nd January 1889, Martin wrote to Devonshire: ‘I have made enquiries regarding the concert 
the Revd C H Fisher is promoting. I find it is to be a good one and Your Grace may safely 
become a patron.’ The letter goes on ‘the womens’ club is held at a low beer house in the 
village and is reputed to me as not being worthy of support’.435 A month later he writes again: 
‘I find the reading room at Appletrewick is in the hands of very respectable people therefore I 
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have sent a Donation of £1 in accordance with Your Grace’s letter’.436 Devonshire was cautious 
in dispensing his patronage. Indeed paternalism was not the indiscriminate provision of 
welfare; as the Victorian aristocracy preferred to profess the virtues of self-help. Instead, 
paternalism was selective. The recipient causes and charities often reflected the aristocrat’s 
own interests and opinions. Devonshire, as a highly educated and devoutly religious man, 
preferred institutions like reading rooms aimed at enabling the working classes to better 
themselves via education or churches. As a paternalist, he would have been wary of any 
organisations that could potentially divide rural society by promoting class agitation, hence 
ensuring that the organisations he supported were run by respectable people or clergymen. As 
we shall later see, Devonshire also held a particular aversion to drunkenness, which partly 
explains his agent not finding the womens’ club worthy of support. 
Even a brief glance at estate accounts will give a variety of examples of the charities 
and organisations which successfully garnered Devonshire’s support. The Chatsworth 1861 
accounts reveal that a total of £205.19.1 was paid to a variety of beneficiaries including small 
sums paid to five separate poor men, one of whom had lost his cow, £21 to Sheffield Infirmary, 
£25 to Revd J Aldred towards the erection of an infant school at Dore, £20 to the Bakewell 
Band and £2 for the Darley Provident Society.437 Perhaps unsurprisingly we find the totals for 
donations and subscriptions in later years to have increased on the Chatsworth Estate. In 1884 
the donations total was £556.4.9, while in 1886 it was £574.4.5.438 In over 20 years the money 
spent on donations on the Chatsworth estate more than doubled. Doubtless, charitable 
expenditure increased alongside the prosperity of Devonshire’s industrial enterprises and 
agricultural land as it went through its ‘golden years’. Yet what is important to note is that 
during the ensuing financial crises in both Devonshire’s agricultural and industrial enterprises, 
charitable expenditure remained high. Here, an understanding of duty dictated the necessity 
to maintain relief expenditure in harsh economic conditions, in spite of the duke’s own 
financial difficulties. 
While Proudfoot argues that Devonshire was less paternal than his predecessor, her 
evidence shows that expenditure on patronage also rose in Ireland under the seventh duke.439 
Patronage expenditure, which Proudfoot describes as donations and subscriptions to churches, 
chapels and charities, grew from an average of £1884 per year (or 4.4% of income) under the 
sixth duke to £2390 per year (or 4.7% of income) under the seventh duke. This suggests that 
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the increase in patronage expenditure was general and wide-ranging, encompassing most or 
all of his estates across Great Britain and Ireland.  
 Devonshire’s response to the agricultural depression was largely a ‘managerial’ one. 
Although he was certainly cautious with regard to his financial position and when making 
decisions that would directly affect it, evidence here presented shows that he still carried out 
the duties that were expected of a landlord to ease the burden on his tenants. He reduced 
rents and maintained expenditure across his estates and did this despite originally striving for 
frugality in the management of his estates. Devonshire had his own severe financial problems 
associated with the debt he inherited from his predecessor and his plan for reducing his debt 
was twofold. Firstly he attempted to embark upon a policy of retrenchment across his estates. 
This section has showed that this policy largely failed. Devonshire’s own sense of duty to his 
tenants and his desire to retain his local and national status was too great to allow him to 
proceed with the extensive retrenchment that was necessary to making any difference to his 
debt. Moreover, Devonshire was not, as he has been previously portrayed, a ‘reluctant’ 
paternalist. He was actively involved in most aspects of the management of his estates and the 
dispensation of benevolence and patronage. The second part of Devonshire’s plan to reduce 
his debts was to invest heavily in industry in Barrow-in-Furness, in the hope that the returns 
would be great enough to pay off his debts. The ensuing section will focus on this activity and 
note whether it was successful. 
 
II 
 At its peak in 1874, Devonshire’s current income had grown to a vast £310,000, which 
made him ‘probably the richest man in the land’.440 Of this, £141,000 came from his net estate 
rental, whilst £169,000 came from dividends.441 90% of Devonshire’s dividend income came 
from his Barrow-in-Furness ventures.442 The huge return Devonshire received from the Barrow 
industries was justified. He had continued to invest heavily in the fledgling town and its 
industries since before inheriting the dukedom and had involved himself in most aspects of 
providing for the town’s swift growth. As a result Barrow had gone from a small village of 150 
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inhabitants in 1846 to an industrial hub town of more than 40,000 in 1874 and over 57,000 in 
1891.443 For all its successes, Devonshire’s involvement in the Barrow industries did not 
principally facilitate the reduction of his debt. Although the amount of current income 
apportioned to service his debts fell from 40% in 1861 to its lowest position of 26% in 1874, his 
total indebtedness remained relatively static until the late sixties.444 This was due to the 
severity of the debts he inherited from his predecessor, his reinvestment of such large portions 
of his income back into the Barrow enterprises and the necessity for fresh borrowing these 
investments continued to create.445 If the industrial prosperity Barrow had achieved in 1874 
had continued, then there is little doubt Devonshire would have not only paid off his debts but 
amassed a fortune to secure the House of Cavendish immense status and influence for many 
generations thereafter. 
However, the prosperity enjoyed by Barrow was to be momentary. As British industry 
fell into a slump along with agriculture in the mid-1870s, Barrow was hit particularly hard for 
four different reasons. Firstly, the many Barrow works undertaken carried with them 
unbearable overheads, because they had mostly been erected at maximum cost ‘under 
conditions of boom and labour shortage’.446 Secondly, the market for Barrow haematite iron 
ore began to give out as the transport of foreign haematite was cheapened and new methods 
allowed for the use of inferior native ores.447 Thirdly, the enormous market in America for 
Barrow’s main export, Bessemer rail, completely collapsed.448 And finally, Barrow docks had 
been erected on a scale that even under the most favourable conditions it could not justify.449  
Not all of the implications of these misfortunes were at first fully appreciated and their 
affects did not set in simultaneously. 1880 to 1883 saw a mild local boom, but by 1886 ‘panic 
had gripped Barrow’s leading industrialists’.450 Yet as early as 1874, virtually all the internal 
sources of capital, drawn from Furness ore and railway revenue, had dried up and Barrow’s 
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many half-finished enterprises, employing thousands of immigrant workers, were in danger of 
complete collapse. ‘Almost overnight the frightening responsibility of keeping the top-heavy 
structure going was thrown on the ageing Duke of Devonshire.’451 It will here be argued that 
his investment and involvement was to be of more importance to Barrow during its decline 
than during its rise. 
The first of Barrow’s industries to fail was the Shipyard Company, whose survival in 
1875 was in severe danger. Not only did Devonshire buy £200,000 of new shares, he also 
extended his existing holdings in the company and that of his family, totalling the Devonshire 
contribution to over £300,000.452 Yet in 1877 Devonshire wrote in his diary: ‘it will clearly be 
necessary for me to find a great deal of money to prevent a smash’.453 A year later all shares 
were written down from £25 to £10 and nearly £270,000 new share capital was created, of 
which Devonshire took £200,000 instantly and the rest by 1883 after buying out other 
shareholders.454 Thankfully the company averted complete collapse when, in 1887, a syndicate 
agreed to take control and turn the yard from ‘the risky and competitive building of merchant 
ships to the sheltered and cartelized production of men-of-war’.455  
The Flax and Jute Mill, formed only in 1874, faced similar financial problems and relied 
again on Devonshire’s funds to buoy it up. In 1877, Devonshire had to contribute £150,000 in 
‘B’ (deferred) shares.456 By 1880 Devonshire considered this initial capital to be ‘lost’ and 
bought shares from smaller holders at a significantly reduced price.457 When in 1882, powers 
were taken to raise £150,000 in £1 shares, Devonshire bought £87,000 of them at once and 
was credited with a further 32,000 for a loan which the company was unable to repay.458 It was 
finally wound up in 1893, following Devonshire’s death.459 
 Pollard claims that in spite of his role as the main financial lifeline to Barrow’s 
crumbling industries, ‘it also fell largely to Devonshire to consider at the same time the 
complex of interrelated industries as a whole’.460 In 1875 Devonshire attempted a sale of the 
Furness Railway to free up capital for the financial support of other firms, but not enough 
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interest could be garnered.461 In 1876 an effort was made to end the general indebtedness to 
the banks. When it ultimately failed and the London and Westminster Bank refused to extend 
any further credit, Devonshire capital became Barrow’s only lifeline.462 
The story of Devonshire’s involvement in trying to save Barrow from the worst 
extremes of an economic crash is one that has already been well narrated by historians 
including David Cannadine and Sidney Pollard. While they have successfully accounted for how 
he tried to keep Barrow afloat by flooding her industries with capital and plunging himself 
even further into debt, they have failed to account for why he did so. Why then didn’t 
Devonshire pull out of Barrow’s industries when the depression hit? 
J. D. Marshall has accusingly claimed that ‘in purely business terms he [Devonshire] 
undoubtedly gained far more than he lost, even though large sums of money appeared on 
both sides of the account books’.463 It is true that Devonshire made significant financial gains 
from royalties for the Park Mine’s use of his land.464 Yet it is unfathomable how Marshall could 
claim Devonshire gained more than he lost considering how much wealth he invested and lost 
during Barrow’s industrial decline, as mentioned above. As a result, he bequeathed over 
£2million of debt to his successor. Economic expediency clearly cannot be held accountable for 
Devonshire’s actions during Barrow’s decline. As Pollard informs us, Devonshire was not even 
a majority shareholder in any of the Barrow companies before the collapse and had the 
potential to gain much more from the enterprises than he actually did. His family only owned 
26.1% of the Flax and Jute Mill in 1871 and 29.3% of the Shipbuilding Company and 12.5% of 
the Barrow Ocean Steamship Company in 1872.465 It was only buoying up the companies 
during Barrow’s decline that made him a majority shareholder in them, owning 95.9% of the 
Shipbuilding Co. and 98.1% of the Flax and Jute Mill in 1886. Yet by this time they had 
significantly reduced in value and were virtually worthless to him. Only the Haematite Steel 
Company was still comparatively successful and faintly prosperous and here Devonshire 
owned only 33.7% in 1886.466   
We cannot realistically blame Devonshire’s poor financial decisions on unsound advice 
he received from his agents and others, as his son Lord Hartington would do upon succeeding 
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his father to the dukedom.467 Devonshire’s diaries repeatedly mention the advice he received 
to drastically reduce his expenditure in Barrow and often to pull out altogether.468 Besides, a 
prizewinning Cambridge mathematician and a man who had hitherto built a reputation for 
entrepreneurship, should hardly require advice in order to realise his decision to continually 
prop up Barrow’s failing industries would be disastrous to his family’s financial position.  
A convincing argument surrounding Devonshire’s lack of foresight may be put forward. 
It is true that landlords and captains of industry in the time of agricultural and industrial 
depression were unaware of how long it would last before their enterprises picked up and 
became prosperous again. In this sense, perhaps Devonshire invested in the hope that 
business would pick up and he would reap the benefits. Yet such an argument could only 
account for continued investment at the beginning of such a depression and not the 
investments that Devonshire continued to make throughout the 1870s and 1880s. 
Devonshire’s diary entries at this time were almost always gloomy, with statements like ‘it will 
clearly be necessary for me to find a great deal of money to prevent a smash’ appearing very 
frequently.469 He clearly understood that by pouring capital into the failing industries, he was 
merely preventing a total crash and accepted that he was highly unlikely to see decent returns 
on his investments again during his own lifetime.470 And yet he continued to invest. 
 It is the contention here that Devonshire’s motivation for continuing to invest to save 
Barrow’s industries from complete collapse, despite severely damaging his family’s financial 
position, was paternalism. Indeed, Pollard implies that ‘paternal feelings’ were a cause and 
claims that ‘it could not be fully appreciated at the time how much his sense of responsibility 
and his resources contributed to the survival of Barrow’.471 Paternalism was in itself an 
inherent sense of duty or responsibility and it is difficult to see how any other motivation held 
more influence on Devonshire’s actions. His continued investment in Barrow provided him 
with an opportunity to have a profound effect on the lives of thousands of workers and 
inhabitants of the town by keeping them employed and trying to prevent the worst effects of 
the depression from falling upon their shoulders. Devonshire viewed the town’s inhabitants in 
much the same way that he viewed the inhabitants of his own landed estates, as Pollard claims 
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‘his approach to their problems did not greatly differ from that of many of his landowning 
forebears’.472 
 It is well known that the aristocracy strived to achieve greater status, both locally and 
nationally. Paternalism was influenced by this desire for status and could often provide the 
means for obtaining it. His involvement in Barrow had initially conferred on Devonshire great 
status, hence the contemporary claim that he was ‘“one of the finest flowers of the Victorian 
nobility”’.473 In this sense perhaps Devonshire was trying to secure his reputation and legacy 
on his noble endeavours to establish Barrow as a British industrial hub with the potential to 
further the economy of the nation as a whole. And yet as Thompson claims, in his old age ‘the 
great entrepreneurial saviour of the family fortunes had been transformed into the source of 
embarrassments much more severe than those caused by the sixth duke’.474 However 
Devonshire was likely the only person of those associated with Barrow who was capable of 
securing credit for the capital required to prop up the failing industries. If he had refused to 
help Barrow during its darkest days then his status, reputation and legacy could have been far 
more damaged than any personal financial embarrassment could have caused. 
 It is interesting that a duke of Devonshire, as the patriarch of one of the most wealthy 
and well established landed families within the British aristocracy, should choose to concern 
himself and invest heavily in industry, when the much more common experience during the 
nineteenth century was for captains of industry to invest in agriculture in order to become 
‘landed’. To increase one’s status and influence is the most feasible explanation behind the 
latter trend and as a sign of the changes that were occurring particularly in the late nineteenth 
century, this could also account for the former example. Clearly Devonshire had to find or 
create an additional source of income in order to solve his debt problems, but discounting the 
obvious potential for industrial development in the Furness area, why did Devonshire choose 
to invest so heavily in industry at Barrow and not in something else? Why didn’t he follow 
Leicester and the many other aristocrats’ example and passively invest in colonial railways, 
banks and mines? Or why didn’t he follow the Duke of Westminster’s example and build 
himself a property empire? 
 Firstly, Devonshire held a close affinity to the Furness area. Not only did he spend most 
of his life residing at Holkher Hall in the nearby Cartmel region of Lancashire, but he had also 
become a principal landowner in the area at the age of 26, when in 1834 he inherited the 
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Burlington title and estates.475 Financial expediency was also important. Devonshire’s dividend 
income of over £169,000 in its peak year of 1874, displays how profitable Barrow’s industries 
could be and Devonshire obviously hoped this situation would improve even further. 
Devonshire was also a reclusive but academic man with a deep interest in science and 
engineering. His keen involvement in not only the finances of Barrow’s industries but also their 
day-to-day running gave him much pleasure, especially considering his distaste for politics and 
high society. And finally status must be considered a pivotal reason for his initial decision to 
invest in Barrow. While Leicester’s passive investments and Westminster’s property interests 
certainly helped them to increase their wealth, such activity didn’t necessarily improve their 
status, as, other than their investment, there was little opportunity for them to become 
involved in the ventures. As a result their skills and experience, and their paternalism, became 
redundant. Devonshire, on the other hand, invested in industrial concerns, to which he could 
also invest his time, effort, skills, experience and paternalism and in becoming so involved with 
the ‘creation, virtually from scratch, of a whole new industrial district’, he could attain greater 
status.476  
Furthermore, Pollard has suggested that Devonshire’s approach to Barrow ‘did not 
greatly differ from that of many of his landowning forebears’.477 Therefore his involvement 
with Barrow enabled the traditional rural paternalism displayed on agricultural estates to be 
adapted to an industrial arena, and this gave Devonshire ‘a constant and extraordinarily 
ambitious role to play in Victorian society’.478 As John Pearson claims, Devonshire felt that the 
aristocracy needed to be ‘useful’ in order to survive – ‘and what better way of being useful 
than in making money?’479 By doing so, aristocrats could ‘create prosperity and fresh 
employment...[and]... in enriching themselves,... [they] would also enrich all classes of society 
and thus provide a true “community of interests” to unite the country’.480 
Yet other historians have been critical of the level of involvement Devonshire 
displayed with his Barrow enterprises, presenting him as aloof, uninvolved and unconcerned 
by the routine management of his interests and considerate of only his general financial 
position. Cannadine has claimed that the rise of Barrow was directed by Robert Hannay, H. W. 
                                                             
475  Thompson, ‘Cavendish, William, seventh duke of Devonshire (1808-1891), landowner and 
industrialist,’ 
476  Thompson, ‘Cavendish, William, seventh duke of Devonshire (1808-1891), landowner and 
industrialist,’ 
477
  Pollard, ‘Barrow-in-Furness and the Seventh Duke of Devonshire,’ p.221 
478
  Pearson, The Serpent and the Stag, p.207 
479  Pearson, The Serpent and the Stag, p.209 
480  Pearson, The Serpent and the Stag, p.209 
97 
 
Schneider, Sir James Ramsden and the Curreys, ‘with the seventh duke himself hovering in the 
background’.481 However, Professor Pollard counters this argument by claiming that 
Devonshire ‘was much more than a figurehead’ and instead was involved in the ‘active 
management’ of his industrial concerns.482 Local historian J. D. Marshall goes even further than 
Cannadine by arguing that not only was Devonshire ‘in the habit of entrusting the 
administration of the towns on his estates to capable agents’, but that he also ‘did not believe 
in or practise paternalism, as that word is usually applied’.483 He goes on: ‘it was only his ever-
growing investments in Barrow industries that frequently brought him into that town’.484 
It will be argued here that despite his use of agents and ‘underlings’, Devonshire was 
heavily involved in Barrow’s industrial rise, as well as its decline, and in his involvement he 
clearly practiced the paternalism one would expect from an aristocrat of his stature.  
 Pollard summarises Devonshire’s involvement with Barrow by claiming that ‘shrewd 
and enlightened attempts to maximize profits went hand in hand with paternal feelings for his 
dependents, his shareholders and the inhabitants of the new town’.485 In turn, Marshall claims 
that Devonshire was esteemed by Barrow workmen because he appeared to show some 
interest in them and that this interest was an expression of his ‘sense of responsibility for the 
town and its troubles’.486 And yet he also claims that Barrow workmen were ‘labouring on a 
corner of the Cavendish estates with far less consideration and security than farming tenants 
enjoyed’ and that ‘the social and industrial relationships of the period ordained that he was to 
show far less personal concern for his steelworkers than for his tenant farmers’.487 Though it is 
true that his tenants’ security was greater than that of the Barrow working classes, evidence 
from Devonshire’s diaries contradicts the idea that the people of Barrow received any less of 
his consideration than any other inhabitants of his estates. 
 A rather comprehensive example of Devonshire’s involvement in his industrial 
ventures and concern for the welfare of the workers of the Furness area is evident when 
plotting the history of his slate quarries from his diary entries. By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the slate-quarrying industry in Furness ‘ranked next in importance to the 
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haematite ore and iron trades of the district’.488 Indeed, ‘more men were employed in slate-
getting than in mining iron ore or in working at iron furnaces, and the former occupation 
became a comparatively well-paid one... It [also] had more influence upon the movement of 
people within the district than did ironmaking, in the sense that it led to new settlement near 
the quarries.’489 With Barrow’s population rising from that of a small village of 150 inhabitants 
in 1846 to a bustling town of more than 40,000 in 1874, this rapid town building acted as a 
‘major stimulus to local quarrying, which remained an important occupation in High Furness 
through much of the nineteenth century’.490 
 Despite being such a vital industry, Devonshire’s Kirkby-in-Furness slate quarries 
(located approximately 10 miles from Barrow) were problematic and management and work-
related issues often required his personal intervention. 
 In February 1845 Devonshire wrote ‘the men have turned out, not at first for wages 
but it has settled on this... [it is] hoped by a slight advance they will resume work but the 
inferior quarries I am afraid will not be able to pay it’.491 Within a week he notes ‘the men are 
all at work again but at a large increase in wages. No doubt it is mainly owing to the Furness 
Railway which is in progress and at which high wages can be earned.’492 Devonshire didn’t 
always give in to the demands of strikers, indeed a year later he ‘firmly resisted’ another 
strike.493 Yet his diaries do show they he displayed a constant concern for his workforce and in 
negotiating with them it is clear he attempted to understand and resolve their grievances to 
the best of his ability. 
 Not only were his quarrymen frequently striking, but Devonshire also found there to 
be an issue with drunkenness and a general lack of order among the men. Under a previous 
and rather incompetent manager, Mr Jopling, Devonshire noted that there were ‘too many 
overlookers, [and] that the men are suffered to waste their time’.494 After sacking Jopling he 
noted ‘I think there has been a great neglect in allowing the merchants to work as they pleased 
and that mischief has been done from the want of control’.495 As Jopling’s replacement 
Devonshire hired Mr Coward. Yet within two years of hiring Coward, Devonshire was ‘much 
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vexed at hearing... that Coward drinks occasionally and I fear encourages drinking among the 
men. He must give this up if he is to continue to manage the quarries.’496 A year later Captain 
Eddy, another adviser, was ‘extremely dissatisfied with Coward and complains greatly of his 
obstinacy and timidity... he thinks a total change of system must be adopted by Christmas’.497  
 After finding Coward ‘utterly unequal to his work’, Devonshire had him removed.498 His 
replacement, Captain Eddy, seems to have been much more capable and Devonshire quickly 
found his arrangements ‘all very satisfactory and the men easily managed’.499  There continued 
to be a ‘good deal of trouble with the men arising from their drunken habits but Eddy appears 
to be gradually putting it down by a system of fines’.500 Indeed, Eddy was so successful that 
unlike his predecessors, he stayed in the employ of Devonshire until his retirement in the early 
1860s. Devonshire then appointed Eddy’s son, the ‘steady and intelligent’ James Eddy, ‘to 
succeed his father generally as Mineral Agent’. This again highlights the preference of the 
aristocracy for families to dynastically hold positions within their estate or business structures, 
particularly considering James Eddy was ‘not equal to his father’, but was still appointed to 
replace him.501 Dynastic appointments put emphasis on shared tradition and multi-
generational loyalty which could facilitate acceptance of the community’s hierarchy and 
promote deference.  
 Devonshire was ‘vexed’ to hear of the drinking habits of his workmen under Coward 
and was glad to hear that under Captain Eddy, these habits were being broken. Here a level of 
self-interest clearly accounts for some of Devonshire’s concern. No business can be effectively 
run to make profit when the workforce is habitually drunk. However, given Devonshire’s strict 
religiosity and his earlier noted aversion to beer houses, his sense of duty to improve the lives 
of those under his jurisdiction was equally accountable for his concern. 
 Paternalism was not only expressed as control. Devonshire’s concern for control in the 
workplace was amalgamated with a genuine level of concern and empathy for his workforce. 
With slate quarrying in a slump, in 1842, he wrote ‘I do not think the [Poor Law] 
commissioners will give their consent to large numbers of applications from Kirkby Ireleth 
where many quarrymen are out of work’.502 The issue was ‘a very anxious concern’ for 
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Devonshire, although it is not clear whether he intervened on their behalf.503 On New Year’s 
Day 1846 he wrote that he was to give ‘a dinner to all men employed’ in his quarries.504 
Although this may seem like a trivial offering from an employer, in reality, with the duke aware 
of his own prestige and esteem, personal contact with his workforce would have gone a long 
way to ensuring their continued loyalty and deference. 
 Devonshire was also responsible for providing his workforces with housing. In 1861 he 
writes ‘we looked at Crowband and at the site near Longlands proposed for some new 
cottages which Mr Eddy is anxious for’.505 Again, in 1870, he writes ‘we propose to build a good 
many new cottages and a new school is contemplated to which it will be necessary for me to 
contribute largely’.506 While in 1885 Eddy was ‘very anxious I [Devonshire] should build some 
cottages and if money was more plentiful it would no doubt [be] very well to do so’.507 This 
highlights an important irony in Devonshire’s involvement with the Furness area and its 
industry. In his initial involvement, Devonshire was attempting to adapt his traditional 
paternalism to the new challenges facing the late nineteenth century aristocracy. Later, his 
altruistic attempts to try to save the industries from complete collapse were a definitive 
expression of paternalism and yet by nearly bankrupting himself Devonshire was prevented 
from displaying his ‘paternal feelings’ for the industrial workers and their families, because he 
no longer had the funds to make concerted efforts to improve their quality of life. His altruism 
was the definitive expression of paternalism and yet ultimately contributed to its demise.  
 With such a rapidly growing population, housing provision was vital to the success of 
Barrow. As Devonshire wrote ‘the various new works are getting on but more slowly than was 
intended, principally owing to the want of cottages... Ramsden says a thousand new ones 
would be occupied at once’.508 Indeed in early 1872, Devonshire was afraid that overcrowding 
in Barrow was having a bad affect on the public health, causing smallpox to be ‘alarmingly 
prevalent’.509 Devonshire saw the provision of extra housing as an ‘urgent’ concern and took 
leadership in ensuring that more were built. Not only did he provide funds and land for houses, 
but also encouraged those companies of which he was a shareholder to build more.510 After 
advising the Steel Company that the provision of more cottages was ‘urgent’, he writes that 
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they ‘will build 100 costing about £160 each but many more will be required... we hope 
building societies and other parties may be disposed to build on a considerable scale’.511 And 
yet, it would be reasonable to presume that if no additional help was found, Devonshire would 
have been obliged to lay down more funds and land for this purpose. This was certainly the 
case when in the late 1870s, when Devonshire saved the many Barrow industries from 
complete collapse. 
 Devonshire’s involvement in Furness’ industry was not necessarily a response to the 
agricultural depression, as he began his investment well before the depression set in. It was 
rather a response to personal financial difficulties he was facing. Yet it may be seen as 
evidence of the aristocracy attempting to adapt their traditional behaviour to their new 
situation in the late nineteenth century. Devonshire’s example is particularly interesting 
because his traditional landlord paternalism was adapted to suit an industrial environment. In 
being landed and yet trying to achieve greater status through industrial exploits, Devonshire 
went against the grain of the common experience during the nineteenth century of industrial 
wealth being invested in land. This was likely a sign of a changing epoch, in which land was 
losing its ability to confer status while industry, which had traditionally been derided by the 
aristocracy, was enabling its leaders to attain greater prestige. While such dedicated 
involvement in industry by an aristocrat was certainly rare and made Devonshire somewhat 
unique, the aristocracy had begun to involve itself in industry, particularly the railway industry, 
albeit rather piecemeal. The most important reason behind Devonshire’s decision to pursue 
industrial concerns, rather than anything else, was industry’s ability to confer status and 
provide the aristocrat with a format in which he could become involved and his paternalism 
could be exercised. The influence of paternalism upon Devonshire’s behaviour was most 
apparent in his altruistic campaign to prop up Barrow’s failing industries at the expense of 
worsening his own already difficult financial position. Yet in turn this altruism was disastrous 
for the future legacy of paternalism, because in deepening Devonshire’s own financial 
problems it restricted his ability to display his ‘paternal feelings’ for his dependents. 
   
III 
 Considering the financial peaks and troughs Devonshire endured during his long life 
and the level of altruism he displayed in saving Barrow from a complete economic disaster, it is 
surprising that Devonshire, unlike his predecessor and successor, has not been the subject of 
any major or extensive biography. His life history instead exists in a fragmented nature, 
amongst the occasional pages of a handful of articles and chapters by various historians. This is 
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exceptionally perplexing when the enormity of primary source material is considered. 
Devonshire was a prolific diary keeper, with very regular entries beginning on the 22 January 
1838 and ending on the 3 August 1890. All but a handful of them have been preserved and are 
available to researchers in the archives at Chatsworth House. 
The present chapter has not intended to serve as the aforementioned, long overdue 
biography. Rather, evidence about Devonshire, his life, his estates and their management and 
the details concerning his industrial enterprises in Furness, have been used as part of a wider 
study concerning the nature of paternalism in late nineteenth-century England. 
 One of the aims of the chapter has been to redress the one sided nature of the recent 
portrayals of Devonshire, as an austere and aloof man, with middle class values and primarily 
concerned with business interests over any romantic notions of chivalric duty, tradition or 
paternalism. While this chapter has granted that Devonshire was socially reclusive, religiously 
devout and a capable and intelligent businessman, it has also highlighted his paternalism, 
where other authors have downplayed it. No doubt Devonshire’s paternalism was frequently 
filtered through his agents, yet a large quantity of evidence here presented shows Devonshire 
to have taken direct action on a number of day-to-day concerns. He was actively involved in 
the management of both his agricultural and industrial concerns and displayed his paternal 
influences in his various efforts to improve the lives of his dependents. On his estates he eased 
the burden of depression on his tenants, whilst taking an interest in their grievances. He also 
increased the levels of patronage on his estates and took interest in where and how 
benevolence would be dispensed. Equally, in his Furness industrial concerns, Devonshire 
concerned himself with the quality of life for the many workers there. His concern for the 
provision of their amenities was mainly confined to housing, yet evidence suggests he was also 
involved in schooling and public health. 
What is most interesting about Devonshire’s story is not that it was such a profound 
fall from grace, but that the fall was rather perplexingly self inflicted. It has been argued here 
that the altruism Devonshire displayed in attempting to save Barrow’s industry is decisive 
evidence of the influence by paternalism upon him. Yet it ironically ultimately led to the 
family’s paternalism being damaged. As Devonshire’s finances became increasingly 
embarrassed, his diaries contain evidence of a desire to carry out his duty to improve the lives 
of the many inhabitants of the Furness district, but he lacked the sufficient finances to enable 
him to do so. After his death, his successors were forced to embark on policies of 
retrenchment on the estates that were much stricter than those that he attempted to carry 
out. They were also required to sell off the Irish estates and hence diminished the social and 
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political standing of the House of Cavendish.512  That said the existence of Barrow as an 
industrial town to this day is evidence of the legacy of paternalism. 
Devonshire’s personal circumstances make his example somewhat unrepresentative of 
the aristocracy at large. Firstly the enormous level of debt he inherited from his predecessors, 
provided the incentive for him to improve his financial position decades before the agricultural 
depression had caused his and the rest of the aristocracy’s financial supremacy to be at risk. 
Secondly, because of Devonshire’s enormous wealth and the land available to him to use as 
security for the vast loans required to prop Barrow up, it is difficult to see how any other 
aristocrat could have invested so heavily in Barrow or involved himself so much in the fortunes 
of its people. At least no other aristocrat could have done so while maintaining their estates 
intact. Yet Devonshire’s narrative is still an important one, as undoubtedly the aristocracy at 
large were watching the story unfold very closely. Devonshire displayed an example of how the 
aristocracy could adapt to the challenges that faced them in this period. And when it proved 
disastrous to his social and financial position, he displayed the risks involved in attempting to 
adapt one’s paternalism and in involving oneself too heavily in industry. Undoubtedly the on 
looking aristocrats, like Leicester, who had invested their surplus wealth more wisely into 
stocks and shares were glad of their decision; potentially unaware that they had put the 
endurance of their paternalism, and in turn their power, status and ascendancy, in jeopardy. 
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Conclusion 
 Although it has been agreed that various political, social and economic factors were at 
play, this thesis has attempted to assert the primacy of the agricultural depression as the most 
important initial cause of the decline of the British aristocracy’s power and ascendancy. As 
Haggard claimed, the landowning class suffered the effects of the depression worst of all, 
because their paternal sense of duty necessitated that they act to relieve the effects of 
depression on their tenants.513 In doing so they accepted a reduction in their rental income. As 
a result, landowners needed to either retrench or adapt and diversify their interests in order to 
maintain their wealth. As this thesis has shown they largely chose the latter option. Yet they 
differed in their views on how they should diversify. Hunt and Pam have claimed that the 
aristocracy’s estates required them to come up with new schemes that would promote local 
economic growth and enable the whole estate to prosper.514 This thesis has shown that this 
happened only very rarely. While some aristocrats failed to diversify at all and significantly 
weakened their economic and social position; the most common experience was for 
landowners to supplement their fallen estate income with the returns of passive investments 
in non-agricultural enterprises. There were examples of landowners who became actively 
involved in their investment concerns, however these were very rare and Devonshire’s 
example shows how risky such activity was.  
 The economic effects of the depression also had important social implications upon all 
rural classes. As the rural economy shrank, class consciousness and agitation became more 
common and as a result rural society was at greater risk of division. This activity, when coupled 
with the aristocracy’s decreasing interest in their localities, meant that rural society was 
gradually fragmenting. Although this probably occurred at a slower speed than Alistair Mutch 
has claimed.515 This thesis has attempted to show that this fragmentation of rural society was 
much more of an underlying, subtle current than Mutch has suggested; and its effects would 
not be fully realised until decades later. The depression also had profound effects on the 
aristocracy’s ability to maintain their status and ascendancy, largely because it diminished their 
paternalism. In adapting to the depression, the aristocracy at large became increasingly reliant 
on invisible income, which to an extent negated the importance of land. Land became, for 
them, a means of keeping up appearances, while in reality they were losing their enthusiasm 
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for it and their attentiveness to the needs of the inhabitants of their estates. Paternalism, as 
means of maintaining and bolstering an aristocrat’s local power, status and ascendancy, 
gradually became neglected along with the land and its people. As a result, the very gradual 
changes going on throughout the nineteenth century that were slowly curbing the 
aristocracy’s ascendancy, such as the increasing size of the state and the democratization of 
politics, were further exacerbated because the aristocracy’s provincial powerbases were also 
deteriorating. 
Although attempts were made by aristocrats to adapt their paternalism into new 
spheres of influence, they were very rare and Devonshire’s very public example probably 
cautioned other aristocrats away from making such attempts. Chaplin tried to adapt rural 
paternalism into politics by representing and championing the agricultural interest in 
parliament. However, since parliament was filled with aristocrats and squires who had 
protected themselves from the depression with supplementary incomes, Chaplin was 
practically ignored. 
Each of the three aristocrats whose narratives have been presented in this thesis had 
personal circumstances which have served to complicate the main narrative in interesting 
ways. Their individual stories and personalities have similarities and differences. Both Chaplin 
and Devonshire were in poor financial positions before the agricultural depression had even 
began and this influenced their actions in different ways. Chaplin pursued a political career 
based on representing the agricultural interest in an effort to persuade government to help 
landlords and tenant farmers by reintroducing protection. As a result of his political ambitions, 
as well as his social and sporting activities, Chaplin was distracted from the careful 
management his estates required. He failed to reduce his personal expenditure sufficiently and 
as a result his mortgagees took his estates away from him. Alternatively, Devonshire set about 
trying to improve his financial position by carefully managing his estates and imploring his 
agents to make efficiency savings wherever possible. He also embarked upon an industrial 
investment campaign in Barrow which had, by the mid 1870s, become very prosperous. Yet 
crashes occurred almost simultaneously in both agriculture and industry. His frugal estate 
management had to be ceased in order to protect his tenants from the full burden of 
depression and likewise his paternalism inspired him to safeguard Barrow from the worst 
distresses of the industrial crash. Although he was able to retain his estates, he died, like 
Chaplin, with his financial position in tatters. 
 Of the three, only Leicester can be said to have been successful in surviving the 
agricultural depression in a strong financial position, which is testament to the power 
economics held in deciding the fortunes of the British aristocracy.  
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 As a squire, Chaplin was lower in rank than his noble counterparts, yet in his lavish 
expenditure, expensive tastes, political preoccupations and busy social and sporting lives; he 
was somewhat more aristocratic than either Leicester or Devonshire. The two aristocrats, who 
were both profoundly middle class in their characters, did not meet the stereotype of the 
Victorian aristocrat hitherto presented. Moreover, they were also both rather reclusive and in 
devoting themselves to their estates, investments and industrial concerns they showed 
themselves to be diligent and conscientious enough to deserve their fine reputations. 
 There are themes which have been general to all three chapters which require some 
elucidation. Firstly, because paternalism was at its core an unspecific but inherent sense of 
duty, it was largely open to interpretation by the individual aristocrat who subscribed to it. 
This meant that to a certain degree, aristocrats would decide for themselves what their duties 
were and to whom. Their duties were specified to a certain degree, in that most would 
continue to carry out those duties of their predecessor. Yet in terms of their benevolence, they 
were largely able to determine for themselves which causes would receive their benefaction. 
Often this was related to their interests. Leicester, a man who regularly suffered with infirmity, 
patronised public health schemes extensively. In the case of Devonshire, who was academic 
and religiously devout, churches and educative institutions received the larger part of his 
benefaction. 
 As an extension of Matthew Cragoe’s argument, this thesis has also asserted, 
throughout its chapters, the importance of the dynasticity of the families on the estate.516 Not 
only did tenant-farmers inherit their parents’ tenancies, but in some cases land agents would 
inherit their fathers’ jobs. Paternal landowners would favour the establishment of families on 
their estates because it enabled the estate’s inhabitants to form a collective identity based on 
shared tradition, heritage and ancestry. This collective identity would also encompass, and in 
turn bolster, the position of the landowner at the top of the estate hierarchy. In this sense, it 
would facilitate the deference that was both an essential cause and consequence of 
paternalism. 
 This thesis has raised the question of the agents’ involvement in paternalism on the 
estates of England. Deciphering the specifics of the agents’ role has been difficult because so 
much of their work was done verbally. Also there was no codification of what the agents’ 
education, background or even job responsibilities were, which means that the importance of 
the agent varied from estate to estate. In some examples, particularly that of the Currey 
family, who were upper middle class professionals and very involved in the routine 
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management of Devonshire’s estates, it has been suggested that paternalism was being 
institutionalised into the role of the agent and hence was transcending from the aristocracy to 
the middle classes. Yet this idea of paternalism becoming a middle class virtue is somewhat 
tested by the example of Leicester’s agents who were increasingly coming from administrative 
backgrounds and thus had less involvement in the management of the estates and less 
interaction with the estates inhabitants. Land agents have largely been understudied by 
historians of this period and it is hoped that by bringing to light the roles of the agents of 
different estates, this thesis will encourage future historiography on the topic. Only with a 
wider range of evidence could any firmly conclusive points be made about the influence of 
aristocratic paternalism upon the agents’ roles. 
 As noted earlier, this thesis has attempted to present Mutch’s idea of the 
fragmentation of rural society, as occurring much more gradually than he has accounted for. It 
is worth noting here that the author of this thesis does not believe that paternalism entirely 
diminished in this period. The agricultural depression began a series of events which placed 
paternalism and its future in crisis. It did survive this period, but in a diminished condition. 
Paternalism therefore did and perhaps still does have a legacy within British rural society. 
Indeed Keith Grieves has shown that paternalism was an important influence upon the 
enlistment of British troops in rural areas during the Great War.517 Furthermore, Howard 
Newby et al have shown that paternalism has infiltrated the middle class dominated rural 
society of the twentieth century.518 They claim that tenant farmers and smaller landowners 
have inherited the paternalism or the ‘traditional authority roles’, from the landed elites of the 
nineteenth century.519 
 It is hoped that by reasserting the importance of paternalism in the rural life of late 
nineteenth-century England, this thesis will encourage further investigation of paternalism in 
different spheres of influence within this period or in landed estates in the twentieth century. 
While this thesis has focused on large estates during the late nineteenth century, in the hope 
that this is where paternalism would be most evident, wider investigations of paternalism on 
smaller estates could be beneficial to our understanding of rural England in this period. 
Furthermore, while this thesis has focused predominantly on aristocratic paternalism in 
agriculture, the historiography could benefit from further study into industrial paternalism in 
this period. Comparisons could then be made between rural and industrial paternalism, which 
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could elucidate greater understanding of the decline of the landed interest and the 
ascendance of the industrial middle classes. This narrative could even be enhanced by 
discussions of Quaker paternalism and the ‘chocolate conscience’ of the factory owners and 
philanthropists in the Rowntree and Cadbury families.520 
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